What Determines Women's Status? Some Evidence from India, Pakistan and Thailand

by

Chander Shekhar Kochar

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SIGNED: Charde Stephen Locre

APPROVAL BY THESIS DIRECTOR

This Thesis has been approved on the dates shown below

T. Rahman — June 25, 10

Dr. Tauhidur Rahman
Associate Professor
Department of Agriculture and Resource Economics

Date

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ABSTRACT

In this study, we examine the determinants of women's status (i.e. female autonomy, acceptability of beating, and preference for son) in India, Pakistan, and Thailand. Most existing studies quantify and analyze women's status based on data from surveys that collect information on only wives or women's perception about their own status. We suggest that such focus is misleading because: (1) a wife's evaluation of her status statistically differs from her husband's evaluation of her status; and (2) while wife's attitudes towards her status are necessary conditions for her actual status, a husband's attitudes towards his wife are also deterministic of her status, particularly, in patriarchal societies. This suggests that programs and policies targeting only wives will not be very effective in improving women's status, unless these policies target husbands and others.

A variety of factors determine women's status in three countries, but there are also some common factors. While wife's age and her ability to support herself and her children are positively associated with her autonomy, the relationship between her autonomy and age is non-linear. While Muslim women are found to have less autonomy, compared to non-Muslim women, they do better in terms of son preference. On other hand, Muslim women have higher acceptability of beating in India, but lower in Pakistan. However, there is no uniform explanation as to why wife beating is acceptable across India and Pakistan. In India and Pakistan, women's years of education and work status are two common factors of son preference, hence promoting female education and labor force participation could be significant policy instruments for government and non-government organizations in reducing son preference.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

In recent decades women in developed countries have increasingly been enjoying a high quality of life with much improved socio-economic status. Unfortunately, this has not been the case in developing and underdeveloped countries, where women are mostly treated as secondary citizens of both the house and the country. Therefore, it is not surprising that some of the recent literature in sociology and economics are focused on studying the factors that help determine what affects women's status in developing countries. But before we move on to the topic at hand, first it is important to understand why the topic is an important issue, i.e. to understand the motivation behind this study.

The status of women has many direct and indirect effects on the quality and general well-being of any society. The direct effects being obvious, no society can be healthy if approximately half of the population (females) is not treated at par with the other half (males). Not only is this socially and morally wrong, one may also be tempted to say it might be the cause of much economic hardship and inefficiency. Women when given the chance have proven to be equally good doctors, lawyers, businesswomen and politicians. In denying women the right to education and better living conditions, we also end up having to choose our professionals from only half of the total labor force that might otherwise have been available. The indirect effects require somewhat more thought and insight. Numerous studies link the socio-economic status of women with diverse factors such as fertility, child survival, fetal and infant death, and allocation of resources in favor of children [Ghuman (2003); Jejeebhoy (1998); Jejeebhoy (2002); Eswaran (2002);

Hogan et al (1999); Mason (1984); Caldwell and Caldwell (1987); Dyson and Moore (1983); Thomas (1990); Strauss and Beegle (2000)]. Thus there are strong moral and economic arguments in the favor of policies and programs targeting enhancing women's status in society.

Given the importance of this topic, there have been numerous studies directly and indirectly related to empowerment of women in developing countries. Some economists have attempted to tackle the underlying issues by promoting theoretical models of the household structure and women's empowerment [Folbre (1986), Sen (1990), Manser and Brown (1980) and McElory and Horney (1981)]. Others have been successful in pin-pointing various determinants that play an important role in empowering women in developing countries. Some of the identified factors of female empowerment include labor force participation, region and religion, women's access to information from the outside world via television, women's pre-marital ownership of assets and access to credit [See, for example, Acharya and Bennett (1982), Ecevit (1991), Finlay (1989), Safa (1992), Jejeebhoy and Sathar (2001), Anderson and Eswaran (2009), Oster and Jensen (2009), Agarwal (1994), Boserup (1970), Dyson and Moore (1983), Folbre (1984) and Kabeer (1999)]. .

In this study, we build upon the previous studies, by introducing several new factors that we argue may play an important role in the empowerment of women. They include an analysis of three culturally and socially distinct countries, using three different measures of empowerment for each country, empirically studying the effects of social capital of status of women and determining the relevance of husband's perception of wife's status. As one might have noticed, the preceding studies that aimed at determining

the factors of gender empowerment focus entirely on women's evaluation of their status in the household (with exception of Jejeebhoy, 2002). In these studies, analysis is done from data sets where the questionnaire required only females to respond with no input from males/husbands. In our view, especially in rural developing countries, especially patriarchal societies, this is misleading. While it is important to focus on what a wife thinks about her status, it is equally important to understand what a husband thinks about his wife's status. The latter part becomes even more important if the husband is the head of household, making all major household decisions. In cases where the wife defers all important aspects and responsibilities of life to the husband, the wife will not be able to improve her status without the support of the husband. If government policies to empower women are based on past and current studies, then it is most likely that they are enacting policies that have a singular focus on women. Such policies may include starting a women's group where women meet and discuss their issues with one another, or by attempting to educate women of their rights and providing benefits to girl children. While there is no denying the importance of these policies, it is equally important to positively influence the husband/men towards the benefits of female empowerment. With this in mind, I attempt to determine, if indeed there is a difference between a wife's view of her own status and the husband's view of his wife's status. If there is no statistical difference then the previous studies have been spot on and all is well. On the other hand, if some statistical difference does exist, it would mean that the previous results might have been biased in their reported affects and there might be a need to re-analyze the entire situation. It would also mean that respective governments should also target their policies towards men as well as women. While ensuring that women realize their right to equality

is a necessary condition for their empowerment, the results suggest it is not sufficient, until and unless their husbands also understand the need for women empowerment.

Recently social capital has been gaining track, and there are many studies examining the effects of social capital on women's status. Caiazza and Putnam (2002) and Mayoux (2001) study the effects social capital has on the status of women. Caiazza and Putnam (2002) determine that there is a strong relationship between levels of social capital and women's status in the United States. Mayoux (2001) finds a positive relationship between micro-finance programs that build social capital and women's empowerment in Cameroon. In this study, we attempt to capture social capital and network effects by using community/village level information on aspects such as infrastructure, women's groups and communications and determine what influence they have on the status of women.

The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the relevant past studies on gender empowerment and how this thesis builds upon previous work. In the Section 3 we present data. Section 4 discusses the empirical strategy and presents basic data analysis. In Section 5, we discuss the empirical results. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.

CHAPTER TWO

PAST STUDIES

There have been many studies in the development and women literature that attempt to understand the determinants of status of women in the developing world. One important factor that many scholars have attributed towards upliftment of women is women's labor force participation. Engels (1884) was one of the earliest proponents of this theory. More recently, Acharya and Bennett (1982), Ecevit (1991), Finlay (1989) and Safa (1992) note that increased female labor force participation rate results in increased domestic decision making power and control over resources. Anderson and Eswaran (2009) argue that earned income could be more important than unearned income in empowering women. They further go on to show that it is not employment per se but employment outside their husband's farms that contributes to women's empowerment. Oster and Jensen (2009) find that introduction of cable television in India is associated with a significant decrease in the reported acceptability of domestic violence by women, decrease in son preference, increase in women's autonomy, and decrease in fertility.

Women's ownership of assets (especially pre-marital assets) and access to credit have also been identified as determinants of gender empowerment (Agarwal, 1994). In developing countries, where agriculture is still the main economic activity, ownership of land is especially effective in uplifting women's status [Boserup (1970), Dyson and Moore (1983)]. Folbre (1984) and Kabeer (1999) have documented significant relationships between pre-marital assets and women's decision making power. Hashemi et al. (1996) demonstrate the positive effect of access to credit on women's status.

In a related line of inquiry, importance of female empowerment has been

highlighted by studying its effects on well-being of children and thus the future of the country. Studies have shown that there is a strong relationship between female autonomy with fertility and child mortality. That is, increased female autonomy results in long-term reduction in fertility and higher survival rates of children [Caldwell and Caldwell (1987), Dyson and Moore (1983), Eswaran (2002), Hogan et al. (1999), Mason (1984), Ghuman (2003), Jejeebhoy (1998) and Jejeebhoy (2002),]. Similarly, it has been found that there exist significant relationship between female empowerment and allocation of resources among children. Women tend to allocate more resources towards the well-being of their children as compared to men, and therefore women's income relative to husband's income has a strong bearing on the well-being of children (Strauss et al., 2000). Thomas (1990) documents a more general result where unearned income under the control of the mother has a greater impact on the health of the family as compared to when it is under the control of the father. He found that the marginal effect for child survival probabilities was roughly twenty times greater. More recent work in this area by Gitter and Barham (2008) and Lancaster et al. (2006) suggest that this relationship is not monotonic.

Economists have also contributed significantly to literature related to household structure and female empowerment from a theoretical viewpoint. For example, Folbre (1986) and Sen (1990) among others argue that households in developing countries are better modeled as conflictual rather than atomistic (where the household is viewed as a monolithic unit, with a single decision maker). With regards to female empowerment specifically, the main contribution in literature has been through bargaining theory (Manser and Brown (1980) and McElory and Horney (1981)). The salient feature of bargaining theory is to show that women can better empower themselves by improving

their threat options. Here, threat options are indicative of their constitution in the event that bargaining breaks down. In bargaining models, under cooperative equilibrium, women will be able to improve their well-being if they are able to improve upon their threat options.

To the best of our knowledge, Ghuman et al (2004) is the only other study that attempts to determine if there is a statistical difference between husband and wife's view on wife's status. Although we use the same data set, there are some fundamental difference between the construct of their autonomy variable and the construct of our autonomy variable. Ghuman et al (2004) use only three permission related questions (freedom of movement questions according to their terminology), while we make use of nine for India and Pakistan and one for Thailand. Another major difference lies in the definition of decision making questions which is a mixture of 'wife has greatest say' and 'wife decides' in Ghuman et al (2004). In our study, the decision questions are defined as wife has at least some say in each decision making process. As a result, while their results are bound to differ from ours, they do conclude that wives and husbands offer considerably different assessments of the wife's autonomy in various domains and that the nature of these differences varies across contexts in ways that generally shown no pattern. Another major difference is that while the paper by Ghuman et al (2004) focuses only on autonomy variables, we focus on a wider range of empowerment variables such autonomy, beating acceptability and son preference.

As stated previously, while none of the above mentioned studies (except for Ghuman et al 2004), takes the husband's perspective into account, we find that they are also lacking in other avenues. Except for the study by Oster and Jensen (2009), remaining

studies tend to focus on mainly one kind of measure of female empowerment, and mostly the studies are centered on autonomy. While female autonomy is undoubtedly one of the most important issues, the factors that affect autonomy do not necessarily affect other issues related to women's empowerment such as son preference or acceptability of beating. In addition, the three criteria used in this study measure different forms of empowerment. Son preference is generally deeply rooted in society and will take at least a generation before any improvement will be observed. Also, it might be hard to observe tangible results in son preference from relatively superficial policies such as increasing cable TV viewership. Changes in attitudes towards beating acceptability or autonomy can appear faster, but they measure two distinct behaviors. Anything related to beating is an extreme form of abuse, while autonomy is more a measure of freedom. A wife could be abuse free, but with limited freedom but vice versa may also occur, or both may occur at the same time. Therefore, when studying women's empowerment, it is important to detail all three criteria and not just focus on one. Secondly, Excluding Jejeebhoy and Sathar (2002) which focuses on India and Pakistan, all of the remaining studies on the determinants of female empowerment/autonomy focus entirely on one country. Since even amongst developing countries each country is culturally and socially distinct, it is not possible to determine which factors are country specific and which factors might be more specific to say a region or a gender. Finally, none of the studies mentioned above empirically determine the effect of social capital on the status of women. We make an attempt to address all of the above mentioned issues in this thesis. First, we study three different measures of women's empowerment, namely their level of autonomy, beating acceptability and son preference and show that each measurement is distinct in its own

right. Second, we compare a wife's measure of her status with the husband's measure of his wife's status and determine whether or not the difference is statistically significant. Third we use data from three culturally, socially and historically distinct countries, namely, India, Pakistan and Thailand. India and Pakistan were both former British colonies, whereas Thailand was never colonized. India is a predominantly Hindu country, Pakistan almost entirely Islamic and Thailand is a predominantly Buddhist country. While rural India and Pakistan are predominantly patriarchal, rural Thailand is predominantly matriarchal. These differences not only allow us to identify which factors uniformly affect women in general and which factors are country specific, but the religious diversity of India and Thailand enable us to distinguish between the influence of religion and the influence of society in the three countries. Another contribution of this paper is to test the effectiveness of social capital in improving the status of women. We are also able to test the bargaining theory as our dataset contains a variable that asks the wives if they are able to support themselves if the husband is unable to do so. According to bargaining theory, this should ensure that the wife has high status given the high level of her threat option. We are also able to test the hypothesis laid out by Anderson and Eswaran (2009), as our dataset allows us to make the distinction between wives who do not work, wives who work but do not earn cash and wives that work and receive a cash payment for their efforts. Finally, another hypothesis that our data enables us to test is whether ownership of land has an effect on status as predicted by some researchers such as Agarwal (1994).

CHAPTER THREE

DATA

We use data from the Survey on the Status and Fertility of Women (SWAF)[1]. The survey, supported by the Rockefeller Foundation and the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, was conducted during 1993-94 in five South-East Asian countries of India, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia and Philippines. This survey is particularly interesting in that husband-wife couples were asked the same set of questions regarding wife's status, thereby allowing a direct comparison between husband's response and his wife's response for given questions of interest. Data related to social/network capital is available for only three countries, India, Pakistan and Thailand. Therefore, these are the three countries that we will focus on.

In India, the aim was to collect data from approximately 1600 couples residing in villages, about half from the state of Uttar Pradesh and the other half from the state of Tamil Nadu. From within each state, about half the respondents were selected from more developed districts, while the remaining half was selected from less developed districts. Also, the respondents were chosen such that approximately half were Muslims and the other half were Hindus. Amongst Hindus, an attempt was made to oversample the castes that were numerically smaller. In each site, the survey covered 100 ERs (eligible respondents, i.e. wife) from the numerically dominant caste and 50 each from "upper" and "lower" castes residing in that area, respectively. Once the district and sub-district had been finalized, villages were chosen such that they met the criteria of 200 Muslim, 100 dominant Hindu caste, 50 other upper castes and 50 lower castes. At times,

[1] http://www.pop.upenn.edu/swaf

contiguous villages were merged into clusters of roughly 1000-2000 households, in a way that would allow for adequate representation of the different groups in our design. As a result, in Tamil Nadu, where there are generally few Muslims, clusters of villages were much larger than in Uttar Pradesh where Muslims represent a substantial proportion of the population. The cluster included in the sample was then selected randomly. Male interviewers interviewed the husband. Interviews were done according to the availability of the husband, so they were sometimes conducted simultaneously (with husband and wife interviews going on in separate places, at least out of hearing distance of each other); or at a different time and place. For the community questionnaire, the respondent was conditioned on the question being asked. In general, such interviewees include people such as block development officers, village leaders, agriculture, education and health department employees, NGOs if any, private doctors etc.

In Pakistan, data was primarily collected in the state of Punjab which in 1993-94 comprised of over 52% of the country's population and over 56% of its geographical area. Within Punjab, grids were made based on agro-ecological zones, geographical and administrative dimensions and linguistic divides. The state can be divided into three distinct agro-ecological zones, north (Northern Barani Belt), central and south. The Northern Barani Belt in the north is an agrarian region where the local population depends upon rain water for cultivation and hence output depends on rainfall. The main crops are wheat, bajra (Pearl millet) and maize (corn). The literacy levels here are generally high and the main languages are Hindko, Potohari and Punjabi. The central zone is the most developed of the three with vegetables, rice and wheat being the main agricultural products. Punjabi is the main language in this zone. The south zone is in the

cotton growing belt and about half the population speaks Seraiki. Eventually 10 sites were chosen from amongst the different zones and approximately 100 women were interviewed from each site. Unfortunately, the number of husbands interviewed is much less, somewhere in the tune of 400. The primary sampling units (PSUs) in Pakistan consist of villages, union council areas or mauzas. The PSUs were selected such that they contain 2500-5000 individuals and therefore about 400-700 households.

In Thailand, the country was divided into 6 domains: 4 rural domains consisting of the North, Northeast, Central and South regions of the country, Bangkok Metropolitan and other provincial urban areas. The SWAF sample is a sub-sample of the Thai Demographic and Health Survey (TDHS). The sample was designed so that approximately equal number of households would be interviewed from each domain. The survey was conducted by Institute of Population Studies, Chulalongkorn University. Overall, 4898 households, 2,800 currently married women aged 15-44 and 1,475 husbands were interviewed.

Related publications that also used the SWAF dataset are Jejeebhoy (1998), Jejeebhoy (2002), Jejeebhoy and Sathar (2001), Ghuman (2003) and Ghuman et al (2004).

CHAPTER FOUR

EMPERICAL STRATEGY

4.1 Measuring Women's Status

Measures of women's status can be broadly classified into two groups: attitudinal and behavioral [Oster and Jensen, 2009].

Preference for sons and acceptability of beating are two commonly used attitudinal measures found in literature. Different approaches have been used to measure son preference. For example Oster and Jensen (2009) measures son preference as a binary variable based on the response of the question " Would you like your next child to be a boy, girl or it does not matter?" where son preference is defined as wanting the next child to be son. Whereas Roy (2009) defines son preference as a ratio of ideal number of boys subtracted from ideal number of girls divided by ideal number of total children. I believe the measure used by Oster might impart incorrect information because the measure does not take into account any historical information regarding number and gender of children already present. For example, a couple might desire only two children, a boy and a girl (this assumption would be valid almost anywhere in the world). If the couple already has a girl, the response to the question about the preferred gender of the next child would be that they want a son. This would be interpreted by Oster and Jensen as son preference, where as clearly this is an incorrect assumption. Therefore, the structure of the variable used to measure son preference in our study is more in similar with the one used by Roy than the one used by Oster and Jensen. In order to measure son preference we first create a ratio of total number of sons desired divided by total number of children desired. Total number of sons desired was calculated as total number of sons alive, living either at home

or away, plus total number of more sons wanted. Total number of children desired was calculated in a similar manner by substituting son(s) with all children (son(s) + daughter(s)). We then observed that in many cases (especially among couple who have yet to have a child) that either the denominator or numerator or both have terms such as, up to god or don't care, making the ratio unviable numerically. What is clear though is that in such instances there is no strong son bias, especially when the term in the denominator is not strictly a numerical value. Finally the variable to measure son preference was created as a binary variable, which took on the value of 1 (indicating son preference) if the above defined ratio was greater than 0.5 and 0 (indicating all other possibilities such as girl preference or unbiased) otherwise. An argument can be made that this measure too can impart incorrect information. For example, what if a family already has three girls and even though they want a son badly, they cannot afford the costs to have another child. In order to answer this question, one needs to remember the context in which the measure was created and the context of the society it was created in. The ratio of total number of sons desired by total number of children desired taken in context of rural Southeast Asia results in a well defined variable. We can say this with a certain level of confidence because, (a) female child infanticide pre (selective abortion) or post birth is rampant in many parts of India and Southeast Asia, so the fact that 3 girls are still alive can be construed as strong indicator that there is no strong bias against females, and, (b) the concept of family planning and small family size does not necessarily exist in rural India (Southeast Asia). It is not uncommon for a couple to keep on having children till they finally have at least 1 son. Therefore the idea of keeping to a small family size, irrespective of number of daughters would again indicate an unbiased

view towards female child.

In order to measure acceptability towards beating (domestic violence), couples were asked: "Would husband be justified in beating wife if she: Was disrespectful to his parents or other senior members of his family; neglected household chores; was disobedient or did not follow his orders; was a drunkard or drug addict; beat the children frequently." The response to each question was coded as a 1 if the answer was no and as a 0 if the answer was yes (for this section and all subsequent sections, any (binary) response indicating higher empowerment for women is coded with a higher (1) value). The overall measure was obtained by taking the average of the response to the above five questions, with a higher values indicating lower acceptability towards beating. A one would indicate that beating is not at all acceptable, where as a zero would indicate beating is fully acceptable. Note that this variable does not exist for Thailand.

The behavioral measure employed is this study is level of autonomy. Level of autonomy itself is a function of decision-making abilities and permission requirements. To measure decision-making abilities, couples were asked: "Does wife have a say in: whether to purchase major goods for the household such as a TV; whether or not she should work outside the home; how many children to have; whether to punish children for misbehaving; deciding what to do when child falls sick; deciding how much schooling to give to your children; what kind of school to send children to." The response to each question was coded as a 1 if the wife had at least some say in the decision making process, else it was coded to a 0. To measure amount of permission required, couples were asked: "Do you have to ask your husband or a senior family member for permission to go to: Any place outside your compound; the local market; the local health center;

fields outside the village; a community center in the village; the home of relatives or friends in the village; a nearby fair; a nearby shrine (temple/mosque); the next village." The response to each question was coded as a 1 if the wife was not required to take permission; else it was coded as a 0. Finally couples were asked: "If the wife wanted to buy a small item of jewelry/clothes, would she feel free to do it without consulting your husband or a senior member of your family?" The response to the question was coded as a 1 if the wife was free to spend the money as she desired else it was coded as a 0. Note, for Thailand we have only 1 permission question, relating to whether or not the wife needs to take permission before leaving the house.

