

# **Gender Discrimination: Evidence from Young Lawyers**

By

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## **Abstract**

This study explores gender discrimination among attorneys using Young Lawyers survey data from 2007. The survey included five questions about discrimination which are used as outcome measures. The survey asks respondents about receiving demeaning comments, missing out on desirable assignments, client requests for someone else to do work, colleague requests for someone else to work with, and the partner discounted hours. Results show gender gaps in two of the discrimination measures: experience in receiving demeaning comments and missed out desirable comments. Gaps persist even after controlling for performance, educational attainment and ability, individual characteristics, firm characteristics and areas of law. Data do not indicate gender gaps for the other measures. This suggests that gender discrimination persists in specific situations among young lawyers.

Keywords: gender, discrimination, performance, workplace.

## Chapter One: Introduction

In 2005, prominent economist and president of Harvard University, Lawrence Summers, sparked a furious public debate by stating that biological differences are the primary reasons for a gender –based performance gap in math and science; not taking into consideration the possibility of gender discrimination as an explanation of differing career opportunities in these fields. (The Guardian, 18 January 2005).

There are two broad, separate theories when it comes to the gender division in society -- the “maximalist,” and “minimalist” perspectives. In the “maximalist” view there is little consideration for the biologically determined gender differences; this perspective steadfastly believes that there is a “women’s culture” in society which is deeply rooted and results in different outcomes of the gender. On the other hand, the “minimalist” perspective does not believe in any biological differences or any existence of “women’s culture”; only psychological traits which evoke from the social roles of the gender are responsible for the differential behavior of sexes (Jacobson, 2007).

In 1815, working women earned 29 cents for every dollar a man earned. By 2004, the amount increased to 76 cents (Jacobson, 2007). Researchers have provided differing explanations of this persistent gender wage gap. Sociologists, anthropologists and psychologists have shown that biological determinism is not a factor in gender difference; rather, social and cultural factors are more influential in determining the gap. Economists have also contributed in this area with empirical studies examining what role socio-economic characteristics have in explaining gender-based wage gaps. However, a gap in the empirical literature exists with respect to the impact of discrimination on differential gender-based outcomes.



This study builds on previous literature in several important ways. The study contributes to previous literature by providing empirical evidence of gender-based discrimination using data sourced from a large sample of U.S. attorneys diverse with respect to race, gender, geography, firm-size, and other important socio-economic characteristics. The use of empirical data is an important extension and opportunity to confirm results based on case-studies and laboratory experiments. Another important contribution involves the examination of the relationship between performance, discrimination, and gender using this data.

This study is organized as follows. The following section, Section 2, reviews the relevant literature. In Section 3, gives a background description of the data and methodology used to clean and condition the ultimate data used in this study's analysis. The empirical model and strategy is outlined in Section 4. Finally, results are presented in Section 5 and conclusions in Section 6.

## Chapter Two: Past Studies

Psychologists Maccoby and Jacklin (1974), based on various case studies, concluded that gender differences in outcomes between the sexes are due to social rather than biological factors. On the other hand, economists Buser, Niederle and Oosterbeek (2007) conducted laboratory experiments and found that differences in competitiveness account for a substantial portion of gender-based differences in education choices, with females demonstrating less competitiveness, higher risk aversion, and less favourable study tracks.

However, there are potential concerns with the results of these studies. Dwyer (1975) noticed that most psychological case studies reviewed in Maccoby and Jacklin (1974) were done on white, middle-class U.S. subjects, a non-representative sample of the population. Therefore, there is the possibility of biased results. Levitt and List (2006) have qualified the role of laboratory experiments in the field of economics, positing that lab experiments are a viable tool for generating qualitative insights; but do not always correspond to empirical evidence.

Wilder, G. Z (2007) analyzed the survey data used in this study focusing on the area of gender. She noted that women report more experiences of discrimination than men in every form; such as demeaning comments, missing out on desirable assignment and others. Also, women, in general, are less satisfied than men with their opportunities for advancement, their compensation and the diversity of their workplaces. As a result, fewer women intend to stay with their current employers for more than five years. She found, the average salary is more for men than women. Fewer women than men work in private law firms where salaries tend to be higher than in other settings. Moreover, women are less likely than men to be solo practitioners. Women are considerably more likely than men to work in public interest, other non-profit and legal service organizations, and to serve as public

defenders. Women are also more likely to work in educational institutions, where working conditions may be more flexible and salaries are lower than men.

However, when examining several characteristics, particularly related to career flexibility and opportunity, Wilder found men stronger in some areas. Men are more likely to change their first job than women. The number of married men is larger than the number of married women. The median number of work hours for the male is 50 per week whereas for a female it is 45. The number of clients brought by the men and women is 9.3 and 4.5 respectively, whereas the average new client revenue is 56,000 for the men and 21,000 for the women.

Dinovitzer et al. (2009) explored the relationship between socio-economic characteristics and differences in earnings between women earning also using the survey data (First wave) used in this study. As part of their multivariate analysis, they tested credentials (GPA, law colleges' rankings), work profiles (practice settings, the size of the firm), opportunity path and structures (networking) and demographic variables (male, race, marital status) and geography in the OLS model as determinants of the gender-based earnings gap. Their analysis shows that men earn a statistically-significant 6.3 percent salary premium compared to women. Even after controlling for credentials, the gap increases to 7 percent, again, a result that is statistically significant. However, controlling for work profile reduces the gap to 5.2 percent and consequently controlling for opportunity paths results in a decline to 4.1 percent. Finally, adding a legal markets geographic control increases the wage gap 5.2 percent. This study serves as the foundation for identifying the determinants of the differential wage gap, however it has not explained the reason behind this differentiation.

Azmat and Ferrer (2016) discussed the role of performance as a source of the existing gender gap of law firms from the same survey data (second wave). They used a similar empirical model, however included hours billed and new client revenue to create

performance gap variables that were subsequently used as dependent variables. They analyzed the performance gap using discrimination (not enough assignments, partner discount hours etc.), childrearing (number of children etc.), career aspirations (scale of ratings for aspirations of becoming an equity partner in the firm etc.), and overbilling, networking, and working on the weekends as explanatory variables. Subsequently, they examine the relationship between performance and difference in earning based on gender. They conclude that the difference in earnings based on gender, found in previous studies, is strongly related to the gender gap in performance. While they emphasize the role of performance as the primary explanation of gender gap in earnings, they do not highlight the significance of their findings in which gender and employee's performance are significantly related to discrimination, the primary focus of this study.

McGee et al. (2014) claimed that the gender wage gap is the result of the lack of competitiveness of females. Using data from National Longitudinal Surveys (NLYS79 and NYLS97), they have shown that women are less likely to go into professions in which compensation is competitive. In the laboratory, Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) found that women are 38 and 33 percentage points, respectively, less likely to opt into competitive tournaments than their male peers and elect to work for piece-rates instead.

This study extends on the literature cited above by exploring more deeply the role in which gender and performance affect work place discrimination. To study gender discrimination, the performance and ability of an employee are crucial considerations. However, sourcing data with both reliable performance and discrimination measures is difficult. One exception is the AJD data cited in the literature above. The reasons behind gender discrimination, particularly among high-skilled workers like lawyers, remain undetermined. As noted above, previous literature (Wilder, G. Z) suggests that the legal profession also persistently discriminates based on race and gender, a surprising finding.

Unlike other professions, law firms evaluate their employees using transparent, consistent, and reliable measures. In the legal profession, the standard practice among law firms in the U.S. is to determine the value of legal services by calculating hourly fees multiplied by the number of hours the employees worked for the clients which are termed as billable hours. Therefore, the legal profession has a more objective and transparent method to compare the performance of employees compared to other high-skilled jobs. Thus, this study provides an important contribution building on previous empirical analysis applied to the AJD data, investigating the existence of discrimination based on gender.

## Chapter Three: Data

Data from the JD (AJD)-Wave 2 has been used for the analysis as part of this study. The AJD project was funded by the American Bar Foundation, Access Group, Inc., Law School Admission Council, and National Association for Law Placement, Open Society Foundations, and National Science Foundation. The AJD is a longitudinal empirical study of the career outcomes of young American lawyers who graduated from law school in the period 1998 through 2000 and became the members of the state bar in 2000. This study aims to capture the professional experiences of those lawyers during their first ten years following graduation from law school. The first wave of the survey was done in 2002, the second wave in 2007, and the third wave in 2012. The AJD is a nationally and socio-economically representative survey that provides an in-depth portrayal of lawyer's career paths.

Information was sourced using a standard survey tool that was administered through mail questionnaire, telephone interview, and web-based survey. This study has applied a two-stage sample design. The sample includes 18 strata based on broad geographic regions and the population-size of new lawyers. In the first stage, the primary sampling units (PSU) were metropolitan areas, portion of a state outside metropolitan areas, or entire states. One PSU was selected per stratum. Included in the sample are large metropolitan areas, each representing independent PSUs, such as Chicago, New York City, Los Angeles, and Washington D.C., among others that contain high populations of new lawyers (defined as more than 2,000). In the second stage individuals were sampled at rates representative of the entire population. Additionally, certain minority groups – Black, Hispanic, and Asian-American, were oversampled. This resulted in an initial identified sample of 9,192 lawyers across the 18 PSU's . Within this sample, the response rate was 50.6 percent resulting in a final sample size of 3,689. <sup>1</sup>

1. <http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/33584>

Data include:

**Demographic characteristics:** Sex, race, age, marital status, personal income, educational and financial background of the household, number of children and their age, spouse's income.

**Employment Situation:** employment status, job responsibilities, professional skills, job support, employment details, areas of practice, clientele, billing hours, type of firm, firm size, alternate career considerations, and other job offers.

**Respondent's Opinion-** lawyers express their opinions regarding job satisfaction, job discrimination, and important factors for obtaining new employment.

**Activities during Law School:** undergraduate education, the transition to law school and decision to attend law school, law school education and activities, educational financing and debt, judicial clerkships, bar admission.

As part of the analysis for this study, a subsample of 1,287 individuals is used to avoid outlier observations of key variables in the empirical model of this study. An individual case (lawyer respondent) was dropped from the sample based on two conditions:

1. If the gender variable is missing, and,
2. If the observation has missing values for the number of new clients who have been brought to the law firm by a lawyer.

Other variables used in the empirical analysis of this study were created as follows:

#### *Marital status*

The individual was titled as married when they were married for the first time, and they were remarried after divorce.

### *Employment status*

The individual was titled as a full time employed when they described “full-time” as their current employment status in the questionnaire.

### *Age*

The age interval of the respondents has been coded from 30 to 45. In the survey, the range of the birth year for the lawyers is from 1965 to 1974.

### *Partnership*

The individual has been taken as a partner in the law firm when they have described their position as equity or a non-equity partner in their current position in their firm.

### *Judicial Clerk*

The individual has been recoded as judicial clerk if he/she is permanent judicial clerk in current position.

### *Law School GPA*

The law school GPA of the lawyers has been recoded from 1 to 4. For GPA, we have recoded the missing values by the mean of the variable *Law School Ranking*

Law school ranking has been recoded from 10 to 30.

### *Firm Size*

The firm size of the law firm has been recoded from 3 to 1,251. For the variables firm size, we have recoded the missing values by the mean of the variable.



*Tenure*

The tenure of the lawyers has been recoded from 1 to 7. The range has been recoded from the year 2000 to 2007. Anything less than 2000 has been recoded as missing values.

*Hours Billed*

To avoid any further droppings from the sample, we have recoded some of the missing variables which are very low in number. In the case of the variable of hours billed we have taken the mean of the intervals and multiplied it by the respective frequencies for our analysis and recoded only 21 missing values as 693.5 hours which is the average of the hours billed in the previous year.

To assess the discrimination as the dependent variables were regressed on the gender, individual characteristics, firm effects, educational variables and performance variables, male mentor and tasks done by the lawyers. The statistical analysis was performed using Stata 13 version.

## Chapter Four: Empirical Strategy

### 4.1 Measuring Gender gap

Ultimately, the primary outcome measure of this study is discrimination, with the following five measures sourced as dependent variables: 1) experiencing demeaning comments, 2) not getting desirable assignments, 3) clients request for someone else, 4) colleague request new attorney; and, 5) partner discount hours. All are sourced from one section in particular of the AJD survey focusing on existing discrimination against the lawyers based on the virtues of race, religion, ethnicity, gender, disability or sexual orientation.

The first of the five questions included in the AJD survey is related to the experience of degrading comments from the employers, colleagues or clients in the firm. The second question investigates discrimination through exclusion from desirable assignments due to lawyer's ethnicity or gender. Next, lawyers are asked if clients ever requested someone else for an assignment. This particular discrimination measure is not always expected to be based on performance or ability, but could be due to a given client's inherent bias against certain socio-economic characteristics (e.g. female, ethnicity, etc.). The fourth question focuses on the behavior of colleagues towards others. Finally, the last question is not directly related to the discrimination variables, instead lawyers were asked if they have ever faced any difficulty in billing. The difficulties could be due to partners not giving them full credit for their work in the form of discounted hours. In the survey, all of the above questions were asked in a "yes/no" format. The response to each question was coded 1 when it is 'yes' and 0 when it is 'no.'