4.2 Econometric Models

We begin by estimating the following regression model for each of the three countries separately:

$$y_i = \alpha + \beta \mathbf{x}_i + \varepsilon_i \qquad (1)$$

where y_i denotes status of woman (i.e. autonomy, or non-acceptability of beating, or preference for son) i, in a country (India, or Pakistan, or Thailand) ε_i denotes the stochastic error and $\mathbf{x}_i$ is the vector of possible explanatory variables, consisting of wife's characteristics. This vector includes age, age square, a dummy for land ownership, a dummy for having lived in a city/town before marriage, years of education for wife, individual dummies if wife has read a newspaper, listened to radio or watched TV within the previous week, dummy for educated father, dummy for educated mother, dummy for wife who is able to take care of herself and her children if the husband is unable to, religion dummies, a dummy for people belonging to scheduled caste or scheduled tribes

(these are people that historically belong to the lowest castes in India and therefore this variable exists for India only), a dummy if wife works and earns cash, a dummy if wife works but does not earn cash (earns in kind), a dummy for wife that does not work and finally a dummy if wife was interviewed alone. Please refer to Appendix B for appropriate abbreviations and definitions.

Age is generally thought to be an important and fundamental factor in determining the status of women. As women have more children, especially sons their status is seen to improve, partly because as the children grow up they do not allow other family members to mistreat their mothers and partly because they attain more seniority in the household after their in-laws pass away. However, the relationship between a women's status and her age might be non-linear, and therefore, in order to account for this non-linear relationship, we include "Age square" variable. The relationship could be non-linear partly because after some years the wife's son (if any) will also bring home a wife. Then as time progresses, if the son is the sole bread earning member of the household, the importance of the son's wife will grow and that of the mother will wane. Therefore we expect age square to have a negative influence since the status of the wife will initially increase with time and then eventually as the son gets more involved with his own family, her status and influence will decrease. OwnLand records whether or not the wife has land in her own name. As stated earlier, numerous studies have suggested that in agrarian societies ownership of land provides women immense bargaining power which in turn allows them a better quality of life. City determines whether or not the wife had ever lived in a town/city before marriage. The idea behind this variable is that having lived in a town/city would have given the wife an opportunity to exposure with the

modern lifestyle of city life either through firsthand experience or through TV/movies. YrsEdu measures the years of education of the wife, the thought being that more educated the wife is, more aware she would be of her rights and better the chances that she would have better status. Newspaper, radio and TV measure the wife's access to information and knowledge. We differentiated them into three separate categories as it is possible that all three have distinct effects on women and their families. Only an educated wife would be able to read a newspaper, whereas anyone with access to a TV or radio can take advantage of those two. Also, the information content from the three media sources are distinct, radio is used mainly for songs and news, newspaper is mostly a serious source of entertainment, while TV provides a visual escape from the reality of hard rural life. FatherEdu and MotherEdu determine if the father and mother of the wife had any kind of education. The idea being that if the parents are educated, they are more sensitive and aware about the rights of their daughters and not that easily bowed down by social pressure. This in turn makes the wife's threat to leave her husband and return to her parent's home when abused more credible. The religion based dummies allow us to determine the composition of our sample and compare other religions with the reference religion. For India, Hinduism was chosen to be the reference religion, for Thailand, Buddhism was chosen as the reference religion, while for Pakistan, we made a dummy consisting of all non Islamic religions. We did this for Pakistan, since the majority of the Pakistani sample is Islamic (99%). Dummy SC_ST is only valid only for India where the caste system is still present and SC/ST stands for Scheduled Caste/ Scheduled Tribe, i.e. this is a flag for the backward caste people in the sample. The general thinking is that women from backward castes might have lower status since they generally come from

poorer, more repressed sections of society. The next three dummy variables divide the sample into three mutually exclusive parts. WorkCash takes on the value of one if the wife works and earns cash for that work. WorkNoCash takes on the value of one if the wife works, but earns in kind for the work she performs. The final category NoWork takes on the value of one if the wife does not work at all. The idea behind this categorization lies in the studies that suggest that the status of women in a household depends on the kind of income she brings back to the household. While most previous studies make a distinction between only working women, we expand the possibilities and include the third category of non-working women.

We then proceed with the following estimation:

$$y_i = \alpha + \beta \mathbf{x}_i + \gamma \mathbf{w}_i + \varepsilon_i \qquad (2)$$

where y_i , $\mathbf{x}_i$, and ε_i retain their previous definitions and $\mathbf{w}_i$ denotes a vector of household characteristics. This vector includes household annual income, and dummies to indicate if someone in the household owns either a radio or TV respectively. Please refer to Appendix B for appropriate abbreviations and definitions.

Annual household income is an important variable since the general belief is that wealthier households generally treat women better. This may possibly be because they might not require a son to look after them or financially support them when they get old or they might be better educated and therefore have a weaker bias towards sons. The latter two variables can serve several purposes. First, owning a radio or a TV increases the possibility of experiencing either one of them first hand. Another use of these variables is that they can possibly be used as a proxy for wealth, especially TV which was considerably expensive in those times. Finally ownership also increases the chance

that other household members, especially the ones either too young or too old to frequent community centers away from home have access to outside information and a source to gain knowledge from.

We then proceed with the following estimation:

$$y_i = \alpha + \beta \mathbf{x}_i + \gamma \mathbf{w}_i + \mu \mathbf{z}_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (3)$$

where y_i , $\mathbf{x}_i$, $\mathbf{w}_i$ and ε_i retain their previous definitions and $\mathbf{z}_i$ denotes a vector of husband characteristics. This vector includes husband's age and husband's years of education. The logic behind age is that as the husband spends more and more time with his wife and as they have children together, the husband is bound to grow closer and thus treat his wife better. The logic behind including his years of education is that a more educated husband is more likely to acknowledge the rights of his wife and more likely to treat her better.

Next we proceed with the following estimation:

$$y_i = \alpha + \beta \mathbf{x}_i + \gamma \mathbf{w}_i + \mu \mathbf{z}_i + \lambda \mathbf{k}_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (4)$$

where y_i , $\mathbf{x}_i$, $\mathbf{w}_i$, $\mathbf{z}_i$ and ε_i retain their previous definitions and $\mathbf{k}_i$ denotes a vector of community characteristics. The idea behind community characteristics is to measure how social capital affects the status of women. Recently, a lot of studies have focused on the benefits of social capital in the health and welfare of society. In this study we make an attempt to see how social capital affects the status of women in developing countries. The first one, FPAbort is used to determine whether or not abortion is available as a possible method of family planning. Given the problems India has with female child infanticide, many due to abortions, we suspect that this variable might negatively affect the status of women. WmnTechr is used to determine if there is at least one female teacher in the village. The thinking is that if at least one female teacher is present, she would be a role

model for other women in the village and they possibly strive for more freedom and education. Also, a female teacher might be able to better convince parents to send their daughters to school and have other social benefits, so we predict this indicator to have a positive effect on female status. The third variable, NearCity measures the distance to the nearest city in kilometers. The closer a village is to a city, the faster facilities like TV, roads and electricity arrive. It also allows for migration of workers to the city. Both of the previous two points allow for faster migration and integration of urban thinking and therefore equality. Thus, closer the village is to a city, better the status of women is what we expect to find. TVComm and SatComm determine the availability of TV and Satellite dish in the village community. As stated earlier, TVs were expensive commodities at that point of time and it was not possible for most poor people to own a TV set. These variables enable us to determine that the villagers had access to TV, regardless of whether or not they themselves owned a TV set. It can also be used a measure of the development of the village. Finally WomGrp determines if there is a women's group in the village. The thinking is that, if such groups are present, it allows women to unite and discuss issues as well as act as a forum to promote new ideas and thoughts. As a result, the presence of women's group in a village would generally result in their better status, or so we think.

Finally we proceed with the following estimation:

$$y_i = \alpha + \beta \mathbf{x}_i + \gamma \mathbf{w}_i + \mu \mathbf{z}_i + \lambda \mathbf{k}_i + \nu \mathbf{c}_i + \varepsilon_i \qquad (5)$$

where y_i, $\mathbf{x}_i$, $\mathbf{w}_i$, $\mathbf{z}_i$, $\mathbf{k}_i$ and ε_i retain their previous definitions and $\mathbf{c}_i$ denotes a vector of control variables. This vector consists of an InterviewAlone variable and set of regional dummies based at either the state, village or directional (North, South, East, West) level.

InterviewAlone is a binary variable that takes on the value of one if the wife was interviewed alone and no third person was present. The idea here is that a wife might alter some of her responses to better match the ideal answers in the presence of a third person.

In a couple of models, we attempt to measure the effect of education/information by removing all indirect sources of information such as City, newspaper, radio, TV, FatherEdu and MotherEdu.

Since both autonomy and non-acceptability measures of women's status are continuous variables, taking values between [0, 1], linear regression models are estimated. On the other hand, since son preference is a binary choice variable, we estimate non-linear probit models.

Given that our data is cross-sectional, it is natural to expect heteroscedasticity. We attempt to tackle this problem by calculating robust standard errors. Also, in the case of Pakistan it is not possible to include both community level characteristics and village dummies as it will cause multicollinearity since both types of variables are at the village level. Data from India and Pakistan is from rural areas, whereas Thailand data is from both rural and urban (Bangkok) areas. Therefore, by default we always include a Bangkok dummy in all Thailand regression. This allows us to separate the urban influence from the regression results. We also expect to capture a considerable portion of the unobservable community level variations by the community level characteristics and/or regional dummies.

4.3 Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 shows the average values given by the wives in India, Pakistan and Thailand on their perceived status. The table is divided into four distinct divisions. The first set of questions corresponds to decision making abilities, the second set of questions corresponds to permission requirements, and then there is a question on financial autonomy, a set of questions on beating acceptability and finally the measure on son preference. For the decision making questions, we see that only about 29% of the women in India report that they have some say in purchasing major household items such as a TV. This is the only measure in India where less that 50% of the women report having some say in the decision making process. 86% of the women in India respond that they have at least some say in punishing the children when they misbehave. Total number of children to have is the only other measure where over 80% of the women in India have some say in the decision making process. A little over 77% of the women report having some say in what to do when children fall sick, almost 63% of the women report having some say in whether she should work outside the house and almost 62% of the women report having some say how much schooling to give to the children. What kind of school to send their children to is the second lowest decision making category for wives in India, with 58% of them reporting in the positive.

For Pakistan we note again that their lowest reported score is in the household decision making category, with only 16.5% of them reporting that they have at least some say in purchasing major household items. None of the decision making categories in Pakistan is able to reach the 80% mark, with a little over 71% saying they have at least some say in punishing children when they misbehave, being the highest reported category. 65% of the women in Pakistan report they have some say in the total number of

children to have and almost 64% report they have some say in what to do when the children fall sick. A little over 53% report they have some say in how much schooling to give to their children and almost 50% have a say in what kind of school their children should be sent to. Only about 38.5% report they have some say in whether or not they can work outside the house. In general we note that women in Pakistan have lower decision making abilities for all seven categories as compared to women in India. The largest gap amongst the women in the two countries is when deciding where to work, and the smallest gap is when deciding what kind of school to send their children to.

In Thailand, almost 90% of the women report having at least some say in total number of children to have. The category in which women have the least say is what kind of school to send the children to, even then almost 56.5% of the women report having some say. A little over 83% have some say in what to do when the children fall sick and 82% have some say in where they can work. A little over 78% of the women report having some say in how to punish children when they misbehave and almost 78% have a say in making major household purchasing decisions. 65% have a say in how much schooling to give to the children. It is pretty obvious that women in Thailand rank much higher than both women in India and Pakistan when it comes to their ability to participate in household decision making process.

The next set of questions pertains to permission requirements. As a reminder, the variables were coded as one when permission was not required and coded as zero when permission was required. For India, the mean varies from somewhere as high as 77% of the women reporting they do not need to ask for permission before leaving the compound to as low as only 12% of the women stating that they do not need to ask for permission

when going to the local fair. Surprisingly, almost 54% of the women report that they do not require permission when going to a neighboring village. After this, 48.5% of the women report not needing to ask for permission to go to the local market and almost 40% do not need to ask for permission when visiting a friend or relative. Almost 30.5% do not need to ask for permission when visiting the local healthcare clinic and almost 21.5% of the women report not having to ask for permission when visiting fields outside the village or to visit a place of worship. Finally, just a little over 17% of the women report that they are free to visit a community health center.

For Pakistan, the range of values varies from 88% of the women reporting not requiring permission to go to the next village, to as low as only about 12% of the women reporting they can go to a nearby place of worship with requiring to ask for permission. About 30% of the women report not having to ask for permission before leaving the family compound or to visit the fields outside the village and a little over 29% do not need to ask for permission when visiting a friend or relative. Almost 21% of the women report they are free to go to the local market without having to take permission first and almost 17% are free to visit a local health center without first having to ask for permission. A little over 15% of the women are free to visit the local community center without having to take permission first and a little over 12% can go to a nearby fair without taking permission. With the exception of visiting a nearby village, we note that a greater number of women in Pakistan almost always require to ask for permission than in India. It is also interesting to note that in India, women have the least amount of freedom when visiting a local fair, whereas in Pakistan the least amount of restriction is when visiting a place of worship.

For Thailand there was only one general question related to permission and questions related to specific activities were not asked. We see from the table that in Thailand, about 44% of the women can leave the house without having to ask for permission.

The next question measures financial freedom of the wives. Women in Thailand have the highest measure of financial freedom with 88.5% of them reporting they have the freedom to buy clothes/jewelry for themselves without having to consult with their family members. Pakistan comes in second, with 39% of the women reporting financial freedom and India is last with only 29.5% of the women reporting financial freedom.

In the fourth set of questions, respondents were asked whether or not beating was acceptable under different circumstances. These questions were not asked in Thailand, thus the empty space. As a reminder, the answers were coded as one when beating was not acceptable and one when they responded that beating was acceptable. For India 80% of the respondents feel beating is not acceptable when they hit the children but as few as 21% think beating is not acceptable when they get drunk. 59% of the women don't think beating is acceptable if she was disrespectful to husband or his parents, almost 48% of the women think beating is not acceptable if she does not do her household work appropriately, while almost 35.5% feel that beating is not acceptable if she is disobedient. For Pakistan, the values range from a maximum of 57.5% women agreeing that beating is not acceptable if they beat their children to as low as 24% of them agreeing that beating is not acceptable if they are alcoholics or drug addicts. A little over 45% of the women feel that beating is not acceptable if they disrespect their husbands/his parents or if they do not complete their household chores appropriately. Almost 33% of the women feel

beating is not justified when they are disobedient towards their husbands. We note that in four out of the possible five scenarios, women in Pakistan find beating to be more acceptable that women in India. Except for a couple of cases, generally the differences are not significantly large, unlike in the decision making questions.

The final question relates to son preference. As a reminder the variable was coded as one if we could find sufficient evidence of strong son bias and coded a zero otherwise. Therefore, a zero would indicate all other scenarios such as daughter bias or no preference. We see from the results that about 38% of the respondents in India seem to indicate a strong son bias; where as 48% of the women seem to indicate a strong son bias and 30.5% of the women in Thailand seem to indicate a strong son bias.

Table 2 depicts the same variables as Table 1, except that the values now indicate the husband's evaluation of their wife's status. For India the values range from as high as 90% of the men responding that their wives has some say in how many children to have and punishing the children to as low as 50% of the men responding that their wives have some say in purchasing major household goods such as a TV. Almost 72% of the men think that their wives have some say in where they while more than 80% of the men think their wives have some in the remaining three categories, i.e. what to do when child falls sick, how much schooling to give to children and what kind of school to send the children to. For Pakistan the values range from a maximum of about 35% of the men responding that their wives have at least some say in punishing children when they misbehave to less than 1% of men reporting that their wives have some say in deciding how much schooling to give to their children and what kind of schools their children should be sent to. About 17% of the men think their wives have some say in deciding where they work

and about 13% of think their wives have some say deciding what to do when children fall ill. Only 2.7% of the men think their wives have a say when purchasing major household goods and less than 1% feel their wives have a say in how many children the couple should have. For Thailand, the men were not asked if they thought the wife had any say whether or not she should work outside the house, as a result there is a blank for that entry. Like India, there seems to be a certain level of consistency in the husband's response. For the first four questions, about 70%-80% of the husband's thought their wives had some say in the respective decision making process. For the last two question, pertaining to level of schooling and amount of school, about 55% of the husbands thought their wives had a say. It appears that husbands in India seem to rate the decision making abilities of their wives more than husbands in Pakistan and Thailand, the values are in particular, very low for Pakistan.

The next set of questions pertains to permission requirements. As a reminder, the variable was coded as one is the husband thought the wife need not take permission for the activity in question and the variable was coded zero otherwise. For India, the values range from a high of 86% of the men reporting their wives need not ask for permission when leaving the compound to as low as 15% of the men reporting their wives need to ask for permission when visiting the local fair. Among the higher values, about 69% of the men report their wives need not take permission when visiting a nearby village, and more than 50% of the men report that their need not take permission when either visiting a friend's/relative's house or visiting the local market. About 47% of the men report that their wives need not ask for permission when visiting a place of worship and 37% report so when their wives go to a local healthcare clinic. Towards the lower end of the scale,

about 27% report that their wives need to ask for permission either when going to the fields outside the village or when visiting the local community center. For Pakistan the values range from about 62% at the higher end where men report that their wives need to take permission when visiting a friend/relative to about 9.5% of them reporting that their wives need not ask for permission when visiting a nearby village. Other responses on the higher side include about 50% of them reporting no permission is required when leaving the family compound, 41.5% reporting no permission is necessary when visiting the fields outside the village, about 37% of them reporting their wives need not take permission when going to the local market and 33% think their wives need not take permission when visiting the local healthcare clinic. Towards the lower end of the spectrum, about 19% report their wives do not need to take permission when going to the local community center, 12% report their wives do not need to take permission when visiting a place of worship and 10% report their wives are free to go to a local fair without having to first ask for permission. A comparison between India and Pakistan shows that women in Pakistan have more freedom to visit the fields outside the village and visit a family/relative's place; whereas women in India have more freedom for the remaining seven categories. As was in the previous case, there is only one permission related question for Thailand and about 39% of the men report their wives need not ask for permission when they leave the house.

The next question pertains to financial freedom. 34.5% of the men in India report that their wives are free to buy jewelry/clothes without having to consult them, 26.5% report the same in Pakistan and almost 55% of the men report so in Thailand.

The next set of questions considers different circumstances under which the

husband thinks beating might or might not be acceptable. As a reminder, each variable was coded as a one if the husband thought beating was not acceptable and zero if he thought beating was acceptable. No data was available from Thailand as these questions were not asked there. In India, the general trend seems to be that most husbands find beating unacceptable, except in the case when the wife is an alcoholic/drug addict, where only 55% of the husbands think beating is not acceptable. About 81% think beating is not justified if the wife is disobedient and more then 90% think beating is not justified if the wife is disrespectful, does not do her household chores or if she hits the children. We find a little more variability in the responses for Pakistan. Towards the upper end, 83.5% of the husbands think beating is not acceptable if the wife hits the children and 70% of them think beating is not justified if the wife does not do her household chores. Towards the lower end of the spectrum, 43.5% of the men think beating is not acceptable if the wife is disrespectful, 36% feel beating is not justified if the wife is an alcoholic/drug addict and 34% feel beating is not acceptable if the wife is disobedient.

The final question pertains to son preference, and as discussed earlier, the variable was coded as one only if the husband portrayed a strong son preference and everything else was coded as zero. 40.5% in India, 46.5% in Pakistan and 33% of the husbands in Thailand portray a strong son preference.

4.4 Test of Means

Table 3 depicts the discrepancy between wife's and husband's evaluation of wife's status. Going by the standard literature available, the only way current results would hold valid is if the discrepancy is not significant. If on the other hand the

discrepancy is significant, not only would it indicate that results from most previous studies might be biased, but also that policy makers might have missed a potentially important target in their quest for a more equable society. We notice that the difference between wife's response and husband's response is almost always strongly significant for all measures. The only measure where the difference is not significant is for son preference. We also note that wife's evaluation of her status is always lower than the husband's evaluation of wife's status. Therefore, either the wife is under-reporting her status or the husband is over-reporting wife's status, or there might be a bit of both happening. While, it is nearly impossible to detect on which side the error lies, what we can say with certainty is that there is a significant difference in the two measures and simply focusing on the wives' self reported status may lead to misleading results.

Table 4 depicts the results for Pakistan. Here we note some more variability in the results as compared to India. For one, we note that while the difference with regard to decision making questions is always significant, unlike India, the difference is always positive. This, it seems is not so much because women in Pakistan over-estimate their own more status, but instead because men in Pakistan seem to report really low values. Difference becomes negative again after that and we find that it is not significant in a few situations related to permission requirements. In the situations where the difference is not significant, we notice that both husband and wife seem to report relatively low values. Over all though the difference in two of the three main categories remains significant as was the case in India. Again, in Pakistan, we note that the difference in son preference is not significant.

Table 5 depicts the same results for Thailand, for the limited variables that we

were able to collect data for. We notice that except for in a couple of situations (the first regarding purchasing of major household items and the second regarding type of school for children) the differences with respect to autonomy variables are always significant. We also note that the differences almost always tend to be positive for these variables. Therefore, for three different countries, each with a different cultural and social setup we notice different patterns, but the final outcome always seems to be the same, that there is a significant difference between wife's perception of her status and husband's perception of wife's status. Also, Thailand is the only country of the three countries where the difference in son preference is significant. We notice that husbands have a stronger son preference in both India and Thailand, while it is almost the same in Pakistan, but the difference is significant only in Thailand.