## 4.2 Potential Explanatory Variables

### **Measuring Performance**

Unlike other professions, the legal profession has the ideal framework to measure the performance of the employees. For this analysis, the performance in the legal profession has been measured using three variables included in the data- 1. total hours billed in previous year, 2. the amount of revenue from new clients (recruited by the respective lawyer respondent) in the last year, and 3. whether a lawyer is a partner in the firm.

### ***Hours Billed***

In this study, the hours billed by lawyers is used as the principal measure of performance, and is considered as part of previous literature, one of the most reliable indicators of the performance of lawyers. As mentioned earlier, the standard practice of law firms in the U.S.A is to pay lawyers based on billable hours. As a measure of performance of lawyers within their respective firms, this study uses total hours billed in the last year, an important survey question. Advocates of billable hours argue that this method serves to calculate the value of the service, minimize transaction costs between clients and law firms, eliminate uncertainty, and reduce substantial variation due to the arbitrariness in which lawyers' bonuses are awarded (American Bar Association, 2002). It is important to note that the number of hours that a lawyer bills does not correspond directly to the number of hours he or she has worked weekly. It is a common practice that the number of hours lawyers work is greater than the number of hours billed because there are other non-billable activities in which lawyers are engaged, including meetings, networking, training, etc.

### *New Client Revenue*

Heinz et al. (2005) argue that a rational way to measure the performance of lawyers is the amount of revenues generated by new clients brought to the firm by the respective lawyer in a given year. Thus, the second measurement of performance used in this study is the amount of new client revenue. It can be assumed that lawyers who are responsible and well-qualified for the job generate new clients at a higher rate than less-qualified lawyers and therefore this metric is an overall good measure of performance.

### 4.3 Econometric Models

We begin by estimating the following regression model:

$$y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 x + \varepsilon_i$$

Where  $y_i$  denotes discrimination, the primary dependent variable. As mentioned earlier we there are five variables measuring discrimination:

- Discrimination 1: “experience demeaning comments”
- Discrimination 2: “missing out assignments”
- Discrimination 3: “clients request someone else”
- Discrimination 4: “colleague request someone else”
- Discrimination 5: “partner discounted hours”

The variable of interest, “x”, is a dummy variable indicating gender. Beta 1 ( $\beta_1$ ) represents the primary effect of interest, or the impact of being female on workplace discrimination.

We then proceed with the following estimation:

$$y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 x + \beta_2 \mathbf{w}_i + \varepsilon_i$$

Where  $y_i$ ,  $x$ , and  $\varepsilon_i$  retain their previous definitions, and  $\mathbf{w}_i$  denotes a vector of possible explanatory variables. These include age, a dummy for marital status, a dummy for being white, a dummy for a lawyer who has a child, a dummy for a lawyer who has two children, a dummy for a lawyer who has more than three children, a dummy for a lawyer who has children aged less than four, a dummy for an individual considering having children who are younger than 4, lawyers' tenure, a dummy for holding judicial clerkship and a dummy for full-time employment status.

In the next step we proceed with the following estimation:

$$y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 x + \beta_2 \mathbf{w}_i + \beta_3 \mathbf{z}_i + \varepsilon_i$$

where  $y_i$ ,  $x$ ,  $\mathbf{w}_i$  and  $\varepsilon_i$  retain their previous definitions and  $\mathbf{z}_i$  denote a vector of educational variables. The educational variables in the model are law school GPA of the lawyers which ranges from 1 to 4 and the rankings of the faculty of law attended by the subjects.

Further, the estimation takes place by the following model:

$$y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 x + \beta_2 \mathbf{w}_i + \beta_3 \mathbf{z}_i + \beta_4 \mathbf{u}_i + \varepsilon_i$$

Where  $y_i$ ,  $x$ ,  $\mathbf{w}_i$ ,  $\mathbf{z}_i$  and  $\varepsilon_i$  retain their previous definitions and  $\mathbf{u}_i$  denote a vector of firm characteristics. This vector includes the firm size and a dummy for each firm types which are solo practice, private law firm, federal government, state or local government, professional service firm, Fortune 100 industries and lastly, any other type of law firms.

Next, we proceed with the following estimation:

$$y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 x + \beta_2 \mathbf{w}_i + \beta_3 \mathbf{z}_i + \beta_4 \mathbf{u}_i + \beta_5 \mathbf{v}_i + \varepsilon_i$$

Where  $y_i$ ,  $x$ ,  $\mathbf{w}_i$ ,  $\mathbf{z}_i$ ,  $\mathbf{u}_i$  and  $\varepsilon_i$  retain their previous definitions and  $\mathbf{v}_i$  denote a vector of all the areas of law. These vector includes a dummy for each areas of law separately namely antitrust, bankruptcy, civil and commercial litigation, civil rights or liberties, commercial law, criminal law, employment law related to management and labour unions, family law, general corporate, general practice, health law, immigration law, insurance, intellectual property, municipal law, personal injury related to defense and plaintiffs, probate, public utilities, commercial real estate and personal real estate, securities, tax, workers' compensation and all the other categories.

Now we advance our models for the estimation based on performance:

$$y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 x + \beta_2 \mathbf{w}_i + \beta_3 \mathbf{z}_i + \beta_4 \mathbf{u}_i + \beta_5 \mathbf{v}_i + \beta_6 * performance + \beta_7 * female * performance + \varepsilon_i$$

Where  $y_i$ ,  $x$ ,  $\mathbf{w}_i$ ,  $\mathbf{z}_i$ ,  $\mathbf{u}_i$ ,  $\mathbf{v}_i$ , and  $\varepsilon_i$  retain their previous definitions and performance represents the two important variables which have been discussed earlier in the paper.

Our following model estimates the effects of being a partner in the law firm:

$$y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 x + \beta_2 \mathbf{w}_i + \beta_3 \mathbf{z}_i + \beta_4 \mathbf{u}_i + \beta_5 \mathbf{v}_i + \beta_6 * partnership + \beta_7 * female * partnership + \varepsilon_i$$

Where  $y_i$ ,  $x$ ,  $\mathbf{w}_i$ ,  $\mathbf{z}_i$ ,  $\mathbf{u}_i$ ,  $\mathbf{v}_i$ , and  $\varepsilon_i$  retain their previous definitions and partnership represents a dummy whether a lawyer is a partner in the firm.

To investigate further we have included the effects of working under a male mentor in the model:

$$y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 x + \beta_2 \mathbf{w}_i + \beta_3 \mathbf{z}_i + \beta_4 \mathbf{u}_i + \beta_5 \mathbf{v}_i + \beta_6 * male mentor + \beta_7 * female * male mentor + \varepsilon_i$$

Where  $y_i$ ,  $x$ ,  $\mathbf{w}_i$ ,  $\mathbf{z}_i$ ,  $\mathbf{u}_i$ ,  $\mathbf{v}_i$ , and  $\varepsilon_i$  retain their previous definitions, and male mentor represents a dummy whether a lawyer has a male mentor in the firm.

And finally we have included tasks done by the lawyers for the firm in the model:

$$y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 x + \beta_2 \mathbf{w}_i + \beta_3 \mathbf{z}_i + \beta_4 \mathbf{u}_i + \beta_5 \mathbf{v}_i + \beta_6 * Task_i + \beta_7 * female * Task_i + \varepsilon_i$$

Where  $y_i$ ,  $x$ ,  $\mathbf{w}_i$ ,  $\mathbf{z}_i$ ,  $\mathbf{u}_i$ ,  $\mathbf{v}_i$  and  $\varepsilon_i$  retain their previous definitions and the  $Task_i$  represents a dummy variable for four important tasks- 1. Keep client updated, 2. Formulate strategy, 3. Travel to courts or clients and, 4. Attend client meeting.

## Chapter Five: Results

### 5.1 Summary Statistics

Table 1 and Table 2 provide descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analysis, by female and male lawyers. Reported are total observations, mean and standard deviation of each outcome and explanatory variables. Also, these statistics are disaggregated by gender, with accompanying tests of significance between males and females. After cleaning, the dataset includes 555 female lawyers and 732 male lawyers as the basis of comparison for the analysis.

Table 1 includes descriptive statistics for all independent variables used in the paper. The first measure of performance, Hours Billed, corresponds to lawyers' total number of hours billed during the year before the survey, 2006. As shown in Table 1, female lawyers bill, on average, 1,180 hours per annum, while male lawyers bill 1,272 hours on average. For the second measure of performance, New Client Revenue is based on responses about the revenue attributed to new clients "personally brought" by the lawyers to their law firm in the year before the survey, 2006. The gender difference in annual new client revenue originated is close to \$43,997 in favour of males. The third measure, being a partner in the law firm as a current position, demonstrates that 15% of female lawyers are a partner in the firm, while for the male lawyers the number is 20%. All of these differences between males and females are statistically significant.

Table 1 also shows that female lawyers more often are working in a private law firm compared to their male counterparts (88% vs. 85%, respectively). Also, 98% of male lawyers are working full time while only 82% of female lawyers are working full time. Interestingly, female lawyers are less likely to be married (72%) compared to males (79%). They are also more liable to belong to a minority group (81% white vs. 86% white). Law school GPA is not significantly different between male and female lawyers, and based on law school ranking,



female lawyers in the sample attend slightly better law programs than males. Tenure and proportions obtaining judicial clerkships are not significantly different.

The other relevant independent variables of the papers are the gender of the mentor of a lawyer and the important tasks performed by lawyers. Table 1 show that 71% of female lawyers have male mentors whereas 89% male lawyers have male mentors. One of the important tasks done by lawyers measured in the survey, there are only two in which differences exist between the proportion of males and females engaging in these tasks. Men are more likely to leave the office to go to court or visit a client (86% vs. 78%), an important and generally prestigious billable task. Men are also slightly more likely to be responsible to keep clients updated (97% vs. 95%). There are no statistically significant differences between proportion of males and females that are responsible for formulating strategy or participating in client meetings.

Table 2 similarly provides descriptive statistics for the dependent variables of the analysis. For the full sample used in this study, 20% of female lawyers have experienced demeaning comments whereas only 7% male lawyers reported any bad experience. The percentage of women lawyers who have stated that they have missed out on a desirable assignment because of discrimination is 12%, and the number of male lawyers in this situation is 8%. In both of these cases, the difference between male and female lawyers is statistically significant.

Continuing with Table 2, female lawyers have experienced clients requesting roughly similar to males, 11% of the time compared to 9%, respectively. For the other two measures of discrimination, lawyers who had colleagues or supervisors request someone else and those that received discounted hours from partners, the overall levels are generally low, 6% and

11% respectively. For all three of these measures there are no statistically significant differences between males and females.

## 5.2 Regression Findings

In this section, we discuss the empirical results of the study. For each outcome variable there are ten models. Following is a discussion of the most salient and interesting results

### **Experience Demeaning Comments**

Table 3 shows the results of the first five models in which the dependent variable is the discrimination measure in which a lawyer indicated receiving demeaning comments. In the first model, the lone independent variable is the gender of lawyer. Results in this first specification indicate that female lawyers are significantly more likely to experience demeaning comments. In the second specification, when controlling for individual characteristics of the lawyer, females continue to be more likely to experience discrimination. Even when including the full range of control variables available in the third, fourth and fifth specifications the dummy measure for female remains strongly significant and the magnitude of the coefficient increases from 0.13 in the first specification to 0.16 in the final specification including all controls.

Table 4 adds the three available performance variables to specification five from Table 3, along with interactions between the performance variables and the female dummy variable. Inclusion of the performance variables in all cases does not change the key relationship highlighted in Table 3 in which females lawyers are more likely to experience demeaning comments than males. Results indicate that hours billed is positively related to the likelihood of experiencing demeaning comments, an unexpected and difficult result to interpret. However, other than hours billed, none of the other performance controls are related to this measure of discrimination.

Table 5 includes the final set of specifications related to this form of discrimination. Specifications in Table 5 substitute controls for lawyers that have a male mentor and the important tasks done by lawyers for the performance measure controls. Including these additional controls does not change the key result that female lawyers are more likely to experience demeaning comments.

### **Missing out a desirable assignment**

Table 6, Table 7, and Table 8 mimic the previous three tables with the only difference being the dependent variable. In these subsequent three tables the measure of discrimination used as the dependent variable is whether the lawyer respondent indicated that they missed desirable assignments.

Table 6 shows that, again, being a female in law firms leads to workplace discrimination. Whether included as the sole independent variable or after controlling for individual, educational, firm and areas of law variables, female lawyers are more likely to miss desirable assignments compared to their male colleagues.

Table 7 includes specifications with performance controls. In most cases, even after controlling for performance, female lawyers continue to be more likely to miss desirable assignments. The only exception, is when controlling for billable hours. When controlling for this measure of productivity there is no difference in the likelihood of receiving desirable assignments between men and women. In the case of partnership as a measure of productivity, females continue to be more likely to be discriminated against in the form of missing desirable assignments. However, the interaction term between the dummy indicating the lawyer is a partner in their respective firm and the female gender dummy has a negative sign, is significant, and the magnitude of the coefficient is greater (in absolute terms) than the magnitude of the coefficient on the female dummy. This implies that women are more likely

to miss out on desirable assignments, except in instances that women are partners, in which case women partners are less likely to miss out on desirable assignments.

Table 8 substitutes the performance controls for a male mentor control and prevalence of engaging in important tasks controls. Results continue to demonstrate that if a female lawyer has a male mentor they still face a higher likelihood of missing desirable assignments. The results also show that including a control for critical tasks performed does not have any effect on reducing this form of discrimination for female lawyers.

### **Client Requests Someone Else**

Results in Table 9, Table 10, and Table 11 reflect yet another form of discrimination: whether lawyers have experienced a client request someone else to replace them. As demonstrated in Table 9, and similar to prior results, females are more likely to experience this form of discrimination when including the basic individual, education, and firm controls. However, when including controls for areas of law there is no difference in the level of discrimination, in this case by clients, between males and females.

Contrary to previous results, Table 10 indicates that females are no more likely than males to be discriminated against by clients when including productivity controls. Table 11 also shows that the discrimination does not exist when controlling for the gender of the mentor and the variables for the tasks of the lawyers.

### **Colleague Requests Someone Else**

Table 12, Table 13, and Table 14 include results for the next discrimination measure used as a dependent variable, a colleague requesting someone else. The results suggest that under no circumstance are females more likely to experience this form of discrimination compared to their male colleagues. This is true whether the gender dummy is included independently (Table 13), or when all other controls are included..

**Partner discount hours**

Next, in Table 15, Table 16, and Table 17, the model is tested with a measure of discrimination in the form of lawyers indicated that partners discounted the hours they billed, even though they felt they performed the work. This variable is one of the principal discrimination variables used by Azmat and Ferrer (2016) in their paper analyzing the performance gap between male and female lawyers. When controlling for discrimination, they found that discrimination is not related to gender-based performance differences.

Results in Table 15, Table 16, and Table 17 suggest otherwise. In no specification is the gender variable significantly related to having hours discounted by partners.

## **Chapter Six: Concluding Remarks**

The aim of our paper was two-fold: 1) To investigate the existence of discrimination by controlling performance, and 2) To find out the kind of discriminatory behavior effects at the workplace most significantly. In summary, this study has shown the existence of discrimination against female lawyers in the legal profession but not in all the situations. The significant discrimination against female lawyers on the issue of demeaning comments and missing assignments show that the cultural and social discrimination in the society exists everywhere. However, when it comes to clients' and colleagues' attitude towards female lawyers, there is no significant discrimination against them. In future, research should emphasise more on the discriminatory patterns rather than lump all the forms of discrimination together. As the legal profession has the most objective methods of defining performance and the survey is reliable for the measure of discrimination, we can rely on this study to comment on any other high-skilled jobs.

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## Appendix: Description of the Variables

<b>Variable Name</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Code</b>
<i>Demographic Variables:</i>		
Female	Dummy for Gender;	1 if female; 0 if Male
Age	Age of the Lawyer	Continuous variable; 30-45;
Married	Dummy for married;	1 if married; 0 if not;
White	Dummy for race;	1 if white; 0 if not;
1 child	Dummy for having a child;	1 if someone has a child; 0 if not;
2 children	Dummy for having two children;	1 if someone has two children; 0 if not;
3+ children	Dummy for having more than three children;	1 if someone has more than three children; 0 if not;
Child age<4	Dummy for having children whose age are less than 4;	1 if someone has children younger than 4; 0 if not;
Tenure	Tenure of the lawyer	Continuous variable;1-7;
Full-time	Dummy for working full-time employed;	1 if full-time employed; 0 if not;
Judicial-Clerk	Dummy for being judicial-clerk;	1 if judicial-clerk; 0 if not;
<i>Educational Variables:</i>		
Law School GPA	GPA of a lawyer during law school;	Continuous Variable;1-4;
Law School Ranking	Ranking of the law school a lawyer has been graduated;	Continuous Variable; 10-30;
<i>Firm Controls</i>		
Firm Size	The size of the firm where a lawyer is employed currently;	Continuous Variable; 3-1,251;
Solo Practitioner	Dummy for a lawyer who is working by his own;	1 if working solo; 0 if not;
Private Law firm	Dummy for a lawyer who is employed in a private law firm;	1 if working in a private law firm; 0 if not;
Federal Government	Dummy for a lawyer who is employed in a federal government;	1 if working in a federal government; 0 if not;
State or Local Government	Dummy for a lawyer who is employed in a state or local government;	1 if working in a state or local government; 0 if not;
Professional Service Firm	Dummy for a lawyer who is employed in a professional service firm;	1 if working in a professional service firm; 0 if not;

Fortune 100 Industry/Service	Dummy for a lawyer who is employed in a fortune 100 industry/service;	1 if working in a fortune 100 industry/service;
<b>Areas of Law</b>		
Antitrust	Dummy for who works as an antitrust lawyer;	1 if antitrust lawyer; 0 if not;
Bankruptcy	Dummy for who works as a bankruptcy lawyer;	1 if bankruptcy lawyer; 0 if not;
Civil and commercial litigation	Dummy for who works as a civil and commercial litigation lawyer;	1 if civil and commercial litigation lawyer; 0 if not;
Civil rights/liberties	Dummy for who works as a civil rights/liberties lawyer;	1 if civil rights/liberties lawyer; 0 if not;
Commercial law	Dummy for who works as a commercial law lawyer;	1 if commercial law lawyer; 0 if not;
Criminal law	Dummy for who works as a criminal law lawyer;	1 if criminal law lawyer; 0 if not;
Employment law – management	Dummy for who works as an employment law-management lawyer;	1 if employment law-management lawyer; 0 if not;
Employment law – unions	Dummy for who works as an employment law-unions lawyer;	1 if employment law-unions lawyer; 0 if not;
Environmental law	Dummy for who works as an environmental lawyer;	1 if environmental lawyer; 0 if not;
Family law	Dummy for who works as a family lawyer;	1 if family lawyer; 0 if not;
General corporate	Dummy for who works as a general corporate lawyer;	1 if general corporate lawyer; 0 if not;
General practice	Dummy for who works as a general practice lawyer;	1 if general practice lawyer; 0 if not;
Health law	Dummy for who works as a health lawyer;	1 if health law lawyer; 0 if not;
Immigration law	Dummy for who works as an immigration lawyer;	1 if immigration lawyer; 0 if not;
Insurance	Dummy for who works as an insurance lawyer;	1 if insurance lawyer; 0 if not;
Intellectual Property	Dummy for who works as an intellectual property lawyer;	1 if intellectual property lawyer; 0 if not;
Municipal law	Dummy for who works as a municipal law lawyer;	1 if municipal law lawyer; 0 if not;
Personal injury - defense	Dummy for who works as a personal injury- defense lawyer;	1 if personal injury- defense lawyer; 0 if not;
Personal injury – plaintiffs	Dummy for who works as a personal injury-plaintiffs lawyer;	1 if personal injury-plaintiffs lawyer; 0 if not;
Probate	Dummy for who works as a probate lawyer;	1 if probate lawyer; 0 if not;
Public utilities	Dummy for who works as a public utilities lawyer;	1 if public utilities lawyer; 0 if not;
Real estate – commercial	Dummy for who works as a real estate- commercial lawyer;	1 if real estate-commercial lawyer; 0 if not;
Real estate – personal	Dummy for who works as a real estate- personal lawyer;	1 if real estate-personal lawyer; 0 if not;
Securities	Dummy for who works as a securities lawyer;	1 if securities lawyer; 0 if not;

Tax	Dummy for who works as a tax lawyer;	1 if tax lawyer; 0 if not;
Workers compensation	Dummy for who works as a workers compensation lawyer;	1 if workers compensation lawyer; 0 if not;
<b>Performance Variables:</b>		
Hours Billed	How many hours is the respondent expected to bill during a typical year at the job?	Continuous Variable; 0.00-80.00
New Clients' Revenue	How much revenue made by the new clients generate for the firm who has been brought by the respondent?	Continuous Variable; 0.00-250,000,000.00
Partnership	Dummy for being a partner in a law firm;	1 if Partner; 0 if not
<b>Other Variables</b>		
Male Mentor	Dummy if a lawyer has a male mentor in the firm;	1 if a lawyer has male mentor; 0 if not;
Task (Keep Client Updated)	Dummy if a lawyer keeps client updated;	1 if a lawyer keeps client updated;0 if not;
Task (Formulate Strategy)	Dummy if a lawyer formulates strategy;	1 if a lawyer formulates strategy;0 if not;
Task (Traveling to Court/Clients)	Dummy if a lawyer travels to court/clients;	1 if a lawyer travels to court/clients;0 if not;
Task (Client Meeting)	Dummy if a lawyer attends client meeting;	1 if a lawyer attends client meeting; 0 if not;
<b>Discrimination Variables:</b>		
Experienced Demeaning Comments	Dummy for experiencing demeaning comments	1 if has experienced; 0 if not
Missed out Assignment	Dummy for missing desirable assignment	1 if has missed; 0 if not
Client Request Someone else	Dummy for showing client request someone else other than the respondent to handle the matter	1 if has happened; 0 if not
Colleague Request Someone else	Dummy for showing colleague request someone else other than the respondent to handle the matter	1 if has happened; 0 if not
Partner Discounted hours	Dummy for having billing difficulty because partners have discounted their actual working hours	1 if has happened; 0 if not

**Table 1: Descriptive Statistics**

	Female Lawyers			Male Lawyers			Difference (A-B)	P-value
	Obs	Mean (A)	Std. Dev.	Obs	Mean (B)	Std. Dev.		
<b>Total Earnings</b>	555	91,144	65,139	732	104,870	71,575	-13726	0.00
<b>Hours Billed (Annual)</b>	555	1,180	840	732	1,272	865	-92	0.06
<b>New Client Revenue</b>	555	24,725	67,843	732	68,722	189,473	-43997	0.00
<b>Hours Worked (Weekly)</b>	555	41	13	732	45	10.00	-4	0.00
<b>Full Time</b>	555	0.82	0.39	731	0.98	0.12	-0.17	0.00
<b>Age</b>	555	35.59	4.69	732	36.12	4.30	-0.53	0.04
<b>Married</b>	551	0.72	0.02	723	0.79	0.41	-0.07	0.01
<b>White</b>	499	0.81	0.39	664	0.86	0.34	-0.05	0.02
<b>Law School Ranking</b>	555	29.30	10.67	732	29.04	10.42	0.25	0.08
<b>Law School GPA</b>	555	3.16	0.43	732	3.12	0.42	0.04	0.67
<b>Partnership</b>	555	0.15	0.36	732	0.20	0.40	-0.06	0.01
<b>Firm Size</b>	555	200.37	329.25	732	202.66	333.14	-2.29	0.90
<b>Private law firm</b>	555	0.88	0.32	732	0.85	0.36	0.04	0.05
<b>Size of workplace&gt;100</b>	555	0.37	0.48	732	0.35	0.48	0.02	0.47
<b>Children</b>	555	0.34	1.41	732	0.75	1.65	-0.40	0.00
<b>Tenure</b>	470	4.25	2.22	617	4.33	2.22	-0.07	0.58
<b>Judicial Clerk</b>	555	0.02	0.15	732	0.01	0.12	0.01	0.29
<b>Male Mentor</b>	398	0.71	0.02	465	0.89	0.01	-0.18	0.00
<b>Task- Keep Client Updated</b>	555	0.95	0.01	555	0.97	0.01	-0.02	0.07
<b>Task- Formulate Strategy</b>	555	0.88	0.01	732	0.87	0.1	0.01	0.49
<b>Task- Travelling to Court/ Clients</b>	555	0.78	0.02	732	0.86	0.01	-0.08	0.00
<b>Task- Client Meeting</b>	555	0.90	0.012	732	0.92	0.01	-0.02	0.12

**Table 2: Descriptive Statistics**

	Female Lawyers			Male Lawyers			Difference (A-B)	P-value
	Obs	Mean (A)	Std. Dev.	Obs	Mean (B)	Std. Dev.		
<b>Experienced demeaning comments</b>	555	0.20	0.40	732	0.07	0.26	0.13	0.00
<b>Missed out on a desirable assignment</b>	555	0.12	0.33	732	0.08	0.27	0.04	0.01
<b>Client request someone else</b>	555	0.11	0.32	732	0.09	0.28	0.02	0.15
<b>Colleague or supervisor request someone else</b>	555	0.06	0.25	732	0.06	0.23	0.01	0.58
<b>Partner discounted hours (or did not give them full credit)</b>	555	0.12	0.32	732	0.11	0.32	0.01	0.76