In Table 6, we attempt to determine discrepancy between husband's and wife's response based on religion. One main motivation of this table was to determine how strong of an effect religion plays and how strong of an effect the social structure of a country has on its citizens. In particular, we noticed that the differences in husbands and wives response for decision making questions were polar opposites when comparing India vs Pakistan. In India the difference was always negative, in Pakistan, the difference was always positive, now we can test how strong of an effect religion plays. In India, we notice that the difference is always negative and significant, irrespective of the religion. In general, Muslim couples tend to report lower status measures than Hindus in India, but nevertheless, the husbands always give higher values than wives. Thus we can say that to some extent Muslims in India behave differently from Muslims in Pakistan. Since the common religion cannot be the reason for this difference, one possible explanation could

be the social setup of a country has a strong influence on religion and the social structure in India is very different from that of Pakistan.

In Table 7, we attempt to again distinguish the responses based on religion for Thailand. We did not make a similar table for Pakistan as 99% of the population in Pakistan in Muslim. In Thailand, we notice that for Inter-racial and Christian couples, the difference is never significant, which we suspect is partially because the sample size is very small. Among Buddhists and Muslims, the pattern remains the same, with the difference being positive and mostly significant. We also note that there is not much of a difference between the response of Muslims and Buddhists in Thailand, thereby providing further evidence that many the social setup of a country has a strong influence over religion.

Table 8 is similar to the previous two tables, but here we show the difference between husband's and wife's perspective based on religion for the main categories that we have information on. Irrespective of religion, we note that mostly the patterns remain the same in both countries.

4.5 Cumulative Statistics

Table 9 was created by summing up the coded response to each set of questions. In India for decision questions, the mode value is 6, i.e. 24.5% of the women report that they have some say in six out seven decision making scenarios. 38 or 2% of the women in India have no say in any decision making scenario and 325 or almost 18% of the women report that they have a say in all seven household decision making scenarios. For Pakistan the mode value is 4, i.e. 16% of the women have a say in four out seven decision making questions. 87 or 8.4% of the women have no say in any of the decision making

scenarios while 74 or 7% of the women have a say in all seven of the decision making scenarios. In Thailand the mode value is also 6, i.e. 32% of the women have a say in six out of seven decision making scenarios. Only 8, or 0.3% of the women have no say at all in any of the seven decision making scenarios, where as 695 or about 25% have a say in all seven decision making scenarios. For permission questions in India, the mode value is 0, i.e. 406 or 22% of the women report that they have to ask for permission in all nine cases and zero women report that they never have to ask for permission. Only 60 or about 3.3% of the women do not have to ask for permission in eight out of nine cases, i.e. for each wife in India, there is at least one situation where she has to take permission. For Pakistan as well the mode value is 0, i.e. 516 or almost 50% of the women report that they have to ask for permission in all nine cases, but 37 or about 3.6% of the women report that they do not have to ask for any permission at all. We do not have similar statistic for women in Thailand as only one permission question was asked of them. In the case of beating acceptability in India the mode value is 1, i.e. 408 women or about 22.2% of the women report that beat is not acceptable in only one situation. 291 women, or 15.8% of the sample believe that beating is acceptable in all five scenarios and 294 or about 16% of the women report that beating is never acceptable. In Pakistan the mode value is zero, i.e. 290 women or about 28% of the sample report that beating is acceptable in all five scenarios and 177 women, or about 17.1% of the sample report that beating is never acceptable.

Table 10 was created in the same manner as Table 9, only in this table we sum up the husband's view regarding wife's status for each set of questions. In India, for decision making questions, surprisingly the mode value is seven, i.e. 565 men or about

34% of the sample believes that their wives have a say in all seven decision making scenarios, while only 13 men or about 0.8% of the sample believe that their wives have no say in any of the decision making scenarios. In Pakistan we see the complete opposite, where the mode value is zero, i.e. 286 men or about 60.3% of the sample report that they believe their haves have no say in any of the decision making process, while no husbands believes that their wife has say in five or more cases. Only one husband thinks that his wife has a say in four out of the seven decision making scenarios. In Thailand, the husbands were asked only 6 questions so there is no value for Decision Sum equal to seven. The mode value is 6, i.e. 395 husbands or about 26.8% of the husbands believe that their wives have a say in all six decision making scenarios, where as only 30 or about 2% of the husbands report that their wives have no say in any of the decision making scenarios. In India, for permission related questions the mode value is 1, i.e. 390 men, or about 23.5% of the men report that there is only one situation where their wife need not ask for permission. 223 men, or about 13.4% of the men believe that their wives need to ask for permission in all nine scenarios and only 61 or about 3.7% of the believe that their wives need not ask for any kind of permission at all. In Pakistan, the mode value is 0, i.e. 127 men or about 26.8% of the men believe that their wives need to ask for permission in all nine situations; whereas only ten or about 2.1% of the men believe that their wives need not ask for any permission at all. In India, with regards to beating acceptability, the mode value is 5, i.e. 823 men or about 49.6% of the men believe that beating is not acceptable under any circumstance and only 13 or about 0.8% of the men believe that beating is acceptable under all five scenarios. For Pakistan, the mode value is two, i.e. 98 men or about 20.7% of the men believe that beating is not acceptable in two out of the

five possible cases, 45 or 9.5% of the men report that beating is acceptable in all five cases and 92 or about 19.4% of the men believe that beating is not acceptable under any of the five circumstances.

4.6 Potential Explanatory Variables

Tables 11, 12 and 13 provide an overview of the possible determinants of the status of women, which have been divided into four main categories: wife's characteristics, household characteristics, community characteristics and finally husband's characteristics.

The first variable under wife's characteristics is age. A quick look shows that for all three countries the maximum age is 40 years and the minimum age is 15 years. This ensures that the women are old enough to bear children, but generally young enough that they aren't they aren't the second generation of the family. The second variable records whether or not the wife has land in her own name. It is not surprising to see that almost 36% of the women in Thailand own land since usually the youngest daughter stays at home with her parents and inherits the property. Land ownership is much lower in India and Pakistan at 5.3% and 3.5% respectively. City determines whether or not the wife had ever lived in a town/city before marriage. While only a little over 21% of the wives from India and Pakistan ever lived in a city before marriage, almost 47% of the wives in Thailand had lived in a city before marriage. The average number of years of education is highest in Thailand with a little over 6 years of education, India comes in second with about 2.65 years of education and Pakistan is last, where on average a wife has 1 year of education. While 30.75% of the women in Thailand had read a newspaper in the last week, only 6.7% of the women in India and 1.5% of the women in Pakistan had read a

newspaper in the last week. In terms of having listened to radio, Thailand and India are close to one another with 48.5% and 41% respectively, while only 12% of the women in Pakistan had listened in the last one week. 68% of the women in Thailand, 29% in Pakistan and 25% of the women in India had watched TV in the last one week. 68% of the women in Thailand, 45.5% in India and 32% of the women in Pakistan have fathers with some kind of education whereas 65% of the women in Thailand, 14% in India and 3.5% of the women in Pakistan have mothers with some kind of education. This shows how wide the disparity between men and women was in India and Pakistan a generation ago and how small it was in Thailand. While 77% of the women in Thailand were self sufficient, 61% of the women in Pakistan and only 42% of the women in India were self sufficient. Pakistan is a predominantly Muslim society with over 99% reporting to be Muslims. The Indian sample is a bit more diverse with 52.5% of the women reporting to be Muslims, 47.5% reporting they are Hindus and one respondent reporting to be a Christian. In Thailand, almost 91% of the women are Buddhist; a little over 8% of the women report being Muslims and the rest are Christians. While almost 91% of the women in Thailand work for cash, almost 32% of the women in Pakistan and only about 26% of the women in India work for cash. About 48% of the women in Pakistan, 36.5% in India and only about 2.5% of the women in Thailand work for kind. Almost 38% of the women in India, 20% in Pakistan and about 7% of the women in Thailand do not work. In terms of interviewing the women alone, India has the highest number with 50%, while only 28% and 18% of the women in Thailand and Pakistan were interviewed alone. Among the household characteristics, while it is hard to compare annual household income for the three countries, 72% and 79% of the women in Thailand, 32% and 25.5%

in Pakistan and 46% and 15% of the women in India report that someone in the households owns a radio and a TV respectively.

We do not report community characteristics for Thailand as we were unsuccessful in matching the communities with individuals. For Pakistan, we see that only two of the community variables NearCity and TVComm have any meaningful numbers. The mean distance from the nearest city is 18.5 km with the nearest being 3 km and the farthest 45km. About 92.5% of the villages reportedly have TV facilities and every village reports to having at least one female teacher. India provides a little more information in this regard. 23% of the villages report having abortion clinics as means of family planning, almost 80% of the villages have at least one female teacher and the average distance from the nearest city is about 5.5 km with the nearest and furthest being 3 km and 8 km respectively. About 80% of the villages reportedly have TV facilities, 3% report having satellite facilities and 16% of the villages report having a women's group.

While the list of husband's characteristics is similar, though not as exhaustive as the one we saw for wives, the two variables of most importance are husband's age and husband's years of education. Considering all three countries together, the age of the husband varies from as little as 16 years to as high as 74 years, with the mean age lying between 33-35 years for the three countries. In terms of years of education, Thai husbands are on average a little more educated than their wives with about 6.8 years of education, while husbands in India and Pakistan are much more educated than their wives with 5.6 and 4.8 years of education respectively.

CHAPTER FIVE

RESULTS

5.1 Female Autonomy

In this section we discuss some of the empirical results of the study. In general, for each outcome variable there are eight models per country. We start discussion with Autonomy Variables and consider what factors seem to affect autonomy of women in the three countries. We next move on to Beating Acceptability, or rather the disapproval of it (as each variable in this category was coded as 1 when beating was not thought to be acceptable). Finally we attempt to determine what variables affect son preference characteristics in women.

Table 14 shows the results of the first four models for autonomy variable in India. In the first model, we consider only linear wife characteristics. All of the variables that are significant have a positive effect on the autonomy of women in India. More specifically, the age of the wife, her years of education, if she has watched TV in the last week, years of education of mother, self sufficiency, and if she works, all seem to significantly improve her autonomy. It is interesting to note the type of income the wife generates has a significant impact on her status. Anderson and Eswaran (2009) argue that earned income could be more important than unearned income in empowering women. We notice a similar effect here, but with a slight twist. Women who work and earn cash have more autonomy than women who do not work, but women who work and receive payment in kind, seem to be worse off than women who do not work at all. Notably, factors such as caste, religion and land ownership seem to not have any effect in this model. In Model 2, we remove all direct and indirect factors that might have affected her

access to information and knowledge, except for years of education. We also attempt to see if age has a non linear, quadratic to be more accurate, effect on the autonomy of women. In this model we notice that the effect of age increases compared to model 1, but we also note that there is significant and negative quadratic effect of age on the status of women. Also, land ownership becomes significant and positive (as stated in previous studies such as Boserup (1970) and Dyson and Moore (1983)), while we also see that religion plays a role, with Muslim women showing lower autonomy as compared to Hindu women. As expected the role of education plays a stronger and more significant role in this model as compared to the first model. Model 3 is similar to Model 1, with the exception that we attempt to determine if age plays a non-linear role in the autonomy of Indian women. As we noted in Model 2, age seems to have a non-linear affect with the quadratic term being negative and significant, this would imply that as the age of the wife increases, her autonomy improves non-linearly but it seems to peak at a certain age, after which her autonomy seems to decrease with age. One possible explanation is that as the wife has children, especially sons, her treatment in the house improves, especially as her sons grow older. But after sometime, it is possible that either the children move out, or they bring in their own spouse(s) and focus more attention towards their own spouse and children, thus leading to the negative quadratic effect. Also we note that in this model land ownership becomes significant, which was not the case in Model 1. In Model 4, we enhance Model 3 by adding household characteristics such as annual household income and ownership of radio/TV by any member of the household. Model 4 indicates some interesting results as well. We notice that TV ownership has a negative and significant impact on the autonomy of women, but it is almost cancelled out by the positive and

significant effect of having watched TV. TV ownership can have two effects, it can be a proxy for the financial well being of the family (only well to do families would have been able to afford a TV set at that time), or it can be a proxy for access to information (a TV set at home increases the probability of watching TV). Here we also note that income also has a significant and negative effect on the autonomy of women. This might lead one to believe that the autonomy of women has a non-linear relationship with income.

Table 15 depicts the results of models five through eight for the autonomy variable in India. In Model 5, we enhance Model 4 by including husband characteristics likely to influence her autonomy, namely, age and years of education. In this model, land ownership is no longer significant, but having lived in a town/city before marriage seems to have a positive and significant effect. This variable is a proxy for information and knowledge, since there is a higher chance for the wife to have been exposed to avenues of equality in a city/town than in a village. Also, we notice that while husband's age has a positive and significant effect on autonomy of wife, his years of education has a negative and significant effect. As, his years of education can be taken to be a proxy for his income (generally better educated people earn more income), this might further lead credence to the notion that income might have a non-linear effect on the autonomy of the wife. In Model 6, we enhance Model 5, by including measures of social capital by means of community characteristics. We notice that the presence of abortion clinics has a negative effect of the autonomy of wife, which is not that surprising given the morbid stories of female child infanticide in India, where as the presence of TV in the village community has a positive effect as expected. What is surprising though is that the presence of at least one woman teacher has a negative and significant effect. One might

tend to think that an independent, empowered female role-model in the form a teacher might have a positive influence on the population. In Model 7, we enhance Model 6 by including the variable Interviewed Alone, which was coded as one if no one else was present during the interview. This was done to see if the presence of any family member during the interview has any effect on the response of the women. As we can see, interviewed alone does not seem to have any impact. This might be partly because, the other measures such as community, husband and household characteristics are able to negate any influence that the presence of a third person might impart. One can also argue that it is not just the presence of a third person, but the stature of the third person that might influence the response of the wife. For example, the presence of a small child/sibling would unlikely affect the response; where as the presence of a mother-in-law/husband might have some effect. Unfortunately, we are unable to make such distinctions for all three countries. In Model 8, we replicated Model 7 with the exception of any direct/indirect influences of knowledge/information like we did in Model 2. Despite this, years of education remain insignificant in Model 8, and we also note that TV ownership by a family member becomes insignificant. It is interesting to note that the closer the village is to a city/town, the worse off the wife is in terms of status according to this model.

In sum, the most robust determinants of female autonomy in India are age (positive), square of age (negative), TV viewership (positive), self-sufficiency (positive), Muslim (negative), work for cash (positive), abortion clinics (negative), TV facility in community (positive), and female teacher (negative).

Table 16 shows the autonomy variable regression results for Pakistan. In Model 1,

we consider on the linear effects of the wife's own characteristics. Here we note that age, having lived in a town before marriage, self sufficiency and being a non Muslims have a positive effect on the autonomy of women. Surprisingly, having listened to radio in the last one week has a negative and significant effect on their autonomy. This might be explained by the fact that, as much as access to information is important, the kind of information imparted is also equally important. It is quite possible that the information broadcasted on radio in Pakistan at that point did not lead to an environment that was beneficial to women's autonomy. It is interesting to note that variables such as land ownership, years of education, TV viewership or work have no impact on the autonomy of wives in Pakistan. In Model 2, we remove any indirect information/knowledge causing variable and include age square. Here we notice that age square has a negative and significant effect similar to what we saw in India. Again, years of education and work have no impact on their autonomy where as self sufficiency and non Muslim is positive and significant variables. In Model 3 we replicate Model 1 while including square of age. The results in Model 3 are quite similar to Model 1, with the exception that age square is significant and negative, just as we found in Model 2. In Model 4, we enhance Model 3 by including household characteristics. We notice that not a single household characteristic plays an important role in determining the autonomy of women. The other results of Model 4 are similar to those found in Model 3.

Table 17 depicts the results of models five through eight for the autonomy variable in Pakistan. In Model 5, we enhance Model 4 by including husband characteristics. We notice that husband's age is positive and significant and now household income becomes significant but negative. On the other hand, having lived in a

city before marriage and listened to radio are no longer significant. We enhance Model 5 by including community characteristics in order to derive the results for Model 6. Here we were not able to include availability of abortion clinics, satellite facilities in the community and presence of women's group since all values were 0; also, the variable measuring at least one woman teacher was dropped since all values were 1. We notice that TV facility in the community has a negative effect and significant effect, again leading us to believe that the content of information is just as important as access to information. We note that an educated mother has a positive influence on the autonomy of a woman, where as having lived in a city or listened to a radio are no longer significant. In Model 7, we enhance Model 5 by including dummy variables for each of the ten villages. Where as in India, we felt we have sufficient community level information to capture individual community characteristics, in Pakistan we felt that there was not enough information available at the community level. The results in Model 7 are quite similar to Model 5 and we note that with reference to Ali Kharak, Beerbal, Bhosin, Chak 48/12L, Dab and Samote all are worse off for women's autonomy. Also, we notice that interview alone is not significant, indicating that the measure of other effects might have negated any bias due to presence of a third person. In Model 8, we take Model 7 and remove all indirect sources of information/knowledge. Years of education remains insignificant, this might be due to either the very small number of women educated or the quality of education or a mixture of both. In this model, Kot Soondki seems to be better for women's autonomy than the rest.

In sum, the most robust determinants of autonomy in Pakistani wives seem to be age (positive), age square (negative), self-sufficiency (positive), annual household

income (negative), husband's age (positive), certain village dummies and TV facility in the community.

Table 18 shows the autonomy variable regression results for Thailand. Since Thailand is the country where women in a city were also interviewed (Bangkok), we control for this by always including a dummy that takes the value of one if the respondent is from Bangkok. In Model 1, we consider on the linear effects of the wife's own characteristics on her autonomy. Here we see that age, land ownership, years of education; TV viewership, self-sufficiency, and working for cash all play a positive and strongly significant role in improving the autonomy of women. It is interesting to see that Christian women have better autonomy than Buddhist women; where as Muslim women are worse off than their Buddhist counterparts. Strangely, having lived in town/city has a negative impact on the status of women. In Model 2, we attempt to remove any indirect sources of information/knowledge that might influence the thinking of women and also include a term for age square. As with the previous two countries we notice that the quadratic age term is negative and significant. The rest of the results for included variables remain similar to Model 1, though the impact of education does become slightly weaker. Model 3 includes all the variables of Model 1 plus the square of age. As expected, age square is significant and negative, while not much else changes in the results. In Model 4, we take Model 3 and incorporate household characteristics. We notice that years of education is no longer significant, where as for the first time we see that annual household income has a positive effect on the autonomy of women.

Table 19 depicts the results of models five through eight for the autonomy variable in Thailand. In Model 5, we enhance Model 4 by including husband's

characteristics in the analysis. Here, apart from the results of Model 4, we note that both years of education for wife and an educated mother positively affect the autonomy of women. Also, annual household income no longer plays any role and the more educated the husband, the worse off the wife is found to be. In Model 6, we enhance Model 5 by including the interviewed alone variable. The main impact it has on the model is that we find that interviewed alone is significant and negatively associated with women's autonomy. That is, women who were interviewed alone tend to report lower autonomy, than women who were interviewed in the presence of a third person. In Model 7, we enhance Model 6 by including dummies for the central and north regions of the country, leaving the southern part as the reference region. Compared to Model 6, the religion effects get stronger and both the northern and central parts of the country are worse off as compared to southern Thailand. Up till this point, the Bangkok dummy has never been significant, indicating that there is not much a difference between rural and urban responses. In Model 8, we strip Model 7 of all indirect sources of knowledge/information. Here we note for the first time that the Bangkok dummy is significant, and it appears to be negative. Considering that the variable, having lived in a town/city before marriage is always negative and mostly significant, it is not surprising to see that women in Bangkok report lower autonomy than women in the south. One possible reason for this might be that in rural areas, a significant number of women own land (almost 36%), so that might give the women good bargaining power.

In sum, the most robust determinants of autonomy in Thai wives seem to be age (positive), age square (negative), own land (positive), lived in city/town before marriage (negative), years of education (positive), self-sufficiency (positive), Muslim (negative),

Christian (positive), work for cash (positive), husband's years of education (negative), interviewed alone (negative) and various regional dummies.

5.2 Non-Acceptability of Beating

Table 20 shows the non- acceptability of beating regression results for India. As a reminder, this variable was coded such that higher values indicated less acceptability towards beating. In Model 1, we consider on the linear effects of the wife's own characteristics on her non- acceptability of beating. We see that land ownership, having lived in a city/town before marriage, years of education and having read a newspaper, all have a positive and significant effect. Whereas beating is found to be more acceptable amongst women who have watched TV in the last week, amongst Muslims and amongst women who earn cash. It is interesting to note that age and self-sufficiency have no significant effect. In Model 2, we strip Model 1 of all indirect sources of knowledge/information and we also add square of age. Model 2 exhibits the same tendencies as Model 1 for all included variables and age square is found to be insignificant. In Model3, we replicated Model 1 with the addition of age square. Again, age square is not of any relevance and the remaining results are similar to what we observed in Model 1. In Model 4, we enhance Model 3 by including household characteristics. The new changes that we observe are that TV ownership has a positive effect, where as a more educated mother has a negative effect when it comes to non-acceptability of beating.