**Table 3: Discrimination: Experience Demeaning Comments**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Female	0.132(.0195)***	0.147(0.024)***	0.147 (0.024)***	0.149(0.024)***	0.160(0.026)***
<b><u>Individual Controls</u></b>					
Age		0.004(0.0025)*	0.003 (0.003)	0.004(0.003)	0.004 (0.029)
Married		0.006(0.028)	0.003(0.028)	0.000(0.028)	0.000(0.031)
White		0.0012(0.029)	-0.001(0.030)	-0.000(0.030)	-0.015 (0.039)
1 Child		0.050(0.0387)	0.043 (0.038)	0.049(0.038)	0.058 (0.038)
2 Children		0.0259(0.038)	0.022 (0.038)	0.027 (0.038)	0.035(0.043)
3+ Children		0.035(0.043)	0.028(0.043)	0.033 (0.043)	0.036 (0.035)
Child age<4		0.003 (0.034)	0.007 (0.034)	0.003(0.034)	-0.011 (0.005)
Tenure		-0.002(0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.003(0.005)	-0.002 (0.051)
Full-time		0.006 (0.051)	0.002 (0.051)	-0.001(0.051)	-0.003 (0.092)
Judicial Clerk		0.078(0.093)	0.082(0.095)	0.081(0.095)	0.093(0.027)
<b><u>Education Controls</u></b>					
Law School GPA			0.002 (0.027)	-0.004 (0.027)	0.002 (0.027)
Law School Ranking			-0.002 (0.001)**	-0.003 (0.001)	-0.003(0.001)**
<b><u>Firm Controls</u></b>					
Firm Size				0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Solo Practitioner				0.008 (0.062)	-0.046(0.122)
Private Law firm				0.037 (0.056)	-0.024(0.118)
Federal Government State or Local Government				-0.221(0.125)*	-0.276(0.142)*
Professional Service Firm				-0.132 (0.078)*	-0.196(0.131)
Fortune 100				1.022 (1.689)	0.978(1.596)
Industry/Service				-0.102(0.068)	-0.123(0.147)
Other Business and Industry				-0.129 (0.104)	-0.189(0.133)
<b><u>Areas of Law</u></b>					
Antitrust					-0.013(0.051)
Bankruptcy					0.001(0.038)
Civil and commercial litigation					-0.013(0.023)
Civil rights/liberties					0.010(0.049)
Commercial law					0.068(0.035)*
Criminal law					0.021(0.034)
Employment law – management					0.036(0.045)
Employment law – unions					-0.101(0.040)*
Environmental law					0.037(0.052)
Family law					-0.042(0.037)
General corporate					0.083 (0.035)*
General practice					-0.034(0.038)
Health law					0.023(0.061)
Immigration law					-0.051(0.047)
Insurance					-0.051(0.041)
Intellectual Property					-0.002(0.031)

<b>Municipal law</b>					0.069(0.064)
<b>Personal injury - defense</b>					0.055(0.039)
<b>Personal injury – plaintiffs</b>					-0.005(0.035)
<b>Probate</b>					0.009(0.037)
<b>Public utilities</b>					-0.094(0.046)
<b>Real estate – commercial</b>					-0.072(0.034)
<b>Real estate – personal</b>					0.052(0.043)
<b>Securities</b>					-0.008(0.045)
<b>Tax</b>					-0.060(0.044)
<b>Workers compensation</b>					0.060(0.056)
<b>Other</b>					-0.014(0.059)

<b>Intercept</b>	0.077(0.009)	-0.125(0.114)	-0.026(0.149)	-0.050(0.155)	0.000(0.188)
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<b>Observations</b>	1287	977	977	977	977
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<b>R-squared</b>	0.0386	0.0572	0.0626	0.0769	0.1102
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p-value > 0.10, \*\* p-value > 0.05, \*\*\* p-value > 0.01

**Table 4:Discrimination: Experience Demeaning Comments-Performance**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<b>Female</b>	0.119(0.042)**	0.152 (0.032)***	0.161 (0.036)***
<b><u>Individual Controls</u></b>			
<b>Age</b>	0.000(0.000)	0.004 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)
<b>Married</b>	0.005 (0.028)	0.001(0.029)	0.002 (0.029)
<b>White</b>	-0.015 (0.031)	-0.015 (0.031)	-0.014 (0.032)
<b>1 Child</b>	0.047 (0.039)	0.058 (0.039)	0.064 (0.039)
<b>2 Children</b>	0.025 (0.040)	0.036 (0.040)	0.041 (0.040)
<b>3+ Children</b>	0.023(0.043)	0.036 (0.043)	0.039 (0.043)
<b>Child age&lt;4</b>	-0.010 (0.034)	-0.011 (0.035)	-0.016 (0.035)
<b>Tenure</b>	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.001(0.005)
<b>Full-time</b>	-0.032 (0.051)	-0.003 (0.051)	0.001 (0.051)
<b>Judicial Clerk</b>	0.102 (0.089)	0.093(0.092)	0.089 (0.092)
<b><u>Education Controls</u></b>			
<b>Law School GPA</b>	0.001 ( 0.027)	0.002 (0.027)	0.004 (0.027)
<b>Law School Ranking</b>	-0.003 (0.001)**	-0.003 (0.005)**	-0.003 (0.003)**
<b><u>Firm Controls</u></b>			
<b>Firm Size</b>	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000(0.000)
<b>Solo Practitioner</b>	-0.044 (0.116)	-0.045 (0.121)	-0.054 (0.118)
<b>Private Law firm</b>	-0.048 (0.114)	-0.023 (0.118)	-0.020 (0.115)
<b>Federal Government</b>	-0.210 (0.140)	-0.277 (0.145)*	-0.288 (0.140)
<b>State or Local Government</b>	-0.147 (0.130)	-0.195 (0.130)	-0.196 (0.127)
<b>Professional Service Firm</b>	0.943(1.581)	0.979 (1.60)	0.970 (1.625)
<b>Fortune 100 Industry/Service</b>	-0.085 (0.135)	-0.121(0.141)	-0.122(0.144)
<b>Other Business and Industry</b>	-0.108 (0.131)	-0.188 (0.134)	-0.190 (0.131)
<b><u>Areas of Law</u></b>			
<b>Antitrust</b>	-0.001 (0.038)	-0.013 (0.051)	-0.014 (0.051)
<b>Bankruptcy</b>	-0.0210 (0.023)	0.000(0.038)	-0.001 (0.037)
<b>Civil and commercial litigation</b>	0.013 (0.048)	-0.013(0.023)	-0.013 (0.023)
<b>Civil rights/liberties</b>	0.0700 (0.035)	0.012(0.049)	0.014 (0.049)
<b>Commercial law</b>	0.027 (0.034)**	0.069 (0.033)*	0.067 (0.031)*
<b>Criminal law</b>	0.028 (0.045)	0.021 (0.034)	0.024 (0.034)
<b>Employment law – management</b>	-0.105 (0.037)	0.037(0.046)	0.035 (0.045)
<b>Employment law – unions</b>	0.036 (0.051)**	-0.101 (0.043)*	-0.104 (0.043)*
<b>Environmental law</b>	-0.026 (0.037)	0.037 (0.052)	0.040 (0.052)
<b>Family law</b>	0.081 (0.035)	-0.042 (0.037)	-0.038 (0.037)
<b>General corporate</b>	-0.035 (0.038)	0.083 (0.035)*	0.084 (0.036)
<b>General practice</b>	0.016 (0.062)	-0.034 (0.039)	-0.033 (0.039)
<b>Health law</b>	-0.045(0.046)	0.023 (0.061)	0.024 (0.060)
<b>Immigration law</b>	-0.061 (0.040)	-0.052 (0.048)	-0.048 (0.048)
<b>Insurance</b>	-0.008 (0.031)	-0.051 (0.041)	-0.054 (0.042)
<b>Intellectual Property</b>	0.071 (0.061)	-0.002 (0.031)	0.002 (0.031)
<b>Municipal law</b>	0.046 (0.040)	0.071 (0.064)	0.069 (0.065)
<b>Personal injury - defense</b>	0.011(0.035)	0.055 (0.040)	0.055 (0.039)
<b>Personal injury – plaintiffs</b>	0.019(0.037)	-0.004 (0.035)	-0.001 (0.035)



<b>Probate</b>	-0.093(0.046)	0.009 (0.038)	0.011 (0.038)
<b>Public utilities</b>	-0.075(0.034)**	-0.095 (0.046)	-0.093 (0.048)*
<b>Real estate – commercial</b>	0.058(0.042)	-0.073(0.036)	-0.070(0.035)
<b>Real estate – personal</b>	-0.011(0.045)	0.053 (0.043)	0.055 (0.043)
<b>Securities</b>	-0.058(0.045)	-0.007 (0.046)	-0.007 (0.046)
<b>Tax</b>	0.055(0.056)	-0.061 (0.045)	-0.060 (0.045)
<b>Workers compensation</b>	-0.011(0.059)	0.061 (0.057)	0.058 (0.057)
<b>Other</b>	-0.01(0.059)	-0.015 (0.060)	-0.016(0.060)
<b><u>Performance Variables</u></b>			
<b>Hours billed</b>	0.000(0.001)*		
<b>Female*hours billed</b>	0.000(0.000)		
<b>New client revenue</b>		0.000(0.000)	
<b>Female*New Client Revenue</b>		0.000(0.000)	
<b>Partnership</b>			-0.038 (0.025)
<b>Female*Partnership</b>			-0.015 (0.061)
<b>Intercept</b>	0.001(0.184)*	0.003 (0.188)	-0.013 (0.186)
<b>Observations</b>	977	977	977
<b>R-squared</b>	0.1206	0.1104	0.1126

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p-value> 0.10, \*\* p-value> 0.05, \*\*\* p-value> 0.01

**Table 5: Discrimination: Experience Demeaning Comments-Male Mentor and Tasks**

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>
<b>Female</b>	0.203(0.032)***	0.157 (0.026)***
<b><u>Individual Controls</u></b>		
<b>Age</b>	0.004 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)
<b>Married</b>	0.006 (0.038)	-0.001 (0.029)
<b>White</b>	0.014 (0.042)	-0.017 (0.032)
<b>1 Child</b>	0.035 (0.047)	0.055 (0.039)
<b>2 Children</b>	0.021 (0.047)	0.031 (0.040)
<b>3+ Children</b>	-0.002 (0.050)	0.037 (0.043)
<b>Child age&lt;4</b>	0.017 (0.041)	-0.008 (0.035)
<b>Tenure</b>	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.005)
<b>Full-time</b>	0.076 (0.062)	-0.004 (0.053)
<b>Judicial Clerk</b>	0.116 (0.109)	0.094 (0.093)
<b><u>Education Controls</u></b>		
<b>Law School GPA</b>	0.005 (0.035)	-0.002 (0.027)
<b>Law School Ranking</b>	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.003 (0.001)**
<b><u>Firm Controls</u></b>		
<b>Firm Size</b>	0.000(0.000)	0.000(0.000)
<b>Solo Practitioner</b>	-0.107 (0.314)	-0.054 (0.118)
<b>Private Law firm</b>	-0.051 (0.309)	-0.027 (0.115)
<b>Federal Government</b>	-0.291 (0.386)	-0.191 (0.164)
<b>State or Local Government</b>	-0.208 (0.339)	-0.124 (0.128)
<b>Professional Service Firm</b>	0.979 (0.920)	0.972 (1.567)
<b>Fortune 100 Industry/Service</b>	-0.083 (0.397)	-0.137 (0.145)
<b><u>Areas of Law</u></b>		
<b>Antitrust</b>	-0.009 (0.073)	-0.011 (0.050)
<b>Bankruptcy</b>	0.026 (0.046)	0.001 (0.038)
<b>Civil and commercial litigation</b>	-0.030 (0.031)	-0.008 (0.024)
<b>Civil rights/liberties</b>	-0.080 (0.062)	0.007 (0.048)
<b>Commercial law</b>	0.102 (0.043)*	0.068 (0.035)*
<b>Criminal law</b>	0.032 (0.047)	0.020 (0.034)
<b>Employment law – management</b>	0.029 (0.055)	0.034 (0.046)
<b>Employment law – unions</b>	-0.060 (0.067)	-0.099 (0.040)
<b>Environmental law</b>	0.068(0.059)	0.045 (0.052)
<b>Family law</b>	0.005 (0.054)	-0.041 (0.037)
<b>General corporate</b>	0.073 (0.042)	0.075 (0.035)*
<b>General practice</b>	0.028 (0.055)	-0.035 (0.039)
<b>Health law</b>	0.031 (0.082)	0.026 (0.060)
<b>Immigration law</b>	0.015 (0.078)	-0.055 (0.047)
<b>Insurance</b>	-0.041 (0.049)	-0.046 (0.041)
<b>Intellectual Property</b>	-0.002 (0.038)	-0.004 (0.031)
<b>Municipal law</b>	0.186 (0.089)**	0.073 (0.064)
<b>Personal injury - defense</b>	0.043 (0.047)	0.054 (0.039)
<b>Personal injury – plaintiffs</b>	-0.038 (0.044)	-0.009 (0.035)

<b>Probate</b>	0.025 (0.050)	0.003 (0.038)
<b>Public utilities</b>	-0.132 (0.057)**	-0.102 (0.046)*
<b>Real estate – commercial</b>	-0.105 (0.039)	-0.081 (0.036)*
<b>Real estate – personal</b>	0.001 (0.055)	0.053 (0.043)
<b>Securities</b>	0.016 (0.055)	-0.006 (0.046)
<b>Tax</b>	-0.053 (0.050)	-0.057 (0.045)
<b>Workers compensation</b>	0.071 (0.068)	0.065 (0.057)
<b>Other</b>	0.009 (0.083)	-0.011 (0.060)
<b><i>Other Variables</i></b>		
<b>Male mentor</b>	-0.033 (0.040)	
<b>Task (Keep Client Updated)</b>		0.079 (0.053)
<b>Task (Formulate Strategy)</b>		-0.016 (0.036)
<b>Task (Traveling to Court/Clients)</b>		-0.062 (0.037)
<b>Task (Client Meeting)</b>		0.077 (0.042)*
<b>Intercept</b>	-0.153 (0.363)	-0.077 (0.188)
<b>Observations</b>	671	977
<b>R-squared</b>	0.1532	0.1168

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p-value > 0.10, \*\* p-value > 0.05, \*\*\* p-value > 0.01

**Table 6: Discrimination: Missed out Desirable Assignments**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
<b>Female</b>	0.044 (0.017)***	0.050 (0.020)**	0.047 (0.020)**	0.051 (0.020)**	0.050 (0.021)**
<b><i>Individual Controls</i></b>					
<b>Age</b>		-0.000 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
<b>Married</b>		-0.004 (0.025)	-0.006 (0.025)	-0.007 (0.025)	-0.003 (0.025)
<b>White</b>		-0.001 (0.025)	-0.004 (0.025)	-0.002(0.025)	-0.011 (0.026)
<b>1 Child</b>		0.079 (0.036)	0.074 (0.036)	0.076 (0.036)**	0.074 (0.037)
<b>2 Children</b>		0.052 (0.034)	0.047 (0.034)	0.054 (0.034)	0.054 (0.035)
<b>3+ Children</b>		0.022 (0.037)	0.016 (0.037)	0.023 (0.037)	0.025 (0.038)
<b>Child age&lt;4</b>		-0.043 (0.032)	-0.041 (0.032)	-0.047 (0.032)	-0.055 (0.033)
<b>Tenure</b>		-0.004 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)
<b>Full-time</b>		0.014 (0.040)	0.011 (0.040)	0.009 (0.039)	-0.001 (0.042)
<b>Judicial Clerk</b>		-0.047 (0.052)	-0.046 (0.053)	-0.047 (0.053)	-0.058 (0.058)
<b><i>Education Controls</i></b>					
<b>Law School GPA</b>			0.028 (0.023)	0.025(0.022)***	0.029 (0.023)
<b>Law School Ranking</b>			-0.002 (0.001)*	-0.002 (0.001)**	-0.002 (0.001)
<b><i>Firm Controls</i></b>					
<b>Firm Size</b>				0.000(0.000)	0.000(0.000)
<b>Solo Practitioner</b>				0.055 (0.073)	-0.001 (0.088)
<b>Private Law firm</b>				0.073 (0.069)	0.010 (0.086)
<b>Federal Government State or Local Government</b>				-0.090(0.136)	-0.179 (0.117)
<b>Professional Service Firm</b>				-0.018 (0.079)	-0.055 (0.094)
<b>Fortune 100 Industry/Service Other Business and Industry</b>				1.051 (0.780)	1.003 (0.703)
				0.968 (0.755)	0.917 (0.785)
				-0.024 (0.105)	-0.102 (0.102)
<b><i>Areas of Law</i></b>					
<b>Antitrust</b>					-0.059 (0.043)
<b>Bankruptcy</b>					0.003 (0.033)
<b>Civil and commercial litigation</b>					0.039 (0.021)
<b>Civil rights/liberties</b>					0.016 (0.046)
<b>Commercial law</b>					0.039 (0.031)
<b>Criminal law</b>					-0.003 (0.029)
<b>Employment law – management</b>					0.051 (0.042)
<b>Employment law – unions</b>					-0.010(0.035)**
<b>Environmental law</b>					0.042 (0.052)
<b>Family law</b>					-0.011 (0.029)
<b>General corporate</b>					0.074 (0.033)**
<b>General practice</b>					-0.004 (0.035)
<b>Health law</b>					0.114 (0.068)*
<b>Immigration law</b>					0.067 (0.062)
<b>Insurance</b>					-0.005 (0.037)
<b>Intellectual Property</b>					-0.037 (0.024)

<b>Municipal law</b>					-0.050 (0.039)
<b>Personal injury - defense</b>					0.006 (0.034)
<b>Personal injury – plaintiffs</b>					-0.014 (0.030)
<b>Probate</b>					-0.012 (0.029)
<b>Public utilities</b>					-0.027 (0.056)
<b>Real estate – commercial</b>					-0.041 (0.032)
<b>Real estate – personal</b>					0.000 (0.034)
<b>Securities</b>					0.002 (0.045)
<b>Tax</b>					0.011 (0.043)
<b>Workers compensation</b>					0.009 (0.044)
<b>Other</b>					-0.018 (0.053)
<b>Intercept</b>	0.077(0.009)***	0.064 (0.100)	0.047 (0.134)	-0.031 (0.143)	-0.033 (0.153)
<b>Observations</b>	1287	977	977	977	977
<b>R-squared</b>	0.0055	0.0169	0.0214	0.0541	0.0934

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p-value> 0.10, \*\* p-value> 0.05, \*\*\* p-value> 0.01

**Table7:Discrimination: Missed out Desirable Assignments-Performance**

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>
<b>Female</b>	-0.006 (0.32)	0.062 (0.026)**	0.072 (0.023)***
<b><u>Individual Controls</u></b>			
<b>Age</b>	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
<b>Married</b>	0.002 (0.025)	-0.003 (0.025)	-0.002 (0.025)
<b>White</b>	-0.0117853	-0.011 (0.026)	-0.010 (0.026)
<b>1 Child</b>	0.0645 (0.037)*	0.073 (0.037)	0.080 (0.037)
<b>2 Children</b>	0.0450 (0.035)	0.053 (0.035)	0.061 (0.035)
<b>3+ Children</b>	0.013 (0.039)	0.025 (0.038)	0.032 (0.038)
<b>Child age&lt;4</b>	-0.053 (0.033)	-0.055 (0.033)	-0.062 (0.033)
<b>Tenure</b>	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)
<b>Full-time</b>	-0.029 (0.043)	-0.001 (0.042)	0.006 (0.041)
<b>Judicial Clerk</b>	-0.050 (0.056)	-0.058 (0.058)	-0.065 (0.059)
<b><u>Education Controls</u></b>			
<b>Law School GPA</b>	0.029 (0.023)**	0.028 (0.023)	0.031 (0.023)
<b>Law School Ranking</b>	-0.002 (0.001)*	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)
<b><u>Firm Controls</u></b>			
<b>Firm Size</b>	0.000(0.000)*	0.000 (0.000)*	0.000 (0.000)*
<b>Solo Practitioner</b>	0.001 (0.082)	-0.002 (0.089)	-0.018 (0.089)
<b>Private Law firm</b>	-0.006 (0.080)	0.008 (0.086)	-0.004 (0.086)
<b>Federal Government</b>	-0.112 (0.110)	-0.178 (0.119)	-0.210 (0.116)
<b>State or Local Government</b>	-0.001 (0.089)	-0.058 (0.095)	-0.082 (0.095)
<b>Professional Service Firm</b>	0.982 (0.716)	1.002 (0.679)	0.995 (0.683)
<b>Fortune 100 Industry/Service</b>	0.939 (0.723)	0.915( 0.715)	0.911 (0.729)
<b>Other Business and Industry</b>	-0.020 (0.098)	-0.102 (0.103)	-0.132 (0.110)
<b><u>Areas of Law</u></b>			
<b>Antitrust</b>	-0.062 (0.044)	-0.059 (0.043)	-0.056 (0.042)
<b>Bankruptcy</b>	0.002 (0.033)	0.004 (0.033)	0.003 (0.033)
<b>Civil and commercial litigation</b>	0.033 (0.021)	0.039 (0.021)	0.040 (0.021)
<b>Civil rights/liberties</b>	0.017 (0.046)	0.014 (0.046)	0.011 (0.046)
<b>Commercial law</b>	0.040 (0.031)	0.039 (0.031)	0.035 (0.032)
<b>Criminal law</b>	-0.002 (0.030)	-0.003 (0.030)	-0.004 (0.029)
<b>Employment law – management</b>	0.043 (0.041)	0.051 (0.042)	0.050 (0.042)
<b>Employment law – unions</b>	-0.104 (0.037)***	-0.099(0.035)**	-0.103 (0.036)***
<b>Environmental law</b>	0.041 (0.051)	0.042 (0.052)	0.047 (0.052)
<b>Family law</b>	0.005 (0.029)	-0.011 (0.029)	-0.011 (0.028)
<b>General corporate</b>	0.074 (0.033)	0.073 (0.032)	0.078(0.032)**
<b>General practice</b>	-0.005 (0.034)	-0.003 (0.035)	-0.007 (0.035)
<b>Health law</b>	0.109 (0.067)	0.114 (0.068)	0.113(0.067)**
<b>Immigration law</b>	0.072 (0.061)	0.068 (0.062)	0.078 (0.062)
<b>Insurance</b>	-0.014 (0.036)	-0.006 (0.037)	-0.005 (0.037)
<b>Intellectual Property</b>	-0.042 (0.024)	-0.037 (0.024)	-0.036 (0.024)

<b>Municipal law</b>	-0.049 (0.040)	-0.051 (0.039)	-0.048 (0.039)
<b>Personal injury - defense</b>	0.001 (0.034)	0.007 (0.034)	0.010 (0.034)
<b>Personal injury – plaintiffs</b>	-0.003 (0.034)	-0.015 (0.031)	-0.010 (0.030)
<b>Probate</b>	-0.004 (0.029)	-0.011 (0.029)	-0.005 (0.029)
<b>Public utilities</b>	-0.027 (0.056)	-0.027 (0.056)	-0.015 (0.057)
<b>Real estate – commercial</b>	-0.045 (0.032)	-0.040 (0.033)	-0.043 (0.032)
<b>Real estate – personal</b>	0.004 (0.034)	-0.001 (0.034)	-0.003 (0.034)
<b>Securities</b>	0.000 (0.045)	0.000 (0.045)	-0.003 (0.045)
<b>Tax</b>	0.014 (0.043)	0.012 (0.043)	0.010 (0.043)
<b>Workers compensation</b>	0.005 (0.044)	0.009 (0.044)	0.007 (0.043)
<b>Other</b>	-0.014 (0.053)	-0.017 (0.054)	-0.025 (0.053)
<b><u>Performance Variables</u></b>			
<b>Hours billed</b>	0.000 (0.000)		
<b>Female*hours billed</b>	0.000 (0.000)**		
<b>New client revenue</b>		0.000 (0.000)	
<b>Female*New Client Revenue</b>		0.000 (0.000)	
<b>Partnership</b>			0.027 (0.031)
<b>Female*Partnership</b>			-0.125 (0.0441)**
<b>Intercept</b>	-0.021 (0.149)	-0.037 (0.153)	-0.056 (0.153)
<b>Observations</b>	977	977	977
<b>R-squared</b>	0.1047	0.094	0.1008

p-value> 0.10, \*\* p-value> 0.05, \*\*\* p-value> 0.01

**Table 8: Discrimination: Missed out Desirable Assignments-Male Mentor and Tasks**

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>
Female	0.059 (0.026)**	0.050 (0.021)**
<i><u>Individual Controls</u></i>		
Age	0.000 (0.003)	0.001 (0.002)
Married	0.005 (0.031)	-0.003 (0.025)
White	-0.021 (0.037)	-0.011 (0.026)
1 Child	0.083 (0.046)**	0.072 (0.037)*
2 Children	0.048 (0.046)	0.052 (0.035)
3+ Children	-0.005 (0.041)	0.025 (0.038)
Child age<4	-0.070 (0.042)	-0.054 (0.033)
Tenure	-0.000 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.004)
Full-time	-0.009 (0.054)	0.000 (0.044)
Judicial Clerk	-0.054 (0.068)	-0.058 (0.058)
<i><u>Education Controls</u></i>		
Law School GPA	0.055 (0.021)	0.028 (0.023)
Law School Ranking	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)
<i><u>Firm Controls</u></i>		
Firm Size	0.000 (0.000)	0.000(0.00)**
Solo Practitioner	-0.017 (0.153)	0.026 (0.069)
Private Law firm	0.009 (0.148)	0.043 (0.067)
Federal Government	-0.203 (0.341)	-0.136 (0.126)
State or Local Government	-0.072 (0.230)	-0.026 (0.083)
Professional Service Firm	1.006 (1.975)	1.037 (0.766)
Fortune 100 Industry/Service	0.962 (1.926)	0.948 (0.830)
<i><u>Areas of Law</u></i>		
Antitrust	-0.062 (0.062)	-0.057 (0.043)
Bankruptcy	-0.021 (0.039)	0.003 (0.033)
Civil and commercial litigation	0.052 (0.027)	0.040 (0.022)
Civil rights/liberties	0.001 (0.065)	0.016 (0.046)
Commercial law	0.053 (0.040)	0.038 (0.031)
Criminal law	-0.009 (0.040)	-0.005 (0.030)
Employment law – management	0.088 (0.056)	0.050 (0.042)
Employment law – unions	-0.077 (0.056)	-0.098(0.037)**
Environmental law	0.044 (0.055)	0.044 (0.052)
Family law	0.009 (0.042)	-0.012 (0.029)
General corporate	0.034 (0.034)	0.072 (0.033)
General practice	0.076 (0.057)	-0.004 (0.035)
Health law	0.107 (0.086)	0.114 (0.068)
Immigration law	0.092 (0.097)	0.065 (0.062)
Insurance	0.007 (0.045)	-0.003 (0.037)
Intellectual Property	-0.047 (0.025)	-0.039 (0.024)
Municipal law	-0.018 (0.059)	-0.049 (0.040)