Table 21 depicts the results of models five through eight for non-acceptability of beating in India. In Model 5, we enhance Model 4 by including husband's characteristics

in the analysis. Here we notice that years of education is no longer significant, while more educated the husband, less acceptable the wife is towards beating. The rest of the results remain similar to Model 4. In Model 6, we enhance Model 5 by including community characteristics as well as interviewed alone variable. We see that some of the results from this model are quite different from previous results. Own land, having lived in town/city and newspaper are no longer significant. Years of education becomes weakly significant, whereas self-sufficiency seems to have a negative effect. We also note that women who work and earn in kind find beating more acceptable than women who do not work at all. Another interesting fact is that availability of abortion clinics seems to have a positive impact. It seems that the presence of abortion clinics somehow strongly reduces the acceptability towards beating. In Model 7, we enhance Model 5 by including a state dummy, which takes the value of one in the state is Tamil Nadu. Here we notice that own land, city/town and years of education all have a positive effect. On the other hand, TV viewership, self-sufficiency, Muslim, work for kind, and annual household income all contribute towards beating being more acceptable. Some of these finding, especially self-sufficiency are perplexing to say the least. One must note though that, beating acceptability does not imply beating per say, so while the wife may find some situations in which she thinks beating is justified, she might also make an effort to ensure that she does not find herself in those situations. Also, women in Tamil Nadu find beating more acceptable than women in Uttar Pradesh. Finally, in Model 8 we take Model 6 and strip it of all indirect sources of knowledge/information. The results for the available variables are similar to what we saw in Model 6.

In sum, the most robust determinants for non-acceptability of beating in Indian

wives seem to be own land (positive), city/town (positive),self-sufficiency (negative), Muslim (negative), work for kind (negative), abortion facility (positive), Tamil Nadu (negative).

Table 22 shows the non- acceptability of beating regression results for Pakistan. In Model 1, we consider on the linear effects of the wife's own characteristics on her non- acceptability of beating. Unlike in India, we observe that age has a significant and negative effect. That is, as women get older, they tend to think that beating is more acceptable. All the other variables that are significant, such as city/town, years of education, read newspapers or listened to radio in past one week are significant and positive. In Model 2, we strip Model 1 of all indirect sources of knowledge/information and we also add square of age. We see that age seems to exhibit a non-linear effect with the quadratic term being positive and significant. Years of education is no longer significant in this model, where as women who work for kind seem to find beating more acceptable as compared to women who do not work at all. In Model3, we replicated Model 1 with the addition of age square. The findings in Model 3 are similar to those of Model 1, with the addition of age square being positive and significant and women that work for kind finding beating more acceptable than women who do not work. In Model 4, we enhance Model 3 by including household characteristics. The findings of Model 4 are similar to those of Model 3, with the addition of household income being positive and significant. This implies that for higher the annual household income, a wife is less likely to report that beating is acceptable. The other two household characteristics are no longer found to be significant.

Table 23 depicts the results of models five through eight for non-acceptability of

beating in Pakistan. In Model 5, we enhance Model 4 by including husband's characteristics in the analysis. Here we notice that both age and age square are no longer significant. Years of education, newspaper and radio are the only self-characteristics that are significant now. Apart from that, the only significant variable is annual household income. None of the husband's characteristics are found to be of an importance. In Model 6, we enhance Model 5 by including the available community characteristics as well as interviewed alone variable. Here we notice that interview alone is positive and strongly significant. This indicates that when the wife was interviewed alone, she found beating less acceptable than when she was interviewed in the presence of someone else. Also the availability of TV facility in the community has a positive effect as well. Apart from that, we find that all the variables that were significant in Model 5 are also significant in Model 6. In Model 7, we remove the community characteristics and include dummies for each region; with the village Ali Kharak used the reference village. We can see that in most of the villages except for Dab and Chak 409GB, women tend to think beating is more acceptable when compared to the women in Ali Kharak. Here again we notice that interview alone is significant. Except for radio, all the remaining variables that were significant in Model 5 are significant in Model 7 as well. In Model 8, we remove all variables that might indirectly affect knowledge/information of the wife. We see that this does not have a major effect on the remaining variables in the model, though the magnitude of number of years of education does increase by a small amount.

In sum, the most robust determinants for non-acceptability of beating in Pakistani wives seem to be years of education (positive), interviewed alone (positive), read newspaper in the last one week (positive), annual household income (positive), TV

facility in community and to a certain extent radio and age.

5.3 Son Preference

Table 24 shows the son preference regression results for India. In Model 1, we consider on the linear effects of the wife's own characteristics on her son preference tendencies. We notice that only two of the variables are significant, age of wife, which has a positive influence and having read the newspaper in the last week, which has a negative influence. This tells us that as women get older, their preference for sons increase but at the same time, reading newspapers has a negative effect on son preference. In Model 2, we strip Model 1 of all indirect sources of knowledge/information. In this model we observe again that age has a positive and significant effect on son preference, while now years of education shows a negative and significant effect on son preference. In Model 3, we enhance Model 1 by adding age square. Now age is no longer a significant variable, instead having lived in a city/town before marriage provides a positive effect where as having read a newspaper in the last one week still has a negative and significant effect on son preference. In Model 4, we enhance Model 3 by including household characteristics. Here, years of education again becomes significant and has a negative effect on son preference, while all of the variables that were significant in Model 3 remain significant. Also, we note that none of the household characteristics have an effect on the wife's son preference.

Table 25 depicts the results of models five through eight for son preference in India. In Model 5, we enhance Model 4 by including the husband's characteristics in the analysis. In this model the only two variables that are significant are years of education, which has a negative effect and husband's years of education, which has a positive effect.

In Model 6, we enhance Model 5 by including community characteristics. In this model, years of education still stays significant and negative while women who work and earn is kind also show a negative and significant trend towards son preference. None of the community characteristics seem to influence son preference in any manner. In Model 7, we enhance Model 6 by including the interviewed alone variable. The results from Model 7 are not that much different from the results of Model 6, with interviewed alone having no significant impact on son preference. For Model 8, we strip Model 7 of all indirect sources of knowledge/information, leaving only years of education in the list. Again, we do not notice much a difference between the results of Model 8 and Model 7, though we do notice that the magnitude of son preference has gone up a bit.

In sum, the most robust determinants for son preference in Indian wives seem to be years of education (negative) and to a certain extent, women who work for kind and not cash when compared to women who do not work at all. Given the fact that the preference for sons is so strong in India and that this preference is so deeply entrenched into society, one would suspect that the only cure for this would be education. Money, religion and infrastructure would not have much of an effect on a social matter such as this.

Tables 26 and 27 show the marginal effects for models one through eight for India. From these tables, the variables that seem to have a robust effect on son preference seem to include having read newspaper in the last week, apart from the ones listed above. Again this is not surprising, since reading newspaper is a form of education and informing gathering. Only such activities can enforce a change in the attitudes of the general public towards an evil so deeply entrenched in society.

Table 28 shows the son preference regression results for Pakistan. In Model 1, we consider on the linear effects of the wife's own characteristics on her son preference tendencies. There are three variables that are significant and all three seem to have a negative effect on son preference. The three variables are years of education, having read newspaper in last one week and wife who works for cash in relation to a wife that does not work at all. In Model 2, we strip Model 1 of all indirect sources of information and observe an effect similar to Model 1. Years of education and wife who works for cash relative to a non working wife exhibit lower tendencies towards son preference. Model 3 is Model 1 plus age square and we notice that the results between the two models are not very different. As we saw in India, it seems that age and religion do not seem to play an important factor in this case. Model 4 is Model 3 plus household characteristics. In this model, having seen TV in the past week has a positive and significant impact on son preference, where as TV ownership has a negative and significant impact on son preference. Apart from that, the same three variables that have been significant up till now remain significant.

Table 29 depicts the results of models five through eight for son preference in Pakistan. In Model 5, we enhance Model 4 by including husband's characteristics in the analysis. We see that in Model 5, both household annual income and wives that work for cash in relation to wives that do not work at all have a negative effect on son preference. For Model 6, we take Model 5 and include community characteristics as well as the interviewed alone variable. Here we notice that years of education again become significant and negative along with working for cash and household annual income. It is also interesting to note that interviewed alone has positive and significant effect. This

would mean that Pakistani wives that are interviewed alone tend to exhibit higher preference for sons than those that are interviewed in the presence of a third person. In Model 7, we remove the community characteristics of Model 6 and instead include village dummies. In terms of which variables remain significant, this change provides no new information. On the other hand, since not a single village dummy is significant with respect to the reference dummy village of Ali Kharak (previously we had noticed that considerable number of villages had lower status measures when compared to Ali Kharak), it is an indicator that son preference is deeply rooted in all areas of society in Pakistan. In Model 8, we strip Model 7 of all indirect avenues of knowledge/information and determine that there is no significant change in the outcome.

In sum, the most robust determinants for son preference in Pakistani wives seem to be years of education (negative), household annual income (negative), women that work for cash in relation to women that do not work all (negative), and interviewed alone (positive). Of these, the only somewhat surprising result would be the positive sign of interviewed alone. In a country with a strong son preference, why would wives want to tone down their son preference poses an interesting questions. Apart from that, the same arguments that were made for India seem to be valid in the case of Pakistan as well.

Tables 30 and 31 show the marginal effects for models one through eight for Pakistan. In terms of which variables significantly impact son preference in Pakistan, we cannot learn much from these tables. Mostly, the arguments made in the case of India, remain valid in Pakistan as well.

Table 32 shows the son preference regression results for Thailand. In Model 1, we consider on the linear effects of the wife’s own characteristics on her son preference

tendencies. Here we see that age has a positive influence on son preference whereas years of education have a negative influence on son preference. None of the other variables seem to have an effect on son preference. For Model 2, we strip Model 1 of all indirect sources of knowledge/information. The results do not change much and still both age and years of education are the only two significant variables. Model 3 is Model 1 plus age square. Here we see that age square is not significant, indicating that age does not have a non-linear relationship with son preference. For Model 4, we include all the variables of Model 3 plus household characteristics. We note that owing a radio has a negative and significant effect on son preference; whereas owning a TV has the opposite effect. Annual income has no effect on son preference. Apart from this, the same variables that were significant before remain significant.

Table 33 depicts the results of models five through eight for son preference in Pakistan. In Model 5, we enhance Model 4 by including husband's characteristics in the analysis. In this model, only two household characteristics were significant as in the previous model i.e. owning a radio and TV remain significant. Age and years of education no longer remain significant and neither are any of the husband characteristics significant. In Model 6, we include the interviewed alone variable into the analysis and determine that it too has no effect on son preference. The results in Model 6 remain pretty similar to the ones we observed in Model 5. For Model 7 we include other regional dummies and observe that the northern region seems to have a lesser preference for sons as compared to southern Thailand. Apart from that the results in Model 7 remain similar to the results in Model 6. In Model 8, we remove all indirect sources of knowledge/information from Model 7. In this model, we notice that ownership of radio

has a negative effect and there is lower son preference in the northern parts, when compared to southern Thailand.

Tables 34 and 35 show the marginal effects for models one through eight for Thailand. In terms of which variables are significant, the marginal effects do not represent any new information. Ownership of radio by someone in the household has a negative effect and ownership of TV by someone in a household has a positive effect on son preference.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, we attempted to provide a most comprehensive and systematic exploration of determinants of women's status in India, Pakistan and Thailand. In each country, women's status is captured by three related but distinct measures, namely, female autonomy, women's non-acceptability of beating, and preference for son. Using these three measures of women's status, we, first, test the statistical significance of the difference between wife's self-evaluation of her status and husband's evaluation of her status. Then, we examine the determinants of women's status.

Our test of means analysis depicts some very interesting results with respect to husband's and wife's assessment of wife's status. When it comes to wife's autonomy, the difference is always significant for all three countries. While for India the difference is negative, it turns out to be positive for Thailand and Pakistan. This means that in India wives tend to under-report their autonomy with respect to husbands (or husbands tend to over-report with respect to wives), while in both Pakistan and Thailand, wives seem to over-report their status with respect to their husbands. Though one can make the argument that in Pakistan, more than wives over-reporting, husbands seem to really under-report their wives decision making abilities. When we conduct this analysis on per country, per religion basis, we note that Muslims in India and Thailand tend to report lower status than couples from other religions. But more importantly, we note that in each country, all religions seem to follow the same national pattern, and Muslims from each country respond differently from those of other countries. This encourages us to believe that in the case of autonomy, each country's cultural and social setup trumps the effect of

religion. When it comes to non-acceptability of beating, both India and Pakistan behave in a similar fashion. In both countries, husbands seem to find beating less acceptable than their wives, with the difference being significant in both countries. Though, in general, couples in India seem to find beating less acceptable than couples in Pakistan. When it comes to son preference, we find no statistical difference between husbands and wives of India and Pakistan. Whereas in Thailand, not only is the difference significant, but husbands seem to have a stronger son preference than wives.

As we see from Table 37, the countries seem to have both common and distinct factors that affect wife's autonomy. For India, the most robust determinants are age (positive), square of age (negative), TV viewership (positive), self-sufficiency (positive), Muslim (negative), work for cash (positive), abortion clinics (negative), TV facility in community (positive), and female teacher (negative). For Pakistan, the most robust determinants are age (positive), age square (negative), self-sufficiency (positive), annual household income (negative), husband's age (positive), certain village dummies and TV facility in the community (negative). Similarly, for Thailand we note that the most robust determinants are age (positive), age square (negative), own land (positive), lived in city/town before marriage (negative), years of education (positive), self-sufficiency (positive), Muslim (negative), Christian (positive), work for cash (positive), husband's years of education (negative), interviewed alone (negative) and various regional dummies. From this we can conclude that, age, age square and self-sufficient play a role in all three countries, while husband's age is important in both Pakistan and Thailand.

For Non-acceptability of beating, in India the most robust determinants are own land (positive), city/town (positive),self-sufficiency (negative), Muslim (negative), work for

kind (negative), abortion facility (positive), Tamil Nadu (negative).While for Pakistan the robust determinants include years of education (positive), interviewed alone (positive), read newspaper in the last one week (positive), annual household income (positive), TV facility in community and to a certain extent radio and age. Surprisingly there are no common factors between India and Pakistan that affect non-acceptability on beating. One possible explanation for this could possibly be that as the societies of both countries developed independent of each other the sensibilities of the local populations became different. Thus, while in India variables related to ownership of assets and city positively affect non-acceptability of beating, for Pakistan, we find variables related to education and information play an important role.

Son preference is interesting variable since we find so few variables actually affect son preference. In India we find the robust determinants are years of education (negative) and to a certain extent, women who work for kind and not cash when compared to women who do not work at all (negative). In Pakistan we find that the robust determinants are years of education (negative), household annual income (negative), women that work for cash in relation to women that do not work all (negative), and interviewed alone (positive). While in Thailand the robust determinants are ownership of radio by someone in the household (negative) and ownership of TV by someone in a household (positive). Not surprisingly, in India and Pakistan, the two countries with high son preference among couples, the common variables that reduce son preference are years of education and working women with respect to women that stay at home. Given that preference for sons is so strongly entrenched in these two societies, one would suspect that the only cure for this would be education. Religion and infrastructure would

not have much of an effect on a social matter such as this.

We also gained much insight about women from different countries based on their response when they were interviewed alone, as opposed to when they were interviewed in the presence of a third person. In Thailand, for example, women tend to report lower autonomy when they are interviewed alone as opposed to when they are interviewed in the presence of a third person. This would indicate that women in Thailand know what their level of autonomy should be in private, but publically they are afraid of speaking or demanding that level of autonomy. In Pakistan on the other hand, women report to be less acceptable towards beating in private than in the presence of a third person. This would mean that though women in Pakistan realize beating is not justified, since it is socially acceptable, they are not strong enough to publically denounce beating. Also interesting to note is that women in Pakistan privately prefer sons more than they show in public.

Chapter 7

Policy Implications

Policies laid out based on the results of this study can have profound implications on the status of women. Firstly, having proven that husbands and wives statistically differ on the wife's status; governments in developing countries must expand their gender empowerment policies to target a wider audience. At a minimum, this expanded audience must included the husbands and if possible also include household elders. The sooner husbands and elders understand the advantages of women's rights, the faster one will notice an actual change in the status of women.

Secondly, there is no doubting the effectiveness and role of widely acknowledged factors such as education and financial independence in promoting the status of women. Still, there are significant variations in women's status along regional, religion and cultural lines. As such, empowerment programs must be contextual and group-specific with a specific target in mind.

Thirdly, each measure of women's status (autonomy, beating acceptability and son preference) is affected by different factors. This implies that there exists no singular fix all policy that can effectively and efficiently improve all dimensions of a woman's status. As such, policies should be built that specifically target each measure independently.

Fourthly, there is a strong religious dimension to women's status. We notice that in all three countries Muslim women report lower autonomy than their Hindu and Buddhist counterparts. On the other hand, Muslim women have lower son preference than others.

This would mean that while in the planning stages of a policy, the religion of the target population should be kept in mind.

Finally, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that promotion of household income, alone, is not a viable policy strategy when attempting to improve women's status. We gain this insight from the fact that annual household income plays no important role in determining the status of women in India and Thailand. Although, we find that annual household income plays a significant role in determining the status of women of Pakistan, the direction of impact is not consistent. Women from relatively richer families (higher annual household incomes) report lower autonomy, but at the same time they also report lower acceptability towards beating and lower son preference. Therefore, we can confidently reject the common notion that poverty is the main cause of poor status of women developing countries.

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APPENDIX A: Outcome variable definitions

Variable	Definition
WIFE	
MajDecs	Does ER have a say in whether to purchase major goods for the household such as a TV....?
WhereWork	Does ER have a say in whether or not she should work outside the home?
NumChild	Does ER have a say in how many children to have?
WhoPunish	Does ER have a say in whether to punish children for misbehaving?
ChildSick	Does ER have a say in deciding what to do when child falls sick?
ChildSchl	Does ER have a say in deciding how much schooling to give to your children?
WhtSchl	Does ER have a say in deciding what kind of school to send children to?
perm	Is there any place for which you must ask permission from your husband or elders in the house before going?
prmhous	Do you have to ask your husband or a senior family member for permission to go to any place outside your compound?
premmart	Do you have to ask your husband or a senior family member for permission to go to the local market?
prephc	Do you have to ask your husband or a senior family member for permission to go to the local health center?
prefield	Do you have to ask your husband or a senior family member for permission to go to fields outside the village?
precomc	Do you have to ask your husband or a senior family member for permission to go to a community center in the village?
prefrnd	Do you have to ask your husband or a senior family member for permission to go to the home of relatives or friends in the village?
prefair	Do you have to ask your husband or a senior family member for permission to go to a nearby fair?
prmtmpl	Do you have to ask your husband or a senior family member for permission to go to a nearby shrine?
prmvill	Do you have to ask your husband or a senior family member for permission to go to the next village?
FreeSpend	If you wanted to buy yourself small item of jewelry/clothes, would you feel free to do it without consulting your husband or a senior member of your family?

beatresp	Would husband be justified in beating wife if she was disrespectful to his parents or other senior members of his family?
beathhw	Would husband be justified in beating wife if she neglected household chores?
beatdisb	Would husband be justified in beating wife if She was disobedient or did not follow his orders?
beatdrk	Would husband be justified in beating wife if She was a drunkard or drug addict?
beathitc	Would husband be justified in beating wife if She beat the children frequently?

Husband

hMajDecs	Does wife have a say in whether to purchase major goods for the household such as a TV....?
hWhereWork	Does wife have a say in whether or not she should work outside the home?
hNumChild	Does wife have a say in how many children to have?
hWhoPunish	Does wife have a say in whether to punish children for misbehaving?
hChildSick	Does wife have a say in deciding what to do when child falls sick?
hChildSchl	Does wife have a say in deciding how much schooling to give to your children?
hWhtSchl	Does wife have a say in deciding what kind of school to send children to?

hprmhous	Does your wife have to ask permission from you or a senior family member for permission to go to any place outside your compound?
hpremart	Does your wife have to ask permission from you or a senior family member for permission to go to the local market?
hprephc	Does your wife have to ask permission from you or a senior family member for permission to go to the local health center?
hprefield	Does your wife have to ask permission from you or a senior family member for permission to go to fields outside the village?
hprecomc	Does your wife have to ask permission from you or a senior family member for permission to go to a community center in the village?
hprefrnd	Does your wife have to ask permission from you or a senior family member for permission to go to the home of relatives or friends in the village?
hprefair	Does your wife have to ask permission from you or a senior family member for permission to go to a nearby fair?
hprmtmpl	Does your wife have to ask permission from you or a senior family member for permission to go to a nearby shrine?
hprmvill	Does your wife have to ask permission from you or a senior family member for permission to go to the next village?

hFreeSpend	If your wife wanted to buy herself a small item of jewelry, such as a pair of earrings/bangle, would she be free to do it without consulting you or a senior family member?
hbeatresp	Would husband be justified in beating wife if she was disrespectful to his parents or other senior members of his family?
hbeathhw	Would husband be justified in beating wife if she neglected household chores?
hbeatdisb	Would husband be justified in beating wife if She was disobedient or did not follow his orders?
hbeatdrk	Would husband be justified in beating wife if She was a drunkard or drug addict?
hbeathitc	Would husband be justified in beating wife if She beat the children frequently?