<b>Personal injury - defense</b>	-0.005 (0.039)	0.005 (0.034)
<b>Personal injury – plaintiffs</b>	-0.036 (0.036)	-0.015 (0.031)
<b>Probate</b>	-0.017 (0.039)	-0.013 (0.029)
<b>Public utilities</b>	-0.060 (0.063)	-0.029 (0.056)
<b>Real estate – commercial</b>	-0.016 (0.037)	-0.042 (0.033)
<b>Real estate – personal</b>	-0.006 (0.047)	0.000 (0.034)
<b>Securities</b>	-0.009 (0.046)	0.003 (0.045)
<b>Tax</b>	0.002 (0.047)	0.014 (0.043)
<b>Workers compensation</b>	-0.010 (0.049)	0.011 (0.044)
<b>Other</b>	-0.064 (0.063)	-0.015 (0.053)
<b><u>Other Variables</u></b>		
<b>Male mentor</b>	0.019 (0.031)	
<b>Task (Keep Client Updated)</b>		-0.017(0.069)
<b>Task (Formulate Strategy)</b>		-0.014 (0.032)
<b>Task (Traveling to Court/Clients)</b>		-0.012 (0.033)
<b>Task (Client Meeting)</b>		0.038 (0.044)
<b>Intercept</b>	-0.160 (0.209)	-0.066 (0.158)
<b>Observations</b>	671	977
<b>R-squared</b>	0.1285	0.0942

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p-value> 0.10, \*\* p-value> 0.05, \*\*\* p-value> 0.01

**Table 9: Discrimination: Client Request Someone Else**

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 4</b>	<b>Model 5</b>
<b>Female</b>	0.025 (0.017)*	0.038(0.022)*	0.039 (0.022)*	0.041(0.023)*	0.033 (0.024)
<b><u>Individual Controls</u></b>					
<b>Age</b>		0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.003)
<b>Married</b>		0.019 (0.025)	0.017 (0.025)	0.013 (0.025)	0.017 (0.026)
<b>White</b>		-0.005(0.027)	-0.0044(0.027)	-0.009 (0.028)	0.003 (0.029)
<b>1 Child</b>		0.017 (0.036)	0.011 (0.036)	0.009 (0.036)	-0.002 (0.037)
<b>2 Children</b>		0.000 (0.036)	-0.001 (0.036)	-0.003 (0.036)	-0.017 (0.037)
<b>3+ Children</b>		0.028 (0.042)	0.023 (0.042)	0.024 (0.042)	0.004 (0.043)
<b>Child age&lt;4</b>		-0.005 (0.034)	-0.001 (0.034)	0.001 (0.034)	0.016 (0.035)
<b>Tenure</b>		0.006 (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)	0.008 (0.004)	0.007 (0.004)
<b>Full-time</b>		0.045 (0.038)	0.042 (0.037)	0.045 (0.037)	0.046 (0.040)
<b>Judicial Clerk</b>		-0.043 (0.052)	-0.037 (0.051)	-0.036 (0.053)	-0.051 (0.051)
<b><u>Education Controls</u></b>					
<b>Law School GPA</b>			-0.019 (0.019)	-0.008 (0.018)	0.002 (0.019)
<b>Law School Ranking</b>			-0.002 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
<b><u>Firm Controls</u></b>					
<b>Firm Size</b>				0.000 (0.000)*	0.000(0.00)*
<b>Solo Practitioner</b>				0.066 (0.0653)	0.062 (0.089)
<b>Private Law firm</b>				0.052 (0.053)	0.088 (0.081)
<b>Federal Government</b>				-0.116 (0.073)	-0.008 (0.134)
<b>State or Local Government</b>				-0.065 (0.069)	-0.011 (0.094)
<b>Professional Service Firm</b>				-0.073 (0.061)	0.004 (0.113)
<b>Fortune 100 Industry/Service</b>				0.953 (0.4000)	1.040 (0.540)
<b>Other Business and Industry</b>				-0.080 (0.072)	0.020 (0.194)
<b><u>Areas of Law</u></b>					
<b>Antitrust</b>					-0.039 (0.035)
<b>Bankruptcy</b>					0.053 (0.039)
<b>Civil and commercial litigation</b>					-0.007 (0.022)
<b>Civil rights/liberties</b>					0.027 (0.050)
<b>Commercial law</b>					-0.06(0.025)*
<b>Criminal law</b>					-0.005 (0.041)
<b>Employment law – management</b>					-0.031 (0.030)
<b>Employment law – unions</b>					-0.012 (0.089)
<b>Environmental law</b>					0.003 (0.046)
<b>Family law</b>					0.060 (0.047)
<b>General corporate</b>					0.017 (0.031)
<b>General practice</b>					0.041 (0.042)
<b>Health law</b>					-0.039 (0.037)
<b>Immigration law</b>					0.045 (0.066)
<b>Insurance</b>					-0.014 (0.037)
<b>Intellectual Property</b>					-0.023 (0.026)
<b>Municipal law</b>					0.007 (0.065)
<b>Personal injury - defense</b>					-0.024 (0.033)

<b>Personal injury – plaintiffs</b>					0.047 (0.040)
<b>Probate</b>					-0.027 (0.035)
<b>Public utilities</b>					0.010 (0.050)
<b>Real estate – commercial</b>					-0.021 (0.033)
<b>Real estate – personal</b>					0.045 (0.042)
<b>Securities</b>					-0.033 (0.035)
<b>Tax</b>					0.054 (0.048)
<b>Workers compensation</b>					0.005 (0.059)
<b>Other</b>					0.032 (0.062)
<b>Intercept</b>	0.089 (0.011)***	-0.071 (0.104)	0.066 (0.129)	-0.025 (0.131)	-0.098 (0.152)
<b>Observations</b>	1287	977	977	977	977
<b>R-squared</b>	0.0017	0.0092	0.0137	0.0314	0.0605

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p-value > 0.10, \*\* p-value > 0.05, \*\*\* p-value > 0.01

**Table 10: Discrimination: Client Request Someone Else-Performance**

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>
<b>Female</b>	0.042 (0.045)	-0.007 (0.040)	0.032 (0.026)
<b><u>Individual Controls</u></b>			
<b>Age</b>	0.001 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)
<b>Married</b>	0.018 (0.026)	0.020 (0.026)	0.016 (0.026)
<b>White</b>	0.002 (0.029)	0.000 (0.029)	0.002 (0.029)
<b>1 Child</b>	-0.005 (0.036)	-0.001 (0.037)	-0.005 (0.037)
<b>2 Children</b>	-0.020 (0.037)	-0.016 (0.037)	-0.020 (0.038)
<b>3+ Children</b>	0.000 (0.043)	0.003 (0.043)	0.002 (0.044)
<b>Child age&lt;4</b>	0.016 (0.035)	0.015 (0.036)*	0.018 (0.036)
<b>Tenure</b>	0.007 (0.004)	0.008 (0.004)	0.007 (0.004)
<b>Full-time</b>	0.040 (0.043)	0.043 (0.040)	0.044 (0.040)
<b>Judicial Clerk</b>	-0.048 (0.051)	-0.050 (0.051)	-0.049 (0.051)
<b><u>Education Controls</u></b>			
<b>Law School GPA</b>	0.001 (0.019)	0.002 (0.019)	0.000 (0.019)
<b>Law School Ranking</b>	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
<b><u>Firm Controls</u></b>			
<b>Firm Size</b>	0.000 (0.000)**	0.000 (0.000)*	0.000 (0.000)*
<b>Solo Practitioner</b>	0.061 (0.090)	0.064 (0.091)	0.067 (0.088)
<b>Private Law firm</b>	0.076 (0.082)	0.091 (0.083)	0.087 (0.080)
<b>Federal Government</b>	0.001 (0.123)	-0.011 (0.114)	-0.002 (0.139)
<b>State or Local Government</b>	-0.010 (0.096)	-0.005 (0.096)	-0.010 (0.094)
<b>Professional Service Firm</b>	-0.015 (0.100)	0.004 (0.140)	0.007 (0.120)
<b>Fortune 100 Industry/Service</b>	1.060 (0.452)**	1.041 (0.561)*	1.040(0.531)*
<b>Other Business and Industry</b>	0.032 (0.178)	0.022 (0.160)	0.022 (0.203)
<b><u>Areas of Law</u></b>			
<b>Antitrust</b>	-0.039 (0.035)	-0.041 (0.035)	-0.039 (0.035)
<b>Bankruptcy</b>	0.052 (0.039)	0.050 (0.039)	0.053 (0.039)
<b>Civil and commercial litigation</b>	-0.010 (0.022)	-0.008 (0.022)	-0.007 (0.022)
<b>Civil rights/liberties</b>	0.030 (0.050)	0.034 (0.051)	0.026 (0.051)
<b>Commercial law</b>	-0.064 (0.025)*	-0.064 (0.025)*	-0.063(0.025)*
<b>Criminal law</b>	0.000 (0.043)	-0.005 (0.042)	-0.006 (0.042)
<b>Employment law – management</b>	-0.034 (0.030)	-0.030 (0.030)	-0.031 (0.030)
<b>Employment law – unions</b>	-0.012 (0.088)	-0.014 (0.088)	-0.010 (0.089)
<b>Environmental law</b>	0.002 (0.046)	0.003 (0.046)	0.001 (0.047)
<b>Family law</b>	0.063 (0.048)	0.060 (0.046)	0.058 (0.047)
<b>General corporate</b>	0.016 (0.031)	0.020 (0.031)	0.017 (0.031)
<b>General practice</b>	0.041 (0.042)	0.039 (0.042)	0.041 (0.042)
<b>Health law</b>	-0.041 (0.037)	-0.038 (0.037)	-0.040 (0.037)
<b>Immigration law</b>	0.047 (0.067)	0.041 (0.067)	0.043 (0.068)
<b>Insurance</b>	-0.016 (0.037)	-0.012 (0.037)	-0.013 (0.037)
<b>Intellectual Property</b>	-0.026 (0.027)	-0.023 (0.026)	-0.025 (0.026)

<b>Municipal law</b>	0.008 (0.065)	0.011 (0.065)	0.007 (0.065)
<b>Personal injury - defense</b>	-0.029 (0.033)	-0.024 (0.033)	-0.025 (0.033)
<b>Personal injury – plaintiffs</b>	0.054 (0.040)	0.050 (0.040)	0.045 (0.040)
<b>Probate</b>	-0.024 (0.036)	-0.029 (0.036)	-0.027 (0.036)
<b>Public utilities</b>	0.012 (0.051)	0.010 (0.051)	0.009 (0.052)
<b>Real estate – commercial</b>	-0.021 (0.033)	-0.026 (0.033)	-0.022 (0.033)
<b>Real estate – personal</b>	0.048 (0.042)	0.048 (0.042)	0.045 (0.042)
<b>Securities</b>	-0.035 (0.035)	-0.029 (0.036)	-0.034 (0.036)
<b>Tax</b>	0.053 (0.048)	0.053 (0.049)	0.054 (0.048)
<b>Workers compensation</b>	0.004 (0.059)	0.005 (0.059)	0.006 (0.059)
<b>Other</b>	0.033 (0.063)	0.032 (0.061)	0.033 (0.062)
<b><u>Performance Variables</u></b>			
<b>Hours billed</b>	0.000 (0.000)		
<b>Female*hours billed</b>	0.000 (0.000)		
<b>New client revenue</b>		0.000 (0.000)	
<b>Female*New Client Revenue</b>		0.000 (0.000)	
<b>Partnership</b>			0.015 (0.035)
<b>Female*Partnership</b>			0.011 (0.063)
<b>Intercept</b>	-0.099 (0.154)	-0.086 (0.153)	-0.092 (0.150)
<b>Observations</b>	977	977	977
<b>R-squared</b>	0.0617	0.0666	0.061

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p-value> 0.10, \*\* p-value> 0.05, \*\*\* p-value> 0.01

Table 11: Discrimination: Client Request Someone Else-Male Mentor and Tasks

	Model 1	Model 2
Female	0.024 (0.029)	0.034 (0.024)
<i><u>Individual Controls</u></i>		
Age	0.003 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)
Married	0.019 (0.034)	0.016 (0.026)
White	-0.048 (0.044)	0.002 (0.029)
1 Child	-0.001 (0.048)	-0.002 (0.037)
2 Children	-0.025 (0.048)	-0.016 (0.037)
3+ Children	-0.007 (0.057)	0.004 (0.043)
Child age<4	0.018 (0.045)	0.015 (0.035)
Tenure	0.005 (0.006)	0.007 (0.004)
Full-time	0.032 (0.052)	0.036 (0.041)
Judicial Clerk	-0.078 (0.063)	-0.050 (0.051)
<i><u>Education Controls</u></i>		
Law School GPA	0.013 (0.023)	0.002 (0.020)
Law School Ranking	0.000 (0.001)	0.000(0.001)***
<i><u>Firm Controls</u></i>		
Firm Size	0.000 (0.000)**	0.000 (0.000)
Solo Practitioner	0.097 (0.199)	0.040 (0.065)
Private Law firm	0.010 (0.183)	0.067 (0.056)
Federal Government	-0.089 (0.204)	0.021 (0.130)
State or Local Government	-0.072 (0.198)	0.010 (0.071)
Professional Service Firm	0.003 (0.198)	-0.021 (0.074)
Fortune 100 Industry/Service	1.059 (1.063)	1.020(0.508)**
<i><u>Areas of Law</u></i>		
Antitrust	-0.033 (0.048)	-0.039 (0.035)
Bankruptcy	0.037 (0.048)	0.052 (0.039)
Civil and commercial litigation	-0.019 (0.029)	-0.011 (0.023)
Civil rights/liberties	0.056 (0.077)	0.027 (0.050)
Commercial law	-0.064 (0.031)	-0.064(0.025)*
Criminal law	-0.004 (0.058)	-0.009 (0.041)
Employment law – management	-0.009 (0.042)	-0.034 (0.030)
Employment law – unions	0.007 (0.139)	-0.014 (0.089)
Environmental law	-0.018 (0.048)	-0.001 (0.046)
Family law	0.059 (0.066)	0.060 (0.046)
General corporate	-0.009 (0.036)	0.021 (0.032)
General practice	0.104 (0.063)	0.041 (0.042)
Health law	-0.025 (0.053)	-0.038 (0.037)
Immigration law	0.035 (0.100)	0.044 (0.068)
Insurance	-0.029 (0.046)	-0.016 (0.037)
Intellectual Property	-0.033 (0.035)	-0.023 (0.026)
Municipal law	0.073 (0.095)	0.003 (0.065)