APPENDIX B: Independent variable definitions

Variable	Definition
WIFE	
Individual Characteristics	
age	Age of wife
OwnLand	Binary variable. 1 if the wife has any land in her name, 0 otherwise
city	Binary variable. 1 if the wife ever lived in a city/town before marraige
YrsEdu	Number of years of education of wife
Newspaper	Binary variable. 1 if the wife has read a newspaper in the last week, 0 otherwise
Radio	Binary variable. 1 if the wife has listened to radio in the last week, 0 otherwise
TV	Binary variable. 1 if the wife has watched TV in the last week, 0 otherwise
FatherEdu	Binary variable. 1 if the father of the wife is educated
MotherEdu	Binary variable. 1 if the mother of the wife is educated
SelfSuff	Binary variable. 1 if the wife is able to support herself and her children independent of husband
Dummy_Buddhism	Binary variable. 1 if wife's religion is Buddhism, 0 otherwise
Dummy_Christian	Binary variable. 1 if wife's religion is Christianity, 0 otherwise
Dummy_Hindu	Binary variable. 1 if wife's religion is Hinduism, 0 otherwise
Dummy_Muslim	Binary variable. 1 if wife's religion is Islam, 0 otherwise
dummySC_ST	Binary variable. 1 if wife belongs to lower/backward caste
Dummy_WorkCash	Binary variable. 1 if wife works and receives cash payment, 0 otherwise
Dummy_WorkNoCash	Binary variable. 1 if wife works and does not receives cash payment, 0 otherwise
Dummy_NoWork	Binary variable. 1 if wife does not work, 0 otherwise
InterviewAlone	Binary Variable. 1 if wife was interviewed alone, 0 if any family member was present
Family Characteristics	
AnnualIncome	Annual household income of family
hhradio	Binary variable. 1 if someone in the household owns a radio
hhtv	Binary variable. 1 if someone in the household owns a TV
Community Characteristics	
FPAbort	Binary Variable. 1 if the community has abortion facilities
WmnTechr	Binary Variable. 1 if there is at least one female teacher in the community
NearCity	Distance to nearest city/town
TVComm	Binary Variable. 1 if the community has TV facilities

SatComm	Binary Variable. 1 if the community has satellite facilities
WomGrp	Binary Variable. 1 if there are any major women's group in the community
WomGrpO	Binary Variable. 1 if there are any other groups in the community in which women are members

Husband

Individual Characteristics

hage	Age of husband
hYrsEdu	Number of years of education of husband
hNewsPaper	Binary variable. 1 if the husband has read a newspaper in the last week, 0 otherwise
hRadio	Binary variable. 1 if the husband has listened to radio in the last week, 0 otherwise
hTV	Binary variable. 1 if the husband has watched TV in the last week, 0 otherwise
hFatherEdu	Binary variable. 1 if the father of the wife is educated
hMotherEdu	Binary variable. 1 if the mother of the wife is educated
hDummy_Buddhism	Binary variable. 1 if husband's religion is Buddhism, 0 otherwise
hDummy_Chrstian	Binary variable. 1 if husband's religion is Christianity, 0 otherwise
hDummy_Hindu	Binary variable. 1 if husband's religion is Hinduism, 0 otherwise
hDummy_Muslim	Binary variable. 1 if husband's religion is Islam, 0 otherwise
hdummySC_ST	Binary variable. 1 if husband belongs to lower/backward caste

Table 1: Women's Perceived Status: India, Pakistan and Thailand

	India (N=1,842)			Pakistan (N=1,036)			Thailand (N=2,800)		
Women's Status	Mean	Min	Max	Mean	Min	Max	Mean	Min	Max
MajDecs	0.289	0	1	0.165	0	1	0.779	0	1
WhereWork	0.628	0	1	0.384	0	1	0.822	0	1
NumChild	0.831	0	1	0.651	0	1	0.898	0	1
WhoPunish	0.861	0	1	0.712	0	1	0.782	0	1
ChildSick	0.773	0	1	0.638	0	1	0.833	0	1
ChildSchl	0.619	0	1	0.533	0	1	0.651	0	1
WhtSchl	0.580	0	1	0.496	0	1	0.564	0	1
perm							0.436	0	1
prmhous	0.775	0	1	0.298	0	1			
premmart	0.485	0	1	0.207	0	1			
prephc	0.304	0	1	0.166	0	1			
prefield	0.213	0	1	0.298	0	1			
precomc	0.171	0	1	0.152	0	1			
prefrnd	0.399	0	1	0.293	0	1			
prefair	0.122	0	1	0.122	0	1			
prmtmpl	0.213	0	1	0.119	0	1			
prmvill	0.537	0	1	0.888	0	1			
FreeSpend	0.295	0	1	0.391	0	1	0.885	0	1
beatresp	0.591	0	1	0.455	0	1			
beathhw	0.488	0	1	0.453	0	1			
beatdisb	0.354	0	1	0.328	0	1			
beatdrk	0.212	0	1	0.242	0	1			
beathitc	0.800	0	1	0.575	0	1			
SonPreference *	0.381	0	1	0.481	0	1	0.305	0	1

*SonPreference had 1,830 observations for India, 1,033 observations for Pakistan and 2,743 observations for Thailand. Missing values indicate no data was available.

Table 2: Husband's Evaluation of Wife's Status: India, Pakistan and Thailand

	India (N=1,660)			Pakistan (N=474)			Thailand (N=1,475)		
Women's Status	Mean	Min	Max	Mean	Min	Max	Mean	Min	Max
hMajDecs	0.501	0	1	0.027	0	1	0.772	0	1
hWhereWork	0.716	0	1	0.169	0	1			
hNumChild	0.899	0	1	0.008	0	1	0.767	0	1
hWhoPunish	0.901	0	1	0.346	0	1	0.696	0	1
hChildSick	0.883	0	1	0.133	0	1	0.759	0	1
hChildSchl	0.828	0	1	0.004	0	1	0.523	0	1
hWhtSchl	0.808	0	1	0.004	0	1	0.559	0	1
Hperm							0.389	0	1
hprmhous	0.862	0	1	0.502	0	1			
hpremart	0.502	0	1	0.367	0	1			
hprephc	0.369	0	1	0.329	0	1			
hprefield	0.269	0	1	0.414	0	1			
hprecomc	0.268	0	1	0.188	0	1			
hprefrnd	0.515	0	1	0.622	0	1			
hprefair	0.153	0	1	0.101	0	1			
hprmtmpl	0.436	0	1	0.122	0	1			
hprmvill	0.687	0	1	0.095	0	1			
hFreeSpend	0.345	0	1	0.264	0	1	0.546	0	1
hbeatresp	0.924	0	1	0.435	0	1			
hbeathhw	0.953	0	1	0.700	0	1			
hbeatdisb	0.808	0	1	0.342	0	1			
hbeatdrk	0.546	0	1	0.363	0	1			
hbeathitc	0.977	0	1	0.835	0	1			
hSonPreference*	0.404	0	1	0.463	0	1	0.328	0	1

*SonPreference had 1,650 observations for India, 469 observations for Pakistan and 1,453 observations for Thailand. Missing values indicate no data was available.

Table 3: Discrepancy between Wife and Husband's Evaluation of Wife's Status in India (N = 1660)

INDIA			
Women's Status	**Wife's Self Evaluation**	**Husband's Evaluation of Wife**	**Difference**
Wife Autonomy	**0.437**	**0.548**	**-0.111****
Does wife have a say in:			
Purchasing household goods	0.281	0.501	-0.219**
Working outside the house	0.620	0.716	-0.096**
Number of children to have	0.833	0.899	-0.066**
Punishing children for misbehaving	0.856	0.901	-0.045**
Care of sick children	0.761	0.883	-0.121**
Amount of schooling for children	0.620	0.828	-0.208**
What kind of school for children	0.582	0.808	-0.225**
Does wife need permission to (go to):			
Anyplace	NA	NA	NA
Outside the compound	0.759	0.862	-0.103**
Local market	0.459	0.502	-0.043**
Local health center	0.283	0.369	-0.086**
Fields outside village	0.195	0.269	-0.074**
Community center in village	0.162	0.268	-0.106**
Friends/relatives house in village	0.366	0.515	-0.148**
Nearby fair	0.115	0.153	-0.037**
Nearby place of worship	0.212	0.436	-0.223**
Next village	0.046	0.069	-0.022**
Buy jewelry/clothes for self	0.287	0.345	-0.058**
Wife Beating Not Acceptable	**0.501**	**0.841**	**-0.34****
Would beating of wife be justified if she:			
Disrespectful to in-laws/elders	0.614	0.924	-0.310**
Neglected household chores	0.501	0.953	-0.452**
Disobedient to husband	0.363	0.808	-0.444**
Drunkard/Drug addict	0.220	0.546	-0.325**
Beat children frequently	0.809	0.977	-0.168**
SonPreference[†]	**0.38**	**0.403**	**-0.023**

[†] Sample size for SonPreference is 1,650

** indicates significance at 5%; * indicates significance at 10%

Table 4: Discrepancy between Wife and Husband's Evaluation of Wife's Status in Pakistan (N = 470)

PAKISTAN			
Women's Status	**Wife's Self Evaluation**	**Husband's Evaluation of Wife**	**Difference**
Wife Autonomy	**0.321**	**0.207**	**.114****
Does wife have a say in:			
Purchasing household goods	0.177	0.028	0.148**
Working outside the house	0.366	0.017	0.348**
Number of children to have	0.366	0.017	0.348**
Punishing children for misbehaving	0.645	0.009	0.636**
Care of sick children	0.609	0.134	0.474**
Amount of schooling for children	0.511	0.004	0.506**
What kind of school for children	0.477	0.004	0.472**
Does wife need permission to (go to):			
Anyplace	NA	NA	NA
Outside the compound	0.260	0.500	-0.240**
Local market	0.177	0.364	-0.187**
Local health center	0.153	0.323	-0.170**
Fields outside village	0.285	0.411	-0.125**
Community center in village	0.143	0.185	-0.042*
Friends/relatives house in village	0.281	0.621	-0.34**
Nearby fair	0.117	0.098	0.019
Nearby place of worship	0.109	0.121	-0.012
Next village	0.081	0.094	-0.012
Buy jewelry/clothes for self	0.396	0.264	0.131**
Wife Beating Not Acceptable	**0.394**	**0.534**	**-0.14****
Would beating of wife be justified if she:			
Disrespectful to in-laws/elders	0.445	0.432	0.013
Neglected household chores	0.428	0.700	-0.272**
Disobedient to husband	0.313	0.340	-0.028
Drunkard/Drug addict	0.223	0.364	-0.140**
Beat children frequently	0.562	0.834	-0.272**
Son Preference†	**0.461**	**0.459**	**0.002**

† Sample size for SonPreference is 469

** indicates significance at 5%; * indicates significance at 10%

Table 5: Discrepancy between Wife and Husband's Evaluation of Wife's Status in Thailand (N = 1,475)

THAILAND			
Women's Status	**Wife's Self Evaluation**	**Husband's Evaluation of Wife**	**Difference**
Wife Autonomy	**0.736**	**0.626**	**0.109****
Does wife have a say in:			
Purchasing household goods	0.791	0.772	0.019
Working outside the house	NA	NA	NA
Number of children to have	0.910	0.766	0 .143**
Punishing children for misbehaving	0.776	0.695	0 .081**
Care of sick children	0.838	0.759	0.079**
Amount of schooling for children	0.646	0.522	0 .124**
What kind of school for children	0.540	0.558	-0.018
Does wife need permission to (go to):			
Anyplace	0.423	0.388	0.035**
Outside the compound	NA	NA	NA
Local market	NA	NA	NA
Local health center	NA	NA	NA
Fields outside village	NA	NA	NA
Community center in village	NA	NA	NA
Friends/relatives house in village	NA	NA	NA
Nearby fair	NA	NA	NA
Nearby place of worship	NA	NA	NA
Next village	NA	NA	NA
Buy jewelry/clothes for self	0.877	0.546	0.33**
Wife Beating Not Acceptable	**NA**	**NA**	**NA**
Would beating of wife be justified if she:			
Disrespectful to in-laws/elders	NA	NA	NA
Neglected household chores	NA	NA	NA
Disobedient to husband	NA	NA	NA
Drunkard/Drug addict	NA	NA	NA
Beat children frequently	NA	NA	NA
Son Preference†	**0.299**	**0.328**	**-.029***

† Sample size for SonPreference is 1,436

** indicates significance at 5%; * indicates significance at 10%

Table 6: Discrepancy between Wife and Husband's Evaluation of Wife's Decision Making Ability in India: by Religion

INDIA			
Women's Status	**Wife's Self Evaluation**	**Husband's Evaluation of Wife**	**Difference**
Muslim (N = 820)			
Does wife have a say in:			
Purchasing household goods	0.256	0.479	-0.223**
Working outside the house	0.583	0.691	-0.108**
Number of children to have	0.783	0.887	-0.104**
Punishing children for misbehaving	0.857	0.915	-0.057**
Care of sick children	0.763	0.906	-0.142**
Amount of schooling for children	0.616	0.826	-0.209**
What kind of school for children	0.583	0.817	-0.234**
Hindu (N = 839)			
Does wife have a say in:			
Purchasing household goods	0.306	0.521	-0.215**
Working outside the house	0.656	0.740	-0.085**
Number of children to have	0.881	0.911	-0.030**
Punishing children for misbehaving	0.855	0.888	-0.033**
Care of sick children	0.760	0.860	-0.100**
Amount of schooling for children	0.624	0.831	-0.207**
What kind of school for children	0.581	0.799	-0.217**

** indicates significance at 5%; * indicates significance at 10%

There is one inter-racial group in India where the wife is a Christian and the husband is a Muslim.

Table 7: Discrepancy between Wife and Husband's Evaluation of Wife's Decision Making Ability in Thailand: by Religion

Thailand			
Women's Status	**Wife's Self Evaluation**	**Husband's Evaluation of Wife**	**Difference**
Buddhist (N = 1,341)			
Does wife have a say in:			
Purchasing household goods	0.790	0.767	0.023
Working outside the house			
Number of children to have	0.914	0.768	0.146**
Punishing children for misbehaving	0.781	0.699	0.081**
Care of sick children	0.843	0.762	0.081**
Amount of schooling for children	0.647	0.516	0.131**
What kind of school for children	0.536	0.559	-0.022
Muslim (N = 108)			
Does wife have a say in:			
Purchasing household goods	0.806	0.787	0.018
Working outside the house			
Number of children to have	0.880	0.722	0.157**
Punishing children for misbehaving	0.741	0.639	0.101*
Care of sick children	0.796	0.694	0.101*
Amount of schooling for children	0.667	0.583	0.083
What kind of school for children	0.574	0.537	0.037
Christian (N = 6)			
Does wife have a say in:			
Purchasing household goods	0.833	1.000	-0.166
Working outside the house			
Number of children to have	0.833	0.833	0
Punishing children for misbehaving	0.833	1.000	-0.167
Care of sick children	0.833	1.000	-0.167
Amount of schooling for children	0.667	0.833	-0.167
What kind of school for children	1.000	0.833	0.167
Inter-Racial (N = 20)			
Does wife have a say in:			
Purchasing household goods	0.800	0.950	-0.15
Working outside the house			
Number of children to have	0.850	0.900	-0.05
Punishing children for misbehaving	0.700	0.650	0.05
Care of sick children	0.800	0.850	-0.05
Amount of schooling for children	0.500	0.550	-0.05
What kind of school for children	0.500	0.600	-0.1

** indicates significance at 5%; * indicates significance at 10%

Table 8: Discrepancy between Wife and Husband's Evaluation of Wife's Status in India and Thailand: by Religion

Women's Status	Wife's Self Evaluation	Husband's Evaluation of Wife	Difference
INDIA			
Wife Autonomy - Hindu (N = 839)	0.463	0.588	-0.125**
Wife Autonomy - Muslim (N = 820)	0.412	0.508	-0.097**
Wife Beating Not Acceptable - Hindu (N = 839)	0.526	0.851	-0.324**
Wife Beating Not Acceptable - Muslim (N = 820)	0.476	0.832	-0.356**
Son Preference - Hindu (N = 839)	0.395	0.411	-0.015
Son Preference - Muslim (N = 820)	0.362	0.399	-0.036
THAILAND			
Wife Autonomy - Buddhist (N = 1,341)	0.741	0.629	0.111**
Wife Autonomy - Muslim (N = 108)	0.678	0.576	0.101**
Wife Autonomy - Christian (N = 6)	0.833	0.813	0.021
Wife Autonomy - Inter-Racial (N = 20)	0.700	0.656	0.043
Son Preference - Buddhist (N = 1,306)	0.300	0.326	-0.026
Son Preference - Muslim (N = 105)	0.314	0.371	-0.057
Son Preference - Christian (N = 6)	0.333	0.333	0
Son Preference - Inter-Racial (N = 19)	0.158	0.263	-0.105

** indicates significance at 5%; * indicates significance at 10%

Table 9: Decision Sum, sums each wife's response to all 7 decision questions. Similarly Permission sum and Beating Sum, sum each wife's response to all 9 decision and all 5 beating questions respectively. (Note: decision variables were coded as 1 if the wife had some say in the decision making process, permission variables were coded as 1 if the wife did not require asking for permission and beating variables were coded as 1 if beating was thought to be unacceptable.) Missing values indicated no data was available.

	India			Pakistan			Thailand		
WIFE	Obs	%	Cum %	Obs	%	Cum %	Obs	%	Cum %
Decision Sum									
0	38	2.06	2.06	87	8.4	8.40	8	0.29	0.29
1	127	6.89	8.96	113	10.91	19.31	34	1.21	1.50
2	183	9.93	18.89	158	15.25	34.56	121	4.32	5.82
3	195	10.59	29.48	125	12.07	46.62	251	8.96	14.79
4	237	12.87	42.35	168	16.22	62.84	315	11.25	26.04
5	285	15.47	57.82	152	14.67	77.51	489	17.46	43.50
6	452	24.54	82.36	159	15.35	92.86	887	31.68	75.18
7	325	17.64	100.00	74	7.14	100.00	695	24.82	100.00
Total	1,842	100.00		1,036	100.00		2,800	100.00	
Permission Sum									
0	406	22.04	22.04	516	49.81	49.81			
1	385	20.90	42.94	147	14.19	64.00			
2	199	10.80	53.75	83	8.01	72.01			
3	271	14.71	68.46	71	6.85	78.86			
4	180	9.77	78.23	68	6.56	85.42			
5	128	6.95	85.18	42	4.05	89.48			
6	114	6.19	91.37	52	5.02	94.50			
7	99	5.37	96.74	8	0.77	95.27			
8	60	3.26	100.00	12	1.16	96.43			
9	0	0.00	100.00	37	3.57	100.00			
Total	1,842	100.00		1,036	100.00				
Beating Sum									
0	291	15.80	15.80	290	27.99	27.99			
1	408	22.15	37.95	205	19.79	47.78			
2	258	14.01	51.95	146	14.09	61.87			
3	256	13.90	65.85	127	12.26	74.13			
4	335	18.19	84.04	91	8.78	82.92			
5	294	15.96	100.00	177	17.08	100.00			
Total	1,842	100.00		1,036	100.00				

Table 10: Decision Sum, sums each husband's response to all 7 decision questions. Similarly Permission sum and Beating Sum, sum each husband's response to all 9 decision and all 5 beating questions respectively. (Note: decision variables were coded as 1 if the wife had some say in the decision making process, permission variables were coded as 1 if the wife did not require asking for permission and beating variables were coded as 1 if beating was thought to be unacceptable.) Missing values indicated no data was available.