<b>Personal injury - defense</b>	-0.020 (0.045)	-0.026 (0.033)
<b>Personal injury – plaintiffs</b>	0.055 (0.057)	0.047 (0.040)
<b>Probate</b>	-0.029 (0.051)	-0.027 (0.035)
<b>Public utilities</b>	0.006 (0.062)	0.014 (0.051)
<b>Real estate – commercial</b>	-0.053 (0.035)	-0.018 (0.034)
<b>Real estate – personal</b>	0.076 (0.059)	0.044 (0.042)
<b>Securities</b>	-0.003 (0.043)	-0.034 (0.035)
<b>Tax</b>	0.017 (0.054)	0.054 (0.048)
<b>Workers compensation</b>	0.022 (0.077)	0.003 (0.059)
<b>Other</b>	0.081 (0.091)	0.027 (0.062)
<b><u>Other Variables</u></b>		
<b>Male mentor</b>	0.028 (0.034)	
<b>Task (Keep Client Updated)</b>		0.018 (0.065)
<b>Task (Formulate Strategy)</b>		-0.002 (0.040)
<b>Task (Traveling to Court/Clients)</b>		0.031 (0.029)
<b>Task (Client Meeting)</b>		0.006 (0.048)
<b>Intercept</b>	-0.163 (0.258)	-0.111 (0.141)
<b>Observations</b>	671	977
<b>R-squared</b>	0.09	0.062

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p-value> 0.10, \*\* p-value> 0.05, \*\*\* p-value> 0.01

**Table 12: Discrimination: Colleague Request New Attorney**

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 4</b>	<b>Model 5</b>
<b>Female</b>	0.008 (0.014)	0.007 (0.017)	0.005 (0.017)	0.002 (0.017)	-0.002 (0.018)
<b><u>Individual Controls</u></b>					
<b>Age</b>		0.003(0.002)*	0.003(0.002)*	0.003(0.002)*	0.005(0.002)*
<b>Married</b>		-0.009(0.021)	-0.010 (0.021)	-0.010(0.021)	-0.007 (0.002)
<b>White</b>		0.016 (0.018)	0.012 (0.018)	0.009 (0.019)	0.003 (0.019)
<b>1 Child</b>		0.031 (0.030)	0.026 (0.029)	0.028 (0.029)	0.022 (0.031)
<b>2 Children</b>		0.015 (0.028)	0.010 (0.028)	0.011 (0.028)	0.009 (0.030)
<b>3+ Children</b>		-0.006(0.030)	-0.011 (0.030)	-0.010(0.030)	-0.011 (0.032)
<b>Child age&lt;4</b>		-0.010(0.026)	-0.008 (0.026)	-0.012(0.026)	-0.016 (0.027)
<b>Tenure</b>		-0.001(0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.002(0.003)	-0.001 (0.004)
<b>Full-time</b>		0.026 (0.029)	0.024 (0.028)	0.016 (0.027)	0.012 (0.029)
<b>Judicial Clerk</b>		0.002 (0.052)	0.001 (0.053)	-0.001(0.053)	-0.006 (0.052)
<b><u>Education Controls</u></b>					
<b>Law School GPA</b>			0.028 (0.014)	0.023 (0.013)	0.024 (0.015)
<b>Law School Ranking</b>			-	-0.002	-
			0.001(0.001)*	(0.00)*	0.002(0.001)*
<b><u>Firm Controls</u></b>					
<b>Firm Size</b>				0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
<b>Solo Practitioner</b>				0.009 (0.037)	-0.035(0.075)
<b>Private Law firm</b>				0.051 (0.033)	0.004 (0.072)
<b>Federal Government</b>				-0.048	
				(0.085)	-0.010 (0.097)
<b>State or Local Government</b>				-0.003	
				(0.047)	-0.033 (0.080)
<b>Professional Service Firm</b>				0.017 (0.069)	-0.005 (0.079)
<b>Fortune 100 Industry/Service</b>				-0.038	
				(0.060)	-0.104 (0.105)
<b>Other Business and Industry</b>				0.004 (0.063)	-0.086 (0.128)
<b><u>Areas of Law</u></b>					
<b>Antitrust</b>					-
					0.048(0.028)*
<b>Bankruptcy</b>					0.028 (0.031)
<b>Civil and commercial litigation</b>					0.012 (0.018)
<b>Civil rights/liberties</b>					-0.006 (0.032)
<b>Commercial law</b>					0.002 (0.027)
<b>Criminal law</b>					0.026 (0.028)
<b>Employment law – management</b>					0.044 (0.035)
<b>Employment law – unions</b>					-0.06(0.024)*
<b>Environmental law</b>					0.002 (0.040)
<b>Family law</b>					0.015 (0.029)
<b>General corporate</b>					0.041 (0.026)
<b>General practice</b>					-0.006 (0.032)
<b>Health law</b>					0.103 (0.059)
<b>Immigration law</b>					0.016 (0.048)
<b>Insurance</b>					0.042 (0.036)
<b>Intellectual Property</b>					-0.027 (0.021)
<b>Municipal law</b>					-0.06(0.017)*



<b>Personal injury - defense</b>					0.008 (0.031)
<b>Personal injury – plaintiffs</b>					-0.023 (0.027)
<b>Probate</b>					-0.029 (0.023)
<b>Public utilities</b>					-0.028 (0.039)
<b>Real estate – commercial</b>					0.020 (0.032)
<b>Real estate – personal</b>					0.009 (0.033)
<b>Securities</b>					0.002 (0.035)
<b>Tax</b>					-0.028 (0.026)
<b>Workers compensation</b>					0.008 (0.039)
<b>Other</b>					0.000 (0.044)
<b>Intercept</b>	0.057 (0.009)***	-0.087 (0.075)	-0.108 (0.094)	-0.139 (0.094)	-0.165 (0.113)
<b>Observations</b>	1287	977	977	977	977
<b>R-squared</b>	0.0002	0.0076	0.0134	0.0199	0.0544

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p-value > 0.10, \*\* p-value > 0.05, \*\*\* p-value > 0.01

**Table 13: Discrimination: Colleague Request New Attorney-Performance**

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>
<b>Female</b>	-0.023 (0.028)	0.011 (0.024)	0.011 (0.020)
<b><i>Individual Controls</i></b>			
<b>Age</b>	0.005 (0.002)**	0.005 (0.002)*	0.005 (0.002)*
<b>Married</b>	-0.005 (0.021)	-0.008 (0.022)	-0.007 (0.022)
<b>White</b>	0.003 (0.019)	0.004 (0.019)	0.004 (0.019)
<b>1 Child</b>	0.017 (0.031)	0.022 (0.031)	0.027 (0.031)
<b>2 Children</b>	0.004 (0.030)	0.008 (0.030)	0.014 (0.030)
<b>3+ Children</b>	-0.017 (0.032)	-0.012 (0.031)	-0.007 (0.032)
<b>Child age&lt;4</b>	-0.015 (0.027)	-0.017 (0.027)	-0.021 (0.027)
<b>Tenure</b>	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)
<b>Full-time</b>	-0.001 (0.029)	0.014 (0.029)	0.017 (0.030)
<b>Judicial Clerk</b>	-0.002 (0.052)	-0.006 (0.053)	-0.010 (0.052)
<b><i>Education Controls</i></b>			
<b>Law School GPA</b>	0.023 (0.015)	0.024 (0.015)	0.026 (0.015)*
<b>Law School Ranking</b>	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)
<b><i>Firm Controls</i></b>			
<b>Firm Size</b>	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
<b>Solo Practitioner</b>	-0.034 (0.072)	-0.033 (0.075)	-0.046 (0.075)
<b>Private Law firm</b>	-0.005 (0.070)	0.006 (0.072)	-0.003 (0.072)
<b>Federal Government</b>	-0.069 (0.094)	-0.099 (0.100)	-0.120 (0.096)
<b>State or Local Government</b>	-0.009 (0.078)	-0.032 (0.080)	-0.048 (0.080)
<b>Professional Service Firm</b>	-0.018 (0.077)	-0.002 (0.078)	-0.011 (0.080)
<b>Fortune 100 Industry/Service</b>	-0.089 (0.093)	-0.099 (0.105)	-0.108 (0.114)
<b>Other Business and Industry</b>	-0.049 (0.118)	-0.082 (0.111)	-0.104 (0.143)
<b><i>Areas of Law</i></b>			
<b>Antitrust</b>	-0.049 (0.029)	-0.048 (0.028)*	-0.046 (0.028)
<b>Bankruptcy</b>	0.027 (0.032)	0.029 (0.031)	0.028 (0.031)
<b>Civil and commercial litigation</b>	0.008 (0.018)	0.011 (0.018)	0.012 (0.018)
<b>Civil rights/liberties</b>	-0.006 (0.032)	-0.007(0.032)	-0.009 (0.032)
<b>Commercial law</b>	0.003 (0.027)	0.002 (0.027)	0.000 (0.027)
<b>Criminal law</b>	0.027 (0.029)	0.025 (0.029)	0.026 (0.028)
<b>Employment law – management</b>	0.040 (0.035)	0.042 (0.035)	0.043 (0.035)
<b>Employment law – unions</b>	-0.062 (0.025)*	-0.059 (0.024)*	-0.063 (0.024)*
<b>Environmental law</b>	0.001 (0.040)	0.001 (0.040)	0.005 (0.040)
<b>Family law</b>	0.022 (0.030)	0.014 (0.029)	0.016 (0.029)
<b>General corporate</b>	0.041 (0.026)	0.040 (0.026)	0.044 (0.026)
<b>General practice</b>	-0.006 (0.032)	-0.006 (0.032)	-0.007 (0.032)
<b>Health law</b>	0.010 (0.059)	0.102 (0.059)	0.102 (0.059)*
<b>Immigration law</b>	0.018 (0.048)	0.017 (0.048)	0.023 (0.048)

<b>Insurance</b>	0.038 (0.036)	0.041 (0.036)	0.042 (0.036)
<b>Intellectual Property</b>	-0.030 (0.021)	-0.029 (0.021)	-0.026 (0.020)
<b>Municipal law</b>	-0.062 (0.017)***	-0.061 (0.017)*	-0.062 (0.017)***
<b>Personal injury - defense</b>	0.005 (0.031)	0.007 (0.031)	0.011 (0.031)
<b>Personal injury – plaintiffs</b>	-0.017 (0.027)	-0.022 (0.027)	-0.020 (0.027)
<b>Probate</b>	-0.025 (0.023)	-0.027 (0.023)	-0.025 (0.023)
<b>Public utilities</b>	-0.027 (0.039)	-0.027 (0.039)	-0.021 (0.040)
<b>Real estate – commercial</b>	0.019 (0.032)	0.021 (0.033)	0.020 (0.032)
<b>Real estate – personal</b>	0.012 (0.033)	0.009 (0.033)	0.008 (0.033)
<b>Securities</b>	0.001 (0.035)	0.002 (0.035)	-0.001 (0.035)
<b>Tax</b>	-0.026 (0.026)	-0.029 (0.026)	-0.028 (0.026)
<b>Workers compensation</b>	0.006 (0.039)	0.008 (0.039)	0.007 (0.039)
<b>Other</b>	0.001 (0.044)	-0.002 (0.044)	-0.005 (0.044)
<b><i>Performance Variables</i></b>			
<b>Hours billed</b>	0.000 (0.000)		
<b>Female*hours billed</b>	0.000 (0.000)		
<b>New client revenue</b>		0.000 (0.000)	
<b>Female*New Client Revenue</b>		0.000 (0.000)	
<b>Partnership</b>			0.009 (0.028)
<b>Female*Partnership</b>			-0.074 (0.035)**
<b>Intercept</b>	-0.160 (0.111)	-0.168 (0.113)	-0.180 (0.114)
<b>Observations</b>	977	977	977
<b>R-squared</b>	0.0584	0.057	0.0588

p-value > 0.10, \*\* p-value > 0.05, \*\*\* p-value > 0.01

**Table 14: Discrimination: Colleague Request New Attorney-Male Mentor and Tasks**

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>
Female	-0.023 (0.022)	-0.003 (0.018)
<i><b>Individual Controls</b></i>		
Age	0.004 (0.002)	0.005 (0.002)*
Married	-0.012 (0.031)	-0.007 (0.022)
White	0.006 (0.028)	0.002 (0.019)
1 Child	0.034 (0.043)	0.020 (0.032)
2 Children	0.019 (0.041)	0.007 (0.030)
3+ Children	-0.021 (0.037)	-0.011 (0.032)
Child age<4	-0.045 (0.036)	-0.015 (0.027)
Tenure	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.004)
Full-time	-0.001 (0.037)	0.009 (0.031)
Judicial Clerk	-0.010 (0.057)	-0.005 (0.052)
<i><b>Education Controls</b></i>		
Law School GPA	0.025 (0.017)	0.022 (0.015)
Law School Ranking	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)*
<i><b>Firm Controls</b></i>		
Firm Size	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Solo Practitioner	-0.014 (0.202)	-0.019 (0.057)
Private Law firm	0.016 (0.197)	0.022 (0.055)
Federal Government	-0.063 (0.220)	-0.034 (0.108)
State or Local Government	-0.012 (0.202)	0.029 (0.062)
Professional Service Firm	-0.009 (0.205)	0.011 (0.075)
Fortune 100 Industry/Service	-0.110 (0.225)	-0.091 (0.076)
<i><b>Areas of Law</b></i>		
Antitrust	-0.048 (0.041)	-0.047 (0.028)
Bankruptcy	0.003 (0.003)	0.028 (0.032)
Civil and commercial litigation	0.004 (0.022)	0.013 (0.018)
Civil rights/liberties	0.012 (0.049)	-0.008 (0.032)
Commercial law	0.017 (0.033)	0.002 (0.027)
Criminal law	0.054 (0.041)	0.024 (0.029)
Employment law – management	0.065 (0.049)	0.042 (0.035)
Employment law – unions	-0.074 (0.050)	-0.059 (0.025)*
Environmental law	0.011 (0.048)	0.005 (0.040)
Family law	0.016 (0.040)	0.015 (0.029)
General corporate	0.019 (0.029)	0.038 (0.027)
General practice	0.026 (0.051)	-0.006 (0.032)
Health law	0.103 (0.079)	0.104 (0.059)*
Immigration law	-0.021 (0.071)	0.014 (0.048)
Insurance	0.067 (0.046)	0.044 (0.036)
Intellectual Property	-0.035 (0.024)	-0.029 (0.021)
Municipal law	-0.069 (0.025)***	-0.062 (0.017)***