	India			Pakistan			Thailand		
Husband	Obs	%	Cum %	Obs	%	Cum %	Obs	%	Cum %
Decision Sum									
0	13	0.78	0.78	286	60.34	60.34	30	2.03	2.03
1	23	1.39	2.17	126	26.58	86.92	104	7.05	9.08
2	71	4.28	6.45	57	12.03	98.95	191	12.95	22.03
3	94	5.66	12.11	4	0.84	99.79	179	12.14	34.17
4	169	10.18	22.29	1	0.21	100.00	262	17.76	51.93
5	239	14.40	36.69	0	0	100.00	314	21.29	73.22
6	486	29.28	65.96	0	0	100.00	395	26.78	100
7	565	34.04	100.00	0	0	100.00			
Total	1,660	100.00		474	100.00		1,475	100	
Permission Sum									
0	223	13.43	13.43	127	26.79	26.79			
1	390	23.49	36.93	53	11.18	37.97			
2	119	7.17	44.10	82	17.30	55.27			
3	172	10.36	54.46	42	8.86	64.14			
4	124	7.47	61.93	33	6.96	71.10			
5	196	11.81	73.73	57	12.03	83.12			
6	161	9.70	83.43	51	10.76	93.88			
7	131	7.89	91.33	9	1.90	95.78			
8	83	5.00	96.33	10	2.11	97.89			
9	61	3.67	100.00	10	2.11	100.00			
Total	1,660	100.00		474	100.00				
Beating Sum									
0	13	0.78	0.78	45	9.49	9.49			
1	30	1.81	2.59	87	18.35	27.85			
2	62	3.73	6.33	98	20.68	48.52			
3	212	12.77	19.10	83	17.51	66.03			
4	520	31.33	50.42	69	14.56	80.59			
5	823	49.58	100.00	92	19.41	100.00			
Total	1,660	100.00		474	100.00				

Table 11: Determinants of Women's Status in India

	N	Mean	Std Dev	Minimum	Maximum
Wife's Characteristics					
age	1842	28.303	6.285	15	39
OwnLand	1842	0.054	0.226	0	1
city	1842	0.211	0.408	0	1
YrsEdu	1842	2.651	3.377	0	15
Newspaper	1842	0.067	0.250	0	1
Radio	1842	0.411	0.492	0	1
TV	1842	0.248	0.432	0	1
FatherEdu	1842	0.455	0.498	0	1
MotherEdu	1842	0.141	0.348	0	1
SelfSuff	1842	0.421	0.494	0	1
Dummy_Muslim	1842	0.525	0.500	0	1
Dummy_Hindu	1842	0.474	0.499	0	1
Dummy_Christian	1842	0.001	0.023	0	1
dummySC_ST	1842	0.123	0.329	0	1
Dummy_WorkCash	1842	0.256	0.437	0	1
Dummy_WorkNoCash	1842	0.366	0.482	0	1
Dummy_NoWork	1842	0.378	0.485	0	1
InterviewAlone	1842	0.508	0.500	0	1
Household Characteristics					
AnnualIncome	1842	20360.800	28042.380	1050	568400
hhradio	1842	0.461	0.499	0	1
hhtv	1842	0.147	0.354	0	1
Community Characteristics					
FPAbort	1329	0.238	0.426	0	1
WmnTechr	1439	0.798	0.401	0	1
NearCity	1515	5.449	1.382	3	8
TVComm	1515	0.750	0.433	0	1
SatComm	1515	0.031	0.173	0	1
WomGrp	1515	0.160	0.367	0	1
WomGrpO	1515	0.000	0.000	0	0
Husband's Characteristics					
hage	1660	33.995	7.661	18	65
hYrsEdu	1660	5.566	4.589	0	19
hNewsPaper	1660	0.501	0.500	0	1
hRadio	1660	0.723	0.447	0	1
hTV	1660	0.245	0.430	0	1
hFatherEdu	1660	0.416	0.493	0	1
hMotherEdu	1660	0.098	0.298	0	1
hDummy_Muslim	1660	0.493	0.500	0	1
hDummy_Hindu	1660	0.507	0.500	0	1
hDummy_Chrstian	1660	0.000	0.000	0	0
hdummySC_ST	1660	0.129	0.335	0	1

Table 12: Determinants of Women's Status in Pakistan

	N	Mean	Std Dev	Minimum	Maximum
Wife's Characteristics					
age	1036	28.505	6.279	15	40
OwnLand	1036	0.035	0.183	0	1
city	1036	0.212	0.409	0	1
YrsEdu	1036	1.077	2.506	0	16
Newspaper	1036	0.014	0.120	0	1
Radio	1036	0.122	0.327	0	1
TV	1036	0.294	0.456	0	1
FatherEdu	1036	0.320	0.467	0	1
MotherEdu	1036	0.035	0.183	0	1
SelfSuff	1036	0.610	0.488	0	1
Dummy_Muslim	1036	0.990	0.098	0	1
Dummy_Other	1036	0.001	0.031	0	1
Dummy_Christian	1036	0.008	0.088	0	1
Dummy_WorkCash	1036	0.319	0.467	0	1
Dummy_WorkNoCash	1036	0.483	0.500	0	1
Dummy_NoWork	1036	0.198	0.399	0	1
InterviewAlone	1011	0.177	0.382	0	1
Household Characteristics					
AnnualIncome	1020	33818.330	132979.740	0	4098000
hhradio	1036	0.321	0.467	0	1
hhtv	1036	0.256	0.437	0	1
Community Characteristics					
FPAbort	933	0.000	0.000	0	0
WmnTechr	1036	1.000	0.000	1	1
NearCity	1036	18.554	12.883	3	45
TVComm	1036	0.925	0.264	0	1
SatComm	1036	0.000	0.000	0	0
WomGrp	1036	0.000	0.000	0	0
WomGrpO	1036	0.000	0.000	0	0
Husband's Characteristics					
hage	474	34.690	8.094	18	62
hYrsEdu	474	4.793	4.138	0	14
hNewspaper	474	0.289	0.454	0	1
hRadio	474	0.435	0.496	0	1
hTV	474	0.508	0.500	0	1
FatherEdu	474	0.266	0.442	0	1
hMotherEdu	474	0.025	0.157	0	1
hDummy_Muslim	474	0.989	0.102	0	1
hDummy_Christian	474	0.011	0.102	0	1

Table 13: Determinants of Women's Status in Thailand

	N	Mean	Std Dev	Minimum	Maximum
Wife's Characteristics					
age	2776	31.688	7.007	15	45
OwnLand	2800	0.358	0.479	0	1
city	2800	0.470	0.499	0	1
YrsEdu	2800	6.146	3.871	0	21
Newspaper	2800	0.308	0.462	0	1
Radio	2800	0.485	0.500	0	1
TV	2800	0.872	0.334	0	1
FatherEdu	2800	0.681	0.466	0	1
MotherEdu	2800	0.651	0.477	0	1
SelfSuff	2800	0.771	0.420	0	1
Dummy_Buddhism	2800	0.909	0.288	0	1
Dummy_Muslim	2800	0.084	0.277	0	1
Dummy_Christian	2800	0.007	0.084	0	1
Dummy_WorkCash	2800	0.906	0.291	0	1
Dummy_WorkNoCash	2800	0.025	0.155	0	1
Dummy_NoWork	2800	0.069	0.253	0	1
InterviewAlone	2800	0.281	0.450	0	1
Household Characteristics					
AnnualIncome	2756	124290.640	125629.070	5000	500000
hhradio	2800	0.722	0.448	0	1
hhtv	2800	0.795	0.404	0	1
Community Characteristics					
Husband's Characteristics					
hage	1462	35.630	8.531	16	74
hYrsEdu	1475	6.847	4.167	0	22
hNewspaper	1475	0.510	0.500	0	1
hRadio	1475	0.605	0.489	0	1
hTV	1475	0.903	0.296	0	1
hFatherEdu	1475	0.710	0.454	0	1
hMotherEdu	1475	0.653	0.476	0	1
hDummy_Buddhism	1475	0.915	0.280	0	1
hDummy_Muslim	1475	0.079	0.269	0	1
hDummy_Christian	1475	0.005	0.073	0	1

Table 14: Autonomy Variable Regression Results: India

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
WIFE CHARACTERISTICS				
Age of wife	.010 (.001) ***	.047 (.006) ***	.047 (.006) ***	.046 (.006) ***
Squared age of wife		-.001 (0) ***	-.0006 (0) ***	-.0006 (0) ***
Land in wife's name	.028 (.018)	.032 (.017) *	.031 (.017) *	.032 (.017) *
Lived in a city/town before marriage	.011 (.011)		.009 (.010)	.010 (.011)
Years of education of wife	.003 (.001) **	.007 (.001) ***	.003 (.001) **	.005 (.001) ***
Read newspaper in the last 1 week	-.008 (.019)		-.007 (.018)	-.003 (.018)
Listened to radio in the last 1 week	.008 (.009)		.008 (.009)	.006 (.010)
Watched TV in the last 1 week	.045 (.011) ***		.044 (.011) ***	.084 (.012) ***
Father educated	.008 (.009)		.007 (.009)	.011 (.009)
Mother educated	.028 (.014) **		.028 (.014) **	.027 (.014) **
Self-sufficient (self and children)	.039 (.008) ***	.037 (.008) ***	.039 (.008) ***	.042 (.008) ***
Muslim	-.010 (.009)	-.015 (.009) *	-.011 (.009)	-.020 (.009) **
SC/ST	.002 (.015)	-.002 (.015)	.002 (.015)	-.005 (.015)
Wife works and earns cash	.085 (.012) ***	.077 (.012) ***	.082 (.012) ***	.073 (.012) ***
Wife works but does not earn cash	-.035 (.010) ***	-.039 (.010) ***	-.037 (.010) ***	-.031 (.010) ***
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS				
Household Annual Income				-5.75e-07 (0) ***
Does anyone in the household own a radio				.007 (.010)
Does anyone in the household own a TV				-.083 (.016) ***
HUSBAND CHARACTERISTICS				
Husband's age				
Husband's years of education				
SOCIAL/NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS				
Abortion a viable option for family planning				
At least one teacher who is a woman				
Nearest City (kms)				
TV facility in the community				
Satellite dish available in community				
Women's group				
CONTROLS				
Interviewed Alone				
State dummy (TN)				
Constant	.096 (.023) ***	-.387 (.090) ***	-.390 (.090) ***	-.375 (.089) ***
Number of Obs	1842	1842	1842	1842
R-sq	0.193	0.194	0.206	0.226
Adj R-sq	0.187	0.190	0.200	0.218

*** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%

Table 15: Autonomy Variable Regression Results: India

	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
WIFE CHARACTERISTICS				
Age of wife	.038 (.007) ***	.048 (.008) ***	.049 (.008) ***	.050 (.008) ***
Squared age of wife	-.0006 (0) ***	-.0006 (0) ***	-.0006 (0) ***	-.0006 (0) ***
Land in wife's name	.012 (.017)	.029 (.024)	.030 (.024)	.036 (.023)
Lived in a city/town before marriage	.021 (.011) **	.030 (.013) **	.031 (.013) **	
Years of education of wife	.004 (.001) ***	-.002 (.002)	-.002 (.002)	0 (.002)
Read newspaper in the last 1 week	.013 (.020)	.034 (.021) *	.035 (.021) *	
Listened to radio in the last 1 week	.006 (.010)	-.011 (.012)	-.011 (.012)	
Watched TV in the last 1 week	.086 (.013) ***	.063 (.016) ***	.064 (.016) ***	
Father educated	.011 (.009)	.003 (.011)	.003 (.011)	
Mother educated	.036 (.014) **	.018 (.015)	.019 (.015)	
Self-sufficient (self and children)	.047 (.008) ***	.102 (.011) ***	.101 (.011) ***	.099 (.011) ***
Muslim	-.045 (.010) ***	-.038 (.014) **	-.038 (.014) **	-.037 (.014) **
SC/ST	-.010 (.016)	-.026 (.020)	-.027 (.020)	-.025 (.020)
Wife works and earns cash	.070 (.012) ***	.049 (.014) ***	.050 (.015) ***	.044 (.015) ***
Wife works but does not earn cash	-.035 (.010) ***	-.013 (.014)	-.013 (.014)	-.016 (.014)
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS				
Household Annual Income	-5.25e-07 (0) **	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Does anyone in the household own a radio	.005 (.010)	.010 (.012)	.010 (.012)	.007 (.011)
Does anyone in the household own a TV	-.084 (.017) ***	-.063 (.021) ***	-.063 (.021) ***	-.018 (.018)
HUSBAND CHARACTERISTICS				
Husband's age	.002 (.001) **	0 (.001)	0 (.001)	-.001 (.001)
Husband's years of education	-.002 (.0012) *	.001 (.001)	.001 (.001)	.002 (.001)
SOCIAL/NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS				
Abortion a viable option for family planning		-.117 (.032) ***	-.113 (.032) ***	-.116 (.033) ***
At least one teacher who is a woman		-.079 (.022) ***	-.079 (.022) ***	-.076 (.023) ***
Nearest City (kms)		-.015 (.009)	-.014 (.009)	-.017 (.009) *
TV facility in the community		.046 (.021) **	.046 (.021) **	.056 (.021) ***
Satellite dish available in community		-.001 (.034)	-.002 (.034)	-.015 (.032)
Women's group		.016 (.017)	.016 (.017)	0 (.018)
CONTROLS				
Interviewed Alone			.011 (.011)	.007 (.011)
State dummy (TN)				
Constant	-.305 (.094) ***	-.224 (.124) *	-.236 (.125)	-.221 (.127) *
Number of Obs	1660	1095	1095	1095
R-sq	0.2418	0.3183	0.3189	0.2998
Adj R-sq	0.2325	0.3017	0.3017	0.2861

*** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%

Table 16: Autonomy Variable Regression Results: Pakistan

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
WIFE CHARACTERISTICS				
Age of wife	0.011 (.001) ***	.042 (.008) ***	.042 (.008) ***	.041 (.008) ***
Squared age of wife		-.0005 (0) ***	-.0005 (0) ***	-.0005 (0) ***
Land in wife's name	.038 (.036)	.046 (.034)	.046 (.036)	.050 (.037)
Lived in a city/town before marriage	.033 (.016) **		.034 (.016) **	.037 (.016) **
Years of education of wife	-.001 (.002)	0 (.002)	-.001 (.002)	-.0008 (.002)
Read newspaper in the last 1 week	.059 (.051)		.061 (.053)	.060 (.053)
Listened to radio in the last 1 week	-.051 (.024) **		-.053 (.024) **	-.056 (.024) **
Watched TV in the last 1 week	.015 (.017)		.016 (.017)	.030 (.021)
Father educated	-.005 (.014)		-.006 (.014)	-.006 (.014)
Mother educated	.012 (.032)		.005 (.031)	.004 (.032)
Self-sufficient (self and children)	.062 (.013) ***	.061 (.013) ***	.064 (.013) ***	.065 (.013) ***
Non Muslim	0.144 (.074) **	.153 (.074) **	.147 (.074) **	.146 (.074) **
Wife works and earns cash	-.029 (.019)	-.028 (.019)	-.028 (.019)	-.029 (.019)
Wife works but does not earn cash	-.016 (.017)	-.013 (.017)	-.013 (.017)	-.013 (.017)
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS				
Household Annual Income				0 (0)
Does anyone in the household own a radio				-.001 (.0146)
Does anyone in the household own a TV				-.014 (.019)
HUSBAND CHARACTERISTICS				
Husband's age				
Husband's years of education				
SOCIAL/NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS				
Abortion a viable option for family planning				
At least one teacher who is a woman				
Nearest City (kms)				
TV facility in the community				
Satellite dish available in community				
Women's group				
Controls				
Interviewed Alone				
Beerbal				
Bhosin				
Chak 48/12L				
Dab				
Chake 409GB				
Khokar Bala				
Kot Soondki				
Rakh Kikran Wali				
Samote				
Ali Kharak (reference)				
Constant	-.008 (.030)	-.428 (.112) ***	-.440 (.112) ***	-.415 (.113) ***
Number of Obs	1036	1036	1036	1020
R-sq	0.136	0.1372	0.1464	0.1466
Adj R-sq	0.1250	0.1305	0.1347	0.1321

*** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%

Table 17: Autonomy Variable Regression Results: Pakistan

	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
WIFE CHARACTERISTICS				
Age of wife	.046 (.011) ***	.043 (.011) **	.051 (.011) ***	.051 (.012) ***
Squared age of wife	-.0006 (0) ***	-.0006 (0) ***	-.0007 (0) ***	-.0007 (0) ***
Land in wife's name	.046 (.048)	.039 (.043)	.043 (.045)	.046 (.045)
Lived in a city/town before marriage	.025 (.023)	.021 (.023)	.018 (.022)	
Years of education of wife	.002 (.004)	.0007 (.003)	.001 (.004)	.002 (.003)
Read newspaper in the last 1 week	-.009 (.043)	.011 (.04)	-.006 (.046)	
Listened to radio in the last 1 week	-.041 (.035)	-.037 (.034)	-.033 (.034)	
Watched TV in the last 1 week	-.022 (.030)	-.02 (.03)	-.037 (.029)	
Father educated	.007 (.022)	.009 (.021)	.010 (.021)	
Mother educated	.070 (.049)	.078 (.045) *	.084 (.041) **	
Self-sufficient (self and children)	.054 (.019) ***	.049 (.019) **	.030 (.019)	.030 (.019)
Non Muslim	.095 (.109)	.094 (.108)	.127 (.1)	.141 (.087) *
Wife works and earns cash	-.037 (.030)	-.036 (.029)	-.03 (.031)	-.030 (.031)
Wife works but does not earn cash	-.040 (.026)	-.034 (.025)	-.03 (.026)	-.027 (.025)
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS				
Household Annual Income	-3.78e-08 (0) **	-3.62e-08 (0) *	-5.27e-08 (0) ***	-6.34e-08 (0) ***
Does anyone in the household own a radio	.008 (.021)	.012 (.02)	.004 (.022)	-.002 (.021)
Does anyone in the household own a TV	.01 (.027)	.001 (.027)	.018 (.026)	-.011 (.021)
HUSBAND CHARACTERISTICS				
Husband's age	.003 (.002) *	.0024 (.0016)	.004 (.001) ***	.004 (.001) ***
Husband's years of education	.0005 (.002)	.001 (.002)	.003 (.003)	.004 (.003)
SOCIAL/NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS				
Abortion a viable option for family planning				
At least one teacher who is a woman				
Nearest City (kms)		-.001 (.0007)		
TV facility in the community		-.123 (.042) ***		
Satellite dish available in community				
Women's group				
Definitions				
Interviewed Alone			-.002 (.024)	-.003 (.024)
Beerbal			-.119 (.041) ***	-.115 (.040) ***
Bhosin			-.069 (.037) *	-.065 (.038) *
Chak 48/12L			-.141 (.038) ***	-.127 (.038) ***
Dab			-.141 (.044) ***	-.130 (.044) ***
Chake 409GB			-.045 (.041)	-.045 (.041)
Khokar Bala			-.072 (.047)	-.051 (.046)
Kot Soondki			.074 (.053)	.090 (.054) *
Rakh Kikran Wali			-.035 (.045)	-.027 (.045)
Samote			-.100 (.044) **	-.093 (.044) **
Ali Kharak (reference)				
Constant	-.513 (.170) ***	-.346 (.174) **	-.567 (.171) ***	-.574 (.174) ***
Number of Obs	461	461	450	450
R-sq	0.1363	0.1638	0.2072	0.1911
Adj R-sq	0.0991	0.1238	0.1525	0.1474

*** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%

Table 18: Autonomy Variable Regression Results: Thailand

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
WIFE CHARACTERISTICS				
Age of wife	.005 (.0005) ***	.045 (.004) ***	.045 (.004) ***	.044 (.004) ***
Squared age of wife		-.0006 (0) ***	-.0006 (0) ***	-.0006 (0) ***
Land in wife's name	.025 (.007) ***	.027 (.007) ***	.026 (.007) ***	.022 (.007) ***
Lived in a city/town before marriage	-.013 (.008) *		-.012 (.007) *	-.014 (.008) *
Years of education of wife	.003 (.001) ***	.001 (0) **	.002 (.001) **	.001 (.001)
Read newspaper in the last 1 week	-.004 (.008)		-.010 (.007)	-.010 (.008)
Listened to radio in the last 1 week	-.008 (.007)		-.005 (.007)	-.002 (.007)
Watched TV in the last 1 week	.021 (.011) **		.017 (.010) *	.013 (.011)
Father educated	-.002 (.008)		0 (.008)	0 (.008)
Mother educated	.010 (.008)		.008 (.008)	.009 (.008)
Self-sufficient (self and children)	.027 (.008) ***	.026 (.008) ***	.027 (.008) ***	.021 (.008) **
Muslim	-.054 (.013) ***	-.058(.014) ***	-.058 (.014) ***	-.064 (.014) ***
Christian	.071 (.025) ***	.067 (.026) **	.069 (.026) ***	.061 (.027) **
Wife works and earns cash	.052 (.015) ***	.050 (.015) ***	.049 (.015) ***	.037 (.014) **
Wife works but does not earn cash	-.005 (.027)	.003 (.027)	.003 (.027)	-.008 (.027)
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS				
Household Annual Income				6.29e-08 (0) **
Does anyone in the household own a radio				-.010 (.008)
Does anyone in the household own a TV				.008 (.010)
HUSBAND CHARACTERISTICS				
Husband's age				
Husband's years of education				
CONTROLS				
Interviewed Alone				
Bangkok	.001 (.011)	-.003 (.010)	.003 (.011)	-.002 (.011)
Central				
North				
South				
Constant	.469 (.026) ***	-.109 (.073)	-.122 (.074) *	-.074 (.073)
Number of Obs	2776	2776	2776	2733
R-sq	0.0752	0.1011	0.1042	0.1015
Adj R-sq	0.0702	0.0978	0.0990	0.0952

*** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%

Table 19: Autonomy Variable Regression Results: Thailand

	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
WIFE CHARACTERISTICS				
Age of wife	.037 (.006) ***	.036 (.006) ***	.036 (.006) ***	.037 (.006) ***
Squared age of wife	-.0005 (0) ***	-.0004 (0) ***	-.0005 (0) ***	-.0005 (0) ***
Land in wife's name	.021 (.009) **	.021 (.009) **	.018 (.009) *	.019 (.009) **
Lived in a city/town before marriage	-.019 (.010) *	-.019 (.010) *	-.019 (.010) *	
Years of education of wife	.004 (.002)**	.004 (.0017) **	.004 (.0017) **	.004 (.0017) **
Read newspaper in the last 1 week	-.005 (.01)	-.004 (.010)	-.004 (.010)	
Listened to radio in the last 1 week	-.001 (.009)	0 (.009)	-.001 (.009)	
Watched TV in the last 1 week	.011 (.015)	.014(.015)	.012 (.015)	
Father educated	-.004 (.011)	-.004 (.011)	-.006 (.011)	
Mother educated	.023 (.011) **	.023 (.011) **	.023 (.011) **	
Self-sufficient (self and children)	.019 (.010) *	.020 (.010) *	.020 (.011) *	.020 (.011) *
Muslim	-.038 (.017) **	-.042 (.017) **	-.062 (.019) ***	-.060 (.019) ***
Christian	.067 (.023) ***	.059 (.023) **	.063 (.023) ***	.056(.025) **
Wife works and earns cash	.017 (.019)	.017 (.019)	.016 (.019)	.016 (.019)
Wife works but does not earn cash	-.008 (.035)	-.012 (.035)	-.010 (.036)	-.012 (.036)
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS				
Household Annual Income	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Does anyone in the household own a radio	-.006 (.011)	-.006 (.011)	-.004 (.011)	-.004 (.011)
Does anyone in the household own a TV	.009 (.013)	.009 (.013)	.010 (.013)	.013 (.012)
HUSBAND CHARACTERISTICS				
Husband's age	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Husband's years of education	-.003 (.002) *	-.003 (.0016) *	-.003 (.0016) *	-.0032 (.0016) **
CONTROLS				
Interviewed Alone		-.035 (.010) ***	-.036 (.010) ***	-.036 (.010) ***
Bangkok	-.007 (.016)	-.008 (.016)	-.029 (.018)	-.036 (.018) **
Central			-.030 (.014) **	-.033 (.014) **
North			-.024 (.013) *	-.022 (.013) *
South (Reference)				
Constant	.055 (.099)	.075 (.099)	.093 (.100)	.099 (.099)
Number of Obs	1437	1437	1437	1437
R-sq	0.088	0.0958	0.0986	0.0931
Adj R-sq	0.0745	0.0817	0.0833	0.0816

*** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%

Table 20: Beating Acceptability Regression Results: India

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
WIFE CHARACTERISTICS				
Age of wife	-.0003 (.001)	-.015 (.012)	-.014 (.011)	-.014 (.011)
Squared age of wife		0 (0)	0 (0)	.0002 (.0002)
Land in wife's name	.072 (.034) **	.070 (.035) **	.071 (.033) **	.071 (.033) **
Lived in a city/town before marriage	.111 (.020) ***		.112 (.020) ***	.111 (.020) ***
Years of education of wife	.006 (.003) **	.003 (.002)	.006 (.003) **	.005 (.003) *
Read newspaper in the last 1 week	.081 (.034) **		.080 (.034) **	.084 (.033) **
Listened to radio in the last 1 week	-.014 (.016)		-.014 (.016)	-.023 (.018)
Watched TV in the last 1 week	-.115 (.020) ***		-.115 (.020) ***	-.139 (.023) ***
Father educated	-.004 (.018)		-.004 (.018)	-.005 (.018)
Mother educated	-.040 (.025)		-.040 (.025)	-.041 (.025) *
Self-sufficient (self and children)	-.002 (.016)	0 (.016)	-.002 (.016)	-.002 (.016)
Muslim	-.088 (.017) ***	-.070 (.018) ***	-.088 (.017) ***	-.082 (.018) ***
SC/ST	-.020 (.027)	-.010 (.027)	-.020 (.027)	-.018 (.027)
Wife works and earns cash	-.042 (.021) **	-.040 (.021) *	-.040 (.021) *	-.036 (.021) *
Wife works but does not earn cash	-.003 (.019)	.001 (.019)	-.003 (.019)	-.004 (.019)
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS				
Household Annual Income				0 (0)
Does anyone in the household own a radio				.019 (.019)
Does anyone in the household own a TV				.057 (.030) *
HUSBAND CHARACTERISTICS				
Husband's age				
Husband's years of education				
SOCIAL/NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS				
Abortion a viable option for family planning				
At least one teacher who is a woman				
Nearest City (kms)				
TV facility in the community				
Satellite dish available in community				
Women's group				
CONTROLS				
Interviewed Alone				
State dummy (TN)				
Constant	.554 (.042) ***	.749 (.164) ***	.751 (.160) ***	.745 (.160) ***
Number of Obs	1842	1842	1842	1842
R-sq	0.0544	0.0176	0.0552	0.0579
Adj R-sq	0.0472	0.0128	0.0474	0.0486

*** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%

Table 21: Beating Acceptability Regression Results: India

	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
WIFE CHARACTERISTICS				
Age of wife	-.005 (.012)	.012 (.015)	-.002 (.012)	.013 (.015)
Squared age of wife	.0001 (.0002)	-.0002 (.0002)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Land in wife's name	.093 (.036) **	.056 (.043)	.066 (.034) *	.052 (.044)
Lived in a city/town before marriage	.096 (.022) ***	.037 (.023)	.063 (.020) ***	
Years of education of wife	.003 (.003)	.0061 (.0037) *	.010 (.003) ***	.006 (.0035) *
Read newspaper in the last 1 week	.083 (.036) **	.057 (.038)	.068 (.035) *	
Listened to radio in the last 1 week	-.016 (.019)	.002 (.023)	-.020 (.019)	
Watched TV in the last 1 week	-.140 (.024) ***	-.073 (.027) ***	-.085 (.025) ***	
Father educated	-.017 (.019)	-.028 (.021)	.006 (.018)	
Mother educated	-.056 (.027) **	-.040 (.027)	-.027 (.026)	
Self-sufficient (self and children)	-.017 (.017)	-.060 (.020) ***	-.062 (.017) ***	-.061 (.020) ***
Muslim	-.058 (.019) ***	-.105 (.025) ***	-.066 (.018) ***	-.097 (.025) ***
SC/ST	-.013 (.028)	-.038 (.036)	-.020 (.027)	-.025 (.035)
Wife works and earns cash	-.017 (.023)	-.009 (.026)	.020 (.022)	-.006 (.026)
Wife works but does not earn cash	0 (.020)	-.042 (.025) *	-.044 (.020) **	-.045 (.025) *
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS				
Household Annual Income	0 (0)	0 (0)	-8.37e-07 (0) *	0 (0)
Does anyone in the household own a radio	.011 (.020)	-.015 (.022)	.026 (.020)	-.018 (.020)
Does anyone in the household own a TV	.061 (.032) *	.109 (.037) ***	.014 (.033)	.064 (.033) *
HUSBAND CHARACTERISTICS				
Husband's age	-.001 (.002)	.002 (.002)	.002 (.002)	.003 (.002)
Husband's years of education	.006 (.002) ***	0 (.002)	.002 (.002)	0 (.002)
SOCIAL/NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS				
Abortion a viable option for family planning		.424 (.058) ***		.439 (.057) ***
At least one teacher who is a woman		.004 (.039)		.011 (.038)
Nearest City (kms)		-.006 (.017)		-.003 (.017)
TV facility in the community		.048 (.037)		.033 (.037)
Satellite dish available in community		.058 (.063)		.059 (.064)
Women's group		-.051 (.037)		-.040 (.036)
CONTROLS				
Interviewed Alone		.026 (.020)	-.025 (.017)	.024 (.020)
State dummy (TN)			-.202 (.020) ***	
Constant	.631 (.168) ***	.227 (.223)	.628 (.164) ***	.160 (.222)
Number of Obs	1660	1095	1660	1095
R-sq	0.0598	0.2506	0.1168	0.2402
Adj R-sq	0.0483	0.2316	0.1049	0.2253

*** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%

Table 22: Beating Acceptability Regression Results: Pakistan

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
WIFE CHARACTERISTICS				
Age of wife	-.003 (.0018) **	-.038 (.016) **	-.040 (.016) **	-.042 (.016) **
Squared age of wife		.0006 (0) **	.0006 (0) **	.0006 (0) **
Land in wife's name	.009 (.056)	0 (.055)	.001 (.056)	-.006 (.057)
Lived in a city/town before marriage	.068 (.029) **		.067 (.028) **	.068 (.029) **
Years of education of wife	.009 (.005) *	.018 (.004)	.009 (.005) *	.009 (.005) *
Read newspaper in the last 1 week	.137 (.069) **		.134 (.071) *	.132 (.071) *
Listened to radio in the last 1 week	.093 (.041) **		.096 (.041) **	.104 (.043) **
Watched TV in the last 1 week	.006 (.031)		.006 (.031)	0 (.035)
Father educated	.019 (.025)		.021 (.025)	.021 (.026)
Mother educated	.036 (.060)		.044 (.061)	.037 (.063)
Self-sufficient (self and children)	-.012 (.024)	-.007 (.023)	-.014 (.024)	-.018 (.024)
Non Muslim	-.028 (.131)	-.055 (.131)	-.032 (.131)	-.035 (.131)
Wife works and earns cash	.003 (.034)	-.003 (.034)	.001 (.034)	.004 (.034)
Wife works but does not earn cash	-.050 (.032)	-.062 (.032) *	-.054 (.032) *	-.052 (.032) *
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS				
Household Annual Income				1.11e-07 (0) ***
Does anyone in the household own a radio				-.025 (.026)
Does anyone in the household own a TV				.008 (.033)
HUSBAND CHARACTERISTICS				
Husband's age				
Husband's years of education				
SOCIAL/NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS				
Abortion a viable option for family planning				
At least one teacher who is a woman				
Nearest City (kms)				
TV facility in the community				
Satellite dish available in community				
Women's group				
Controls				
Interviewed Alone				
Beerbal				
Bhosin				
Chak 48/12L				
Dab				
Chake 409GB				
Khokar Bala				
Kot Soondki				
Rakh Kikran Wali				
Samote				
Ali Kharak (reference)				
Constant	.497 (.061) ***	1 (.239) ***	.994 (.239) ***	1.024 (.240) ***
Number of Obs	1036	1036	1036	1020
R-sq	0.0465	0.0334	0.0513	0.054
Adj R-sq	0.0344	0.0259	0.0383	0.0380

*** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%

Table 23: Beating Acceptability Regression Results: Pakistan

	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
WIFE CHARACTERISTICS				
Age of wife	-.021 (.024)	-.024 (.024)	-.021 (.025)	-.019 (.025)
Squared age of wife	.0003 (.0004)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Land in wife's name	.037 (.086)	.056 (.083)	.059 (.082)	.042 (.078)
Lived in a city/town before marriage	.011 (.041)	.009 (.040)	.007 (.040)	
Years of education of wife	.018 (.007) **	.019 (.007) ***	.020 (.007) ***	.024 (.007) ***
Read newspaper in the last 1 week	.292 (.124) **	.263 (.113) **	.269 (.129) **	
Listened to radio in the last 1 week	.099 (.061) *	.103 (.061) *	.095 (.061)	
Watched TV in the last 1 week	.032 (.050)	.025 (.052)	.013 (.050)	
Father educated	.018 (.039)	.023 (.039)	.030 (.040)	
Mother educated	-.021 (.093)	-.011 (.095)	-.022 (.095)	
Self-sufficient (self and children)	.041 (.035)	.033 (.037)	.032 (.038)	.039 (.037)
Non Muslim	-.161 (.147)	-.174 (.126)	-.137 (.123)	-.149 (.111)
Wife works and earns cash	.024 (.052)	.017 (.052)	.018 (.055)	.007 (.055)
Wife works but does not earn cash	-.008 (.047)	0 (.047)	-.005 (.049)	-.018 (.048)
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS				
Household Annual Income	1.18e-07 (0) ***	1.21e-07 (0) ***	1.17e-07 (0) ***	1.27e-07 (0) ***
Does anyone in the household own a radio	-.015 (.037)	-.021 (.038)	-.012 (.040)	.006 (.038)
Does anyone in the household own a TV	-.018 (.048)	-.015 (.049)	.014 (.049)	.046 (.041)
HUSBAND CHARACTERISTICS				
Husband's age	.002 (.002)	.002 (.002)	.002 (.003)	.001 (.002)
Husband's years of education	-.007 (.004)	-.006 (.004)	-.005 (.004)	-.005 (.004)
SOCIAL/NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS				
Abortion a viable option for family planning				
At least one teacher who is a woman				
Nearest City (kms)		-.0004 (.001)		
TV facility in the community		.103 (.062) *		
Satellite dish available in community				
Women's group				
Controls				
Interviewed Alone		.122 (.039) ***	.126 (.040) ***	.120 (.040) ***
Beerbal			-.137 (.083) *	-.149 (.082) *
Bhosin			-.218 (.073) ***	-.220 (.073) ***
Chak 48/12L			-.186 (.083) **	-.199 (.082) **
Dab			-.135 (.087)	-.132 (.087)
Chake 409GB			-.113 (.080)	-.115 (.080)
Khokar Bala			-.158 (.087) *	-.179 (.086) **
Kot Soondki			-.253 (.088) ***	-.271 (.087) ***
Rakh Kikran Wali			-.158 (.080) **	-.165 (.079) **
Samote			-.188 (.089) **	-.196 (.089) **
Ali Kharak (reference)				
Constant	.610 (.357)	.535 (.365)	.704 (.363) *	.717 (.358) **
Number of Obs	461	450	450	450
R-sq	0.0651	0.0891	0.1121	0.1121
Adj R-sq	0.0248	0.0422	0.0508	0.0508

*** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%

Table 24: Son Preference Regression Results: India

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
WIFE CHARACTERISTICS				
Age of wife	.010 (.004) **	.010 (.005) **	-.028 (.046)	-.028 (.046)
Squared age of wife			.0006 (.0008)	.0006 (.0008)
Land in wife's name	.125 (.132)	.125 (.132)	.121 (.132)	.120 (.132)
Lived in a city/town before marriage	.120 (.132)		.121 (.074) *	.121 (.074) *
Years of education of wife	-.018 (.011)	-.021 (.009) **	-.018 (.011)	-.019 (.011) *
Read newspaper in the last 1 week	-.249 (.138) *		-.251 (.138) *	-.265 (.139) *
Listened to radio in the last 1 week	.014 (.064)		.013 (.064)	.022 (.074)
Watched TV in the last 1 week	.008 (.077)		.009 (.077)	.007 (.091)
Father educated	.024 (.068)		.025 (.068)	.022 (.068)
Mother educated	-.007 (.097)		-.007 (.097)	-.006 (.097)
Self-sufficient (self and children)	.027 (.061)	.029 (.061)	.027 (.061)	.023 (.062)
Muslim	-.097 (.068)	-.104 (.067)	-.097 (.068)	-.094 (.069)
SC/ST	.001 (.103)	-.007 (.101)	.001 (.103)	.011 (.103)
Wife works and earns cash	-.086 (.083)	-.094 (.083)	-.083 (.084)	-.077 (.084)
Wife works but does not earn cash	.029 (.073)	.032 (.072)	.030 (.073)	.022 (.073)
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS				
Household Annual Income				0 (0)
Does anyone in the household own a radio				-.027 (.075)
Does anyone in the household own a TV				-.026 (.116)
HUSBAND CHARACTERISTICS				
Husband's age				
Husband's years of education				
SOCIAL/NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS				
Abortion a viable option for family planning				
At least one teacher who is a woman				
Nearest City (kms)				
TV facility in the community				
Satellite dish available in community				
Women's group				
CONTROLS				
Interviewed Alone				
State dummy (TN)				
Constant	-.530 (.161) ***	-.469 (.156) ***	-.014 (.638)	-.029 (.638)
Number of Obs	1830	1830	1830	1830
Pseudo R-sq	0.0089	0.0063	0.0092	0.0102
LLH	-1205.21	-1208.32	-1204.8669	-1203.6343

*** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%

Table 25: Son Preference Regression Results: India

	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
WIFE CHARACTERISTICS				
Age of wife	-.044 (.050)	.049 (.066)	.049 (.066)	.014 (.013)
Squared age of wife	.0009 (.0008)	0 (.001)	0 (.001)	
Land in wife's name	.085 (.146)	.150 (.199)	.148 (.199)	.142 (.198)
Lived in a city/town before marriage	.87 (.079)	.018 (.103)	.016 (.103)	
Years of education of wife	-.027 (.012) **	-.031 (.015) **	-.031 (.015) **	-.036 (.014) **
Read newspaper in the last 1 week	-.226 (.149)	-.263 (.167)	-.264 (.167)	
Listened to radio in the last 1 week	.047 (.078)	.075 (.097)	.075 (.097)	
Watched TV in the last 1 week	.031 (.097)	.074 (.115)	.074 (.115)	
Father educated	.030 (.073)	.044 (.089)	.044 (.089)	
Mother educated	-.049 (.105)	.018 (.118)	.017 (.118)	
Self-sufficient (self and children)	.021 (.065)	.046 (.086)	.046 (.086)	.052 (.086)
Muslim	-.063 (.074)	.083 (.107)	.082 (.107)	.081 (.106)
SC/ST	.064 (.107)	.010 (.147)	.011 (.147)	-.011 (.145)
Wife works and earns cash	-.025 (.090)	-.111 (.112)	-.111 (.112)	-.116 (.111)
Wife works but does not earn cash	.034 (.078)	-.176 (.107) *	-.177 (.107) *	-.180 (.107) *
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS				
Household Annual Income	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Does anyone in the household own a radio	-.059 (.080)	-.036 (.098)	-.037 (.098)	.006 (.086)
Does anyone in the household own a TV	-.060 (.124)	-.109 (.158)	-.109 (.158)	-.073 (.141)
HUSBAND CHARACTERISTICS				
Husband's age	.003 (.009)	.007 (.011)	.007 (.011)	.006 (.011)
Husband's years of education	.019 (.008) **	.017 (.012)	.017 (.012)	.018 (.011)
SOCIAL/NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS				
Abortion a viable option for family planning		.154 (.251)	.148 (.253)	.129 (.252)
At least one teacher who is a woman		.057 (.163)	.056 (.163)	.041 (.162)
Nearest City (kms)		-.037 (.073)	-.037 (.073)	-.043 (.073)
TV facility in the community		-.255(.160)	-.254 (.160)	-.244 (.158)
Satellite dish available in community		.323 (.262)	.324 (.262)	.319 (.261)
Women's group		-.020 (.150)	-.020 (.150)	-.040 (.147)
CONTROLS				
Interviewed Alone			-.018 (.086)	-.018 (.086)
State dummy (TN)				
Constant	-.019(.679)	-1.25 (.971)	-1.231 (.975)	-.633 (.379) *
Number of Obs	1648	1085	1085	1085
Pseudo R-sq	0.013	0.0258	0.0259	0.023
LLH	-1079.0781	-688.58965	-688.56661	-690.57825

*** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%

Table 26: Son Preference Marginal Effects: India

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
WIFE CHARACTERISTICS				
Age of wife	.003 (.001) **	.004 (.002) **	-.010 (.017)	-.010 (.017)
Squared age of wife			.0002 (.0003)	.0002 (.0003)
Land in wife's name	.048 (.051)	.048 (.051)	.047 (.051)	.046 (.051)
Lived in a city/town before marriage	.046 (.028) *		.046 (.028) *	.046 (.028) *
Years of education of wife	-.006 (.004)	-.008 (.003)**	-.006 (.004)	-.007 (.004) *
Read newspaper in the last 1 week	-.091 (.048) *		-.091 (.048) *	-.096 (.048) **
Listened to radio in the last 1 week	.005 (.024)		.005 (.024)	.008 (.028)
Watched TV in the last 1 week	.003 (.029)		.003 (.029)	.002 (.034)
Father educated	.009 (.025)		.009 (.025)	.008 (.025)
Mother educated	-.002 (.037)		-.002 (.037)	-.002 (.037)
Self-sufficient (self and children)	.010 (.023)	.011 (.023)	.010 (.023)	.009 (.023)
Muslim	-.037 (.026)	-.040 (.025)	-.037 (.026)	-.035 (.026)
SC/ST	.0005 (.039)	-.002 (.038)	.0004 (.039)	.004 (.039)
Wife works and earns cash	-.032 (.031)	-.035 (.031)	-.031 (.031)	-.029 (.031)
Wife works but does not earn cash	.011 (.027)	.012 (.027)	.011 (.027)	.008 (.028)
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS				
Household Annual Income				0 (0)
Does anyone in the household own a radio				-.010 (.028)
Does anyone in the household own a TV				-.009 (.043)
HUSBAND CHARACTERISTICS				
Husband's age				
Husband's years of education				
SOCIAL/NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS				
Abortion a viable option for family planning				
At least one teacher who is a woman				
Nearest City (kms)				
TV facility in the community				
Satellite dish available in community				
Women's group				
CONTROLS				
Interviewed Alone				
State dummy (TN)				

*** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%

Table 27: Son Preference Marginal Effects: India

	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
WIFE CHARACTERISTICS				
Age of wife	-.016 (.019)	.018 (.024)	.018 (.024)	.005 (.005)
Squared age of wife	.0003 (.0003)	0 (0)	0 (0)	
Land in wife's name	.032 (.057)	.057 (.077)	.056 (.077)	.053 (.076)
Lived in a city/town before marriage	.033 (.030)	.006 (.038)	.006 (.038)	
Years of education of wife	-.010 (.004) **	-.011 (.005) **	-.011 (.005) **	-.013 (.005) **
Read newspaper in the last 1 week	-.082 (.052)	-.093 (.055) *	-.093 (.055) *	
Listened to radio in the last 1 week	.018 (.030)	.028 (.036)	.028 (.036)	
Watched TV in the last 1 week	.012 (.037)	.027 (.043)	.027 (.043)	
Father educated	.011 (.027)	.016 (.033)	.016 (.033)	
Mother educated	-.018 (.039)	.006 (.044)	.006 (.044)	
Self-sufficient (self and children)	.008 (.024)	.017 (.032)	.017 (.032)	.019 (.032)
Muslim	-.023 (.028)	.030 (.039)	.030 (.039)	.030 (.039)
SC/ST	.024 (.041)	.003 (.054)	.004 (.054)	-.004 (.053)
Wife works and earns cash	-.009 (.034)	-.041 (.041)	-.041 (.041)	-.042 (.040)
Wife works but does not earn cash	.013 (.029)	-.064 (.038) *	-.064 (.038) *	-.065 (.038) *
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS				
Household Annual Income	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Does anyone in the household own a radio	-.022 (.030)	-.013 (.036)	-.013 (.036)	.002 (.032)
Does anyone in the household own a TV	-.022 (.046)		-.039 (.056)	-.027 (.051)
HUSBAND CHARACTERISTICS				
Husband's age	.001 (.003)	.002 (.004)	.002 (.004)	.002 (.004)
Husband's years of education	.007 (.003) **	.006 (.004)	.006 (.004)	.006 (.004)
SOCIAL/NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS				
Abortion a viable option for family planning		.058 (.095)	.055 (.096)	.048 (.095)
At least one teacher who is a woman		.021 (.059)	.020 (.059)	.015 (.059)
Nearest City (kms)		-.013 (.027)	-.013 (.027)	-.015 (.059)
TV facility in the community		-.097 (.061)	-.096 (.062)	-.092 (.060)
Satellite dish available in community		.125 (.104)	.125 (.104)	.123 (.103)
Women's group		-.007 (.055)	-.007 (.055)	-.015 (.054)
CONTROLS				
Interviewed Alone			-.006 (.032)	-.006 (.032)
State dummy (TN)				

*** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%

Table 28: Son Preference Regression Results: Pakistan

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
WIFE CHARACTERISTICS				
Age of wife	-.003 (.006)	-.003 (.006)	.084 (.057)	.085 (.057)
Squared age of wife			-.001 (.001)	-.001 (.001)
Land in wife's name	-.009 (.219)	-.002 (.217)	.010 (.220)	.070 (.223)
Lived in a city/town before marriage	.017 (.099)		.020 (.100)	.037 (.100)
Years of education of wife	-.040 (.018) **	-.042 (.016) **	-.040 (.018) **	-.031 (.018) *
Read newspaper in the last 1 week	-.669 (.389) *		-.667 (.391) *	-.700 (.398) *
Listened to radio in the last 1 week	-.160 (.149)		-.165 (.149)	-.141 (.156)
Watched TV in the last 1 week	.152 (.108)		.153 (.109)	.314 (.136) **
Father educated	.030 (.090)		.027 (.090)	.042 (.091)
Mother educated	-.090 (.223)		-.111 (.224)	-.020 (.230)
Self-sufficient (self and children)	-.077 (.082)	-.075 (.082)	-.071 (.083)	-.077 (.084)
Non Muslim	.114 (.421)	.153 (.421)	.125 (.420)	.113 (.419)
Wife works and earns cash	-.203 (.118) *	-.215 (.117) *	-.201 (.118) *	-.231 (.119) *
Wife works but does not earn cash	-.112 (.108)	-.122 (.107)	-.104 (.108)	-.122 (.109)
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS				
Household Annual Income				0 (0)
Does anyone in the household own a radio				-.041 (.094)
Does anyone in the household own a TV				-.272 (.127) **
HUSBAND CHARACTERISTICS				
Husband's age				
Husband's years of education				
SOCIAL/NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS				
Abortion a viable option for family planning				
At least one teacher who is a woman				
Nearest City (kms)				
TV facility in the community				
Satellite dish available in community				
Women's group				
CONTROLS				
Interviewed Alone				
Beerbal				
Bhosin				
Chak 48/12L				
Dab				
Chake 409GB				
Khokar Bala				
Kot Soondki				
Rakh Kikran Wali				
Samote				
Ali Kharak (reference)				
Constant	.235 (.204)	.258 (.200)	-.962 (.797)	-.950 (.803)
Number of Obs	1033	1033	1033	1017
Pseudo R-sq	0.0122	0.0083	0.0139	0.0179
LLH	-706.5551	-709.3364	-705.3445	-691.2320

*** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%

Table 29: Son Preference Regression Results: Pakistan

	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
WIFE CHARACTERISTICS				
Age of wife	.112 (.087)	.110 (.089)	.112 (.090)	.005 (.013)
Squared age of wife	-.002 (.0015)	-.001 (.001)	-.001 (.001)	
Land in wife's name	-.144 (.345)	-.115 (.347)	-.123 (.350)	-.091 (.346)
Lived in a city/town before marriage	.086 (.151)	.045 (.155)	.073 (.158)	
Years of education of wife	-.047 (.030)	-.053 (.031) *	-.063 (.032) **	-.055 (.031) *
Read newspaper in the last 1 week	.289 (.981)	.182 (.971)	.295 (1.00)	
Listened to radio in the last 1 week	-.308 (.238)	-.273 (.240)	-.331 (.244)	
Watched TV in the last 1 week	.251 (.197)	.246 (.200)	.287 (.203)	
Father educated	.010 (.142)	.066 (.145)	.079 (.148)	
Mother educated	.214 (.353)	.258 (.354)	.291 (.361)	
Self-sufficient (self and children)	.049 (.126)	-.010 (.131)	-.048 (.135)	-.066 (.133)
Non Muslim	.101 (.640)	.092 (.649)	.140 (.653)	.276 (.659)
Wife works and earns cash	-.313 (.188) *	-.327 (.192) *	-.403 (.203) **	-.408 (.201) **
Wife works but does not earn cash	-.095 (.169)	-.091 (.173)	-.200 (.183)	-.243 (.180)
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS				
Household Annual Income	-5.61e-06 (0) **	-5.51e-06 (0) **	-7e-06 (0) **	-6.72e-06 (0) **
Does anyone in the household own a radio	.172 (.141)	.130 (.144)	.087 (.151)	.040 (.142)
Does anyone in the household own a TV	.007 (.188)	-.023 (.193)	-.003 (.199)	.131 (.155)
HUSBAND CHARACTERISTICS				
Husband's age	.013 (.009)	.013 (.010)	.009 (.010)	.008 (.010)
Husband's years of education	-.001 (.016)	-.001 (.017)	-.002 (.018)	.003 (.017)
SOCIAL/NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS				
Abortion a viable option for family planning				
At least one teacher who is a woman				
Nearest City (kms)		-.002 (.004)		
TV facility in the community		-.153 (.281)		
Satellite dish available in community				
Women's group				
CONTROLS				
Interviewed Alone		.326 (.153) **	.404 (.157) **	.394 (.155) **
Beerbal			-.350 (.287)	-.294 (.283)
Bhosin			-.382 (.274)	-.375 (.270)
Chak 48/12L			-.168 (.290)	-.112 (.283)
Dab			-.432 (.310)	-.376 (.303)
Chake 409GB			-.407 (.285)	-.378 (.281)
Khokar Bala			-.482 (.317)	-.422 (.309)
Kot Soondki			-.094 (.350)	-.054 (.345)
Rakh Kikran Wali			-.453 (.293)	-.408 (.289)
Samote			.181 (.317)	.167 (.311)
Ali Kharak (reference)				
Constant	-1.88 (1.25)	-1.71 (1.31)	-1.46 (1.30)	.050 (.414)
Number of Obs	460	449	449	449
Pseudo R-sq	0.0395	0.0475	0.0621	0.071
LLH	-304.0390	-294.2829	-289.7652	-292.7683

*** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%

Table 30: Son Preference Marginal Effects: Pakistan

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
WIFE CHARACTERISTICS				
Age of wife	-.001 (.002)	-.001 (.002)	.033 (.022)	.033 (.022)
Squared age of wife			0 (0)	0 (0)
Land in wife's name	-.003 (.087)	-.001 (.086)	.004 (.087)	.027 (.089)
Lived in a city/town before marriage	.007 (.039)		.008 (.039)	.015 (.040)
Years of education of wife	-.016 (.007) **	-.017 (.006) **	-.016 (.007) **	-.012 (.007) *
Read newspaper in the last 1 week	-.245 (.121) **		-.244 (.122) **	-.253 (.120) **
Listened to radio in the last 1 week	-.063 (.058)		-.065 (.058)	-.056 (.061)
Watched TV in the last 1 week	.060 (.043)		.061 (.043)	.124 (.053) **
Father educated	.012 (.035)		.011 (.035)	.016 (.036)
Mother educated	-.035 (.088)		-.044 (.088)	-.008 (.091)
Self-sufficient (self and children)	-.030 (.033)	-.030 (.032)	-.028 (.033)	-.030 (.033)
Non Muslim	.045 (.167)	.061 (.167)	.049 (.167)	.045 (.167)
Wife works and earns cash	-.080 (.046) *	-.085 (.046) *	-.079 (.046) *	-.092 (.047) **
Wife works but does not earn cash	-.044 (.043)	-.048 (.042)	-.041 (.043)	-.048 (.043)
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS				
Household Annual Income				0 (0)
Does anyone in the household own a radio				-.016 (.037)
Does anyone in the household own a TV				-.107 (.049) **
HUSBAND CHARACTERISTICS				
Husband's age				
Husband's years of education				
SOCIAL/NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS				
Abortion a viable option for family planning				
At least one teacher who is a woman				
Nearest City (kms)				
TV facility in the community				
Satellite dish available in community				
Women's group				
CONTROLS				
Interviewed Alone				
Beerbal				
Bhosin				
Chak 48/12L				
Dab				
Chake 409GB				
Khokar Bala				
Kot Soondki				
Rakh Kikran Wali				
Samote				
Ali Kharak (reference)				

*** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%

Table 31: Son Preference Marginal Effects: Pakistan

	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
WIFE CHARACTERISTICS				
Age of wife	.044 (.034)	.043 (.035)	.044 (.035)	.002 (.005)
Squared age of wife	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	
Land in wife's name	-.055 (.131)	-.044 (.132)	-.047 (.132)	-.035 (.132)
Lived in a city/town before marriage	.034 (.060)	.017 (.061)	.028 (.062)	
Years of education of wife	-.018 (.012)	-.021 (.012) *	-.024 (.012) **	-.021 (.012) *
Read newspaper in the last 1 week	.115 (.389)	.072 (.387)	.117 (.399)	
Listened to radio in the last 1 week	-.117 (.086)	-.104 (.088)	-.124 (.087)	
Watched TV in the last 1 week	.099 (.077)	.097 (.079)	.112 (.079)	
Father educated	.004 (.056)	.026 (.057)	.031 (.058)	
Mother educated	.085 (.140)	.102 (.141)	.115 (.143)	
Self-sufficient (self and children)	.019 (.049)	-.004 (.051)	-.019 (.052)	-.026 (.052)
Non Muslim	.039 (.254)	.036 (.258)	.055 (.260)	.109 (.262)
Wife works and earns cash	-.121 (.071) *	-.126 (.072) *	-.153 (.075) **	-.156 (.074) **
Wife works but does not earn cash	-.037 (.066)	-.035 (.068)	-.078 (.071)	-.095 (.069)
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS				
Household Annual Income	0 (0) **	0 (0) **	0 (0) **	-2.63e-06 (0) **
Does anyone in the household own a radio	.067 (.055)	.051 (.057)	.034 (.059)	.015 (.055)
Does anyone in the household own a TV	.003 (.073)	-.009 (.075)	-.001 (.077)	.051 (.061)
HUSBAND CHARACTERISTICS				
Husband's age	.005 (.003)	.005 (.004)	.003 (.004)	.003 (.004)
Husband's years of education	0 (.006)	0 (.006)	0 (.007)	.001 (.006)
SOCIAL/NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS				
Abortion a viable option for family planning				
At least one teacher who is a woman				
Nearest City (kms)		0 (.001)		
TV facility in the community		-.060 (.112)		
Satellite dish available in community				
Women's group				
CONTROLS				
Interviewed Alone		.129 (.060) **	.159 (.061) **	.156 (.061) **
Beerbal			-.131 (.101)	-.111 (.102)
Bhosin			-.142 (.096)	-.140 (.095)
Chak 48/12L			-.064 (.109)	-.043 (.108)
Dab			-.159 (.105)	-.140 (.106)
Chake 409GB			-.151 (.098)	-.141 (.098)
Khokar Bala			-.176 (.104) *	-.156 (.105)
Kot Soondki			-.036 (.134)	-.021 (.133)
Rakh Kikran Wali			-.166 (.099) *	-.151 (.100)
Samote			.071 (.126)	.066 (.123)
Ali Kharak (reference)				

*** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%

Table 32: Son Preference Regression Results: Thailand

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
WIFE CHARACTERISTICS				
Age of wife	.030 (.004) ***	.029 (.003) ***	.063 (.034) *	.056 (.034) *
Squared age of wife			0 (0)	0 (0)
Land in wife's name	.011 (.055)	.011 (.055)	.011 (.055)	-.002 (.056)
Lived in a city/town before marriage	-.049 (.057)		-.049 (.057)	-.052 (.058)
Years of education of wife	-.013 (.007) *	-.018 (.006) ***	-.012 (.007) *	-.012 (.008)
Read newspaper in the last 1 week	-.074 (.060)		-.078 (.060)	-.083 (.062)
Listened to radio in the last 1 week	-.039 (.052)		-.037 (.052)	-.032 (.055)
Watched TV in the last 1 week	-.063 (.077)		-.067 (.077)	-.138 (.085) *
Father educated	-.071 (.063)		-.068 (.063)	-.072 (.063)
Mother educated	.054 (.062)		.053 (.062)	.062 (.063)
Self-sufficient (self and children)	.005 (.062)	-.003 (.061)	.004 (.062)	.013 (.063)
Muslim	-.006 (.094)	.014 (.093)	-.009 (.094)	-.012 (.096)
Christian	-.025 (.298)	-.032 (.296)	-.027 (.298)	-.046 (.299)
Wife works and earns cash	-.109 (.101)	-.104 (.100)	-.113 (.101)	-.115 (.103)
Wife works but does not earn cash	-.178 (.194)	-.155 (.193)	-.173 (.195)	-.238 (.199)
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS				
Household Annual Income				0 (0)
Does anyone in the household own a radio				-.211 (.062) ***
Does anyone in the household own a TV				.167 (.076) **
HUSBAND CHARACTERISTICS				
Husband's age				
Husband's years of education				
CONTROLS				
Interviewed Alone				
Bangkok	.010 (.079)	-.013 (.076)	.012 (.079)	.021 (.082)
Central				
North				
South (reference)				
Constant	-1.179 (.185) ***	-1.25 (.171) ***	-1.68 (.541) ***	-1.51 (.547) ***
Number of Obs	2720	2720	2720	2680
Pseudo R-sq	0.026	0.0242	0.0263	0.0304
LLH	-1628.0829	-1631.1582	-1627.5861	-1597.8530

*** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%

Table 33: Son Preference Regression Results: Thailand

	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
WIFE CHARACTERISTICS				
Age of wife	.058 (.048)	.059 (.048)	.066 (.049)	.030 (.008) ***
Squared age of wife	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	
Land in wife's name	.031 (.077)	.031 (.077)	.029 (.077)	.031 (.077)
Lived in a city/town before marriage	-.071 (.082)	-.071 (.082)	-.085 (.082)	
Years of education of wife	-.012 (.014)	-.012 (.014)	-.010 (.014)	-.015 (.013)
Read newspaper in the last 1 week	-.098 (.086)	-.098 (.086)	-.109 (.087)	
Listened to radio in the last 1 week	.011 (.077)	.010 (.077)	.010 (.078)	
Watched TV in the last 1 week	-.192 (.121)	-.193 (.121)	-.191 (.121)	
Father educated	-.123 (.088)	-.123 (.088)	-.120 (.089)	
Mother educated	.124 (.087)	.124 (.087)	.132 (.087)	
Self-sufficient (self and children)	.033 (.087)	.032 (.088)	.010 (.088)	.007 (.088)
Muslim	-.060 (.145)	-.057 (.146)	-.176 (.165)	-.140 (.162)
Christian	-.086 (.443)	-.082 (.443)	-.006 (.443)	-.055 (.437)
Wife works and earns cash	-.003 (.148)	-.003 (.148)	.013 (.149)	.040 (.148)
Wife works but does not earn cash	.051 (.295)	.054 (.295)	.112 (.297)	.152 (.294)
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS				
Household Annual Income	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Does anyone in the household own a radio	-.225 (.087) **	-.225 (.087) **	-.217 (.088) **	-.218 (.083) ***
Does anyone in the household own a TV	.240 (.107) **	.240 (.107) **	.233 (.107) **	.155 (.097)
HUSBAND CHARACTERISTICS				
Husband's age	.001 (.007)	.001 (.007)	.001 (.007)	.002 (.007)
Husband's years of education	.004 (.013)	.003 (.013)	.004 (.013)	.003 (.012)
CONTROLS				
Interviewed Alone		.023 (.080)	.035 (.081)	.020 (.080)
Bangkok	.030 (.118)	.030 (.118)	-.063 (.141)	-.077 (.137)
Central			-.048 (.118)	-.038 (.116)
North			-.209 (.108) **	-.184 (.107) *
South (reference)				
Constant	-1.79 (.774) **	-1.79 (.770) **	-1.821 (.780) **	-1.421 (.273) ***
Number of Obs	1415	1415	1415	1415
Pseudo R-sq	0.0377	0.0378	0.0405	0.035
LLH	-829.7251	-829.6822	-827.3334	-832.0858

*** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%

Table 34: Son Preference Marginal Effects: Thailand

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
WIFE CHARACTERISTICS				
Age of wife	.010 (.001) ***	.010 (.001) ***	.022 (.011) *	.019 (.012)
Squared age of wife			0 (0)	0 (0)
Land in wife's name	.004 (.019)	.004 (.019)	.004 (.019)	-.001 (.019)
Lived in a city/town before marriage	-.017 (.019)		-.017 (.019)	-.018 (.020)
Years of education of wife	-.004 (.002) *	-.006 (.002) ***	-.004 (.002) *	-.004 (.003)
Read newspaper in the last 1 week	-.025 (.020)		-.027 (.020)	-.028 (.021)
Listened to radio in the last 1 week	-.013 (.018)		-.013 (.018)	.011 (.019)
Watched TV in the last 1 week	-.022 (.027)		-.023 (.027)	-.049 (.031)
Father educated	-.024 (.022)		-.023 (.022)	-.025 (.022)
Mother educated	.018 (.021)		.018 (.021)	.021 (.021)
Self-sufficient (self and children)	.001 (.021)	-.001 (.021)	.001 (.021)	.004 (.021)
Muslim	-.002 (.032)	.004 (.032)	-.003 (.032)	-.004 (.033)
Christian	-.008 (.102)	-.011 (.101)	-.009 (.102)	-.015 (.101)
Wife works and earns cash	-.039 (.036)	-.037 (.036)	-.040 (.036)	-.040 (.037)
Wife works but does not earn cash	-.059 (.060)	-.051 (.061)	-.057 (.061)	-.077 (.059)
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS				
Household Annual Income				0 (0)
Does anyone in the household own a radio				-.075 (.022) ***
Does anyone in the household own a TV				.056 (.024) **
HUSBAND CHARACTERISTICS				
Husband's age				
Husband's years of education				
CONTROLS				
Interviewed Alone				
Bangkok	.003 (.027)	-.004 (.026)	.004 (.027)	.007 (.028)
Central				
North				
South (reference)				

*** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%

Table 35: Son Preference Marginal Effects: Thailand

	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
WIFE CHARACTERISTICS				
Age of wife	.020 (.016)	.020 (.016)	.022 (.016)	.010 (.003) ***
Squared age of wife	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	
Land in wife's name	.010 (.026)	.010 (.026)	.010 (.026)	.010 (.026)
Lived in a city/town before marriage	-.024 (.028)	-.024 (.028)	-.029 (.028)	
Years of education of wife	-.004 (.004)	-.004 (.004)	-.003 (.004)	-.005 (.004)
Read newspaper in the last 1 week	-.033 (.029)	-.033 (.029)	-.036 (.029)	
Listened to radio in the last 1 week	.003 (.026)	.003 (.026)	.003 (.026)	
Watched TV in the last 1 week	-.068 (.044)	-.068 (.044)	-.068 (.044)	
Father educated	-.042 (.031)	-.042 (.031)	-.041 (.031)	
Mother educated	.041 (.029)	.042 (.029)	.044 (.029)	
Self-sufficient (self and children)	.011 (.029)	.011 (.029)	.003 (.030)	.002 (.030)
Muslim	-.020 (.048)	-.019 (.048)	-.057 (.051)	-.046 (.051)
Christian	-.029 (.144)	-.027 (.144)	-.002 (.151)	-.018 (.145)
Wife works and earns cash	-.001 (.051)	-.001 (.051)	.004 (.050)	.013 (.050)
Wife works but does not earn cash	.017 (.103)	.018 (.104)	.039 (.107)	.054 (.108)
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS				
Household Annual Income	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Does anyone in the household own a radio	-.079 (.031) **	-.079 (.031) **	-.076 (.031) **	-.076 (.029) **
Does anyone in the household own a TV	.078 (.033) **	.078 (.033) **	.076 (.033) **	.051 (.031) *
HUSBAND CHARACTERISTICS				
Husband's age	0 (.002)	0 (.002)	0 (.002)	0 (.002)
Husband's years of education	.001 (.004)	.001 (.004)	.001 (.004)	.001 (.004)
CONTROLS				
Interviewed Alone		.008 (.027)	.012 (.028)	.007 (.027)
Bangkok	.010 (.040)	.010 (.040)	-.021 (.047)	-.026 (.045)
Central			-.016 (.039)	-.013 (.039)
North			-.070 (.036) **	-.062 (.036) *
South (reference)				

*** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%

Table 36: Robust determinants of women's empowerment by category. 'x' indicates the variable is robust, +/- indicate the direction of influence

	Autonomy Variable			Non-Acceptability of Beating		Son Preference		
	India	Pakistan	Thailand	India	Pakistan	India	Pakistan	Thailand
WIFE CHARACTERISTICS								
Age of wife	x (+)	x (+)	x (+)					
Squared age of wife	x (-)	x (-)	x (-)					
Land in wife's name			x (+)	x (+)				
Lived in a city/town before marriage			x (-)	x (+)				
Years of education of wife			x (+)		x (+)	x (-)	x (-)	
Read newspaper in the last 1 week					x (+)			
Listened to radio in the last 1 week					x (+)			
Watched TV in the last 1 week	x (+)			x (-)				
Educated father								
Educated mother								
Self-sufficient (self and children)	x (+)	x (+)	x (+)	x (-)				
Muslim	x (-)		x (-)	x (-)				
Christian			x (+)					
SC/ST								
Wife works and earns cash	x (+)						x (-)	
Wife works but does not earn cash						x (-)		
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS								
Household Annual Income		x (-)			x (+)		x (-)	
Does anyone in the household own a radio								x (-)
Does anyone in the household own a TV								x (+)
HUSBAND CHARACTERISTICS								
Husband's age		x (+)						
Husband's years of education			x (+)					
SOCIAL/NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS								
Abortion a viable option for family planning	x (-)			x (+)				
At least one teacher who is a woman	x (-)							
Nearest City (kms)								
TV facility in the community	x (+)	x (-)						
Satellite dish available in community								
Women's group								
CONTROLS								
Interviewed Alone			x (-)		x (+)		x (+)	
Regional Dummies	x	x	x	x	x			