<b>Personal injury - defense</b>	0.012 (0.042)	0.007 (0.031)
<b>Personal injury – plaintiffs</b>	-0.063 (0.033)	-0.025 (0.027)
<b>Probate</b>	-0.012 (0.034)	-0.032 (0.023)
<b>Public utilities</b>	-0.027 (0.050)	-0.030 (0.038)
<b>Real estate – commercial</b>	0.035 (0.037)	0.017 (0.032)
<b>Real estate – personal</b>	-0.012 (0.039)	0.010 (0.033)
<b>Securities</b>	-0.014 (0.037)	0.002 (0.035)
<b>Tax</b>	-0.066 (0.021)***	-0.026 (0.027)
<b>Workers compensation</b>	0.030 (0.056)	0.010 (0.040)
<b>Other</b>	-0.026 (0.055)	0.000 (0.044)
<b><u>Other Variables</u></b>		
<b>Male mentor</b>	-0.017 (0.028)	
<b>Task (Keep Client Updated)</b>		0.035 (0.029)
<b>Task (Formulate Strategy)</b>		-0.004 (0.027)
<b>Task (Traveling to Court/Clients)</b>		-0.022 (0.028)
<b>Task (Client Meeting)</b>		0.038 (0.029)
<b>Intercept</b>	-0.104 (0.224)	-0.226 (0.105)**
<b>Observations</b>	671	977
<b>R-squared</b>	0.0762	0.0568

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p-value> 0.10, \*\* p-value> 0.05, \*\*\* p-value> 0.01

Table 15: Discrimination: Partner Discount Hours

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Female	0.006 (0.018)	0.005 (0.023)	0.004 (0.023)	-0.005 (0.023)	-0.002 (0.025)
<i><u>Individual Controls</u></i>					
Age		0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)
Married		0.047 (0.029)	0.046 (0.029)	0.039 (0.029)	0.041 (0.030)
White		-0.019 (0.029)	-0.020 (0.029)	-0.030 (0.030)	-0.047 (0.031)
1 Child		-0.048 (0.035)	-0.053 (0.035)	-0.051 (0.035)	-0.055 (0.037)
2 Children		-0.031 (0.038)	-0.035 (0.039)	-0.040 (0.039)	-0.043 (0.039)
3+ Children		-0.028 (0.043)	-0.033 (0.044)	-0.031 (0.044)	-0.037 (0.045)
Child age<4		-0.022 (0.033)	-0.019 (0.033)	-0.022 (0.034)	-0.028 (0.034)
Tenure		-0.020 (0.005)	-0.020 (0.005)	-0.021 (0.005)	-0.020 (0.005)
Full-time		0.042 (0.035)	0.040 (0.035)	0.022 (0.036)	0.012 (0.037)
Judicial Clerk		0.015 (0.083)	0.017 (0.083)	0.014 (0.081)	0.027 (0.087)
<i><u>Education Controls</u></i>					
Law School GPA			0.007 (0.024)	0.009 (0.024)	0.014 (0.024)
Law School Ranking			-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)
<i><u>Firm Controls</u></i>					
Firm Size				0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Solo Practitioner				0.036 (0.070)	0.032 (0.107)
Private Law firm				0.136 (0.064)	0.099 (0.104)
Federal Government				0.005 (0.089)	-0.037 (0.135)
State or Local Government				-0.063 (0.084)	-0.073 (0.120)
Professional Service Firm				-0.015 (0.080)	-0.091 (0.115)
Fortune 100 Industry/Service				-0.061 (0.097)	-0.116 (0.170)
Other Business and Industry				0.021 (0.128)	-0.064 (0.126)
<i><u>Areas of Law</u></i>					
Antitrust					-0.006 (0.049)
Bankruptcy					0.003 (0.038)
Civil and commercial litigation					0.039 (0.023)
Civil rights/liberties					-0.019 (0.045)
Commercial law					0.047 (0.037)
Criminal law					-0.032 (0.032)
Employment law – management					0.066 (0.046)
Employment law – unions					0.069 (0.116)
Environmental law					-0.033 (0.050)
Family law					-0.002 (0.035)
General corporate					0.070 (0.034)
General practice					-0.006 (0.039)
Health law					0.030 (0.062)
Immigration law					-0.104(0.035)*
Insurance					0.000 (0.042)
Intellectual Property					0.026 (0.036)
Municipal law					-0.031 (0.055)
Personal injury - defense					0.039 (0.044)
Personal injury – plaintiffs					0.002 (0.037)

<b>Probate</b>					-0.025 (0.034)
<b>Public utilities</b>					0.049 (0.054)
<b>Real estate – commercial</b>					0.000 (0.038)
<b>Real estate – personal</b>					-0.001 (0.041)
<b>Securities</b>					-0.018 (0.046)
<b>Tax</b>					0.048 (0.047)
<b>Workers compensation</b>					0.007 (0.050)
<b>Other</b>					-0.004 (0.060)

<b>Intercept</b>	0.113 (0.117)***	0.107 (0.110)	0.157 (0.128)	0.042 (0.139)	-0.008 (0.164)
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<b>Observations</b>	1287	977	977	977	977
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<b>R-squared</b>	0.0001	0.0291	0.0318	0.0443	0.0755
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p-value > 0.10, \*\* p-value > 0.05, \*\*\* p-value > 0.01

**Table 16:Discrimination: Partner Discount Hours-Performance**

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>
<b>Female</b>	0.050 (0.035)	0.020 (0.036)	-0.022 (0.027)
<b><u>Individual Controls</u></b>			
<b>Age</b>	0.004 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)
<b>Married</b>	0.043 (0.030)	0.040 (0.030)	0.044 (0.030)
<b>White</b>	-0.048 (0.031)	-0.046 (0.031)	-0.047 (0.032)
<b>1 Child</b>	-0.067 (0.038)	-0.054 (0.037)	-0.048 (0.037)
<b>2 Children</b>	-0.055 (0.039)	-0.043 (0.038)	-0.038 (0.039)
<b>3+ Children</b>	-0.051 (0.045)	-0.038 (0.045)	-0.036 (0.045)
<b>Child age&lt;4</b>	-0.030 (0.035)	-0.030 (0.034)	-0.032 (0.035)
<b>Tenure</b>	-0.020 (0.005)	-0.020 (0.005)	-0.018 (0.005)***
<b>Full-time</b>	-0.009 (0.038)	0.016 (0.036)	0.014 (0.037)
<b>Judicial Clerk</b>	0.037 (0.087)	0.025 (0.087)	0.024 (0.085)
<b><u>Education Controls</u></b>			
<b>Law School GPA</b>	0.009 (0.024)	0.015 (0.024)	0.017 (0.024)
<b>Law School Ranking</b>	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)
<b><u>Firm Controls</u></b>			
<b>Firm Size</b>	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
<b>Solo Practitioner</b>	0.028 (0.094)	0.036 (0.111)	0.029 (0.113)
<b>Private Law firm</b>	0.049 (0.091)	0.105 (0.107)	0.123 (0.110)
<b>Federal Government</b>	-0.013 (0.143)	-0.036 (0.144)	-0.032 (0.139)
<b>State or Local Government</b>	-0.079 (0.110)	-0.071 (0.123)	-0.047 (0.125)
<b>Professional Service Firm</b>	-0.172 (0.171)	-0.083 (0.118)	-0.102 (0.121)
<b>Fortune 100 Industry/Service</b>	-0.031 (0.243)	-0.104 (0.173)	-0.109 (0.155)
<b>Other Business and Industry</b>	-0.029 (0.114)	-0.053 (0.143)	-0.036 (0.135)
<b><u>Areas of Law</u></b>			
<b>Antitrust</b>	-0.008 (0.049)	-0.007 (0.049)	-0.012 (0.049)
<b>Bankruptcy</b>	0.000 (0.037)	0.003 (0.037)	0.000 (0.037)
<b>Civil and commercial litigation</b>	0.027 (0.023)	0.037 (0.023)	0.038 (0.023)
<b>Civil rights/liberties</b>	-0.009 (0.044)	-0.018 (0.045)	-0.007 (0.044)
<b>Commercial law</b>	0.048 (0.037)	0.045 (0.037)	0.046 (0.037)
<b>Criminal law</b>	-0.011 (0.032)	-0.034 (0.032)	-0.026 (0.032)
<b>Employment law – management</b>	0.057 (0.047)	0.061 (0.046)	0.064 (0.046)
<b>Employment law – unions</b>	0.070 (0.116)	0.071 (0.116)	0.064 (0.120)
<b>Environmental law</b>	-0.035 (0.050)	-0.035 (0.050)	-0.031 (0.050)
<b>Family law</b>	0.006 (0.035)	-0.003 (0.035)	0.007 (0.035)
<b>General corporate</b>	0.064 (0.034)	0.068 (0.034)	0.069 (0.034)
<b>General practice</b>	-0.005 (0.038)	-0.006 (0.038)	-0.002 (0.039)
<b>Health law</b>	0.020 (0.062)	0.028 (0.061)	0.034 (0.061)
<b>Immigration law</b>	-0.095 (0.036)	-0.101 (0.035)	-0.107 (0.036)
<b>Insurance</b>	-0.008 (0.042)	-0.003 (0.042)	-0.005 (0.041)
<b>Intellectual Property</b>	0.014 (0.036)	0.023 (0.036)	0.032 (0.036)



<b>Municipal law</b>	-0.028 (0.055)	-0.027 (0.054)	-0.033 (0.054)
<b>Personal injury - defense</b>	0.022 (0.044)	0.036 (0.044)	0.037 (0.044)
<b>Personal injury – plaintiffs</b>	0.034 (0.037)	0.005 (0.037)	0.006 (0.036)
<b>Probate</b>	-0.014 (0.033)	-0.022 (0.034)	-0.028 (0.034)
<b>Public utilities</b>	0.058 (0.054)	0.050 (0.054)	0.042 (0.052)
<b>Real estate – commercial</b>	0.000 (0.037)	0.002 (0.038)	0.005 (0.038)
<b>Real estate – personal</b>	0.010 (0.040)	-0.001 (0.040)	0.006 (0.041)
<b>Securities</b>	-0.024 (0.046)	-0.017 (0.046)	-0.011 (0.046)
<b>Tax</b>	0.045 (0.048)	0.045 (0.047)	0.049 (0.047)
<b>Workers compensation</b>	0.003 (0.049)	0.007 (0.050)	0.004 (0.050)
<b>Other</b>	-0.003 (0.061)	-0.009 (0.060)	-0.001 (0.062)
<b><u>Performance Variables</u></b>			
<b>Hours billed</b>	0.000 (0.000)		
<b>Female*hours billed</b>	0.000 (0.000)		
<b>New client revenue</b>		0.000 (0.000)	
<b>Female*New Client Revenue</b>		0.000 (0.000)	
<b>Partnership</b>			-0.111 (0.028)***
<b>Female*Partnership</b>			0.087 (0.055)
<b>Intercept</b>	-0.013 (0.155)	-0.012 (0.166)	-0.016 (0.169)
<b>Observations</b>	977	977	977
<b>R-squared</b>	0.0963	0.0823	0.0777

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p-value> 0.10, \*\* p-value> 0.05, \*\*\* p-value> 0.01

**Table 17: Discrimination: Partner Discount Hours- Male Mentor and Tasks**

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>
Female	0.079 (0.041)	0.060 (0.031)
<i><b>Individual Controls</b></i>		
Age	0.004 (0.004)	0.005 (0.003)
Married	0.042 (0.049)	0.034 (0.037)
White	0.032 (0.050)	0.044 (0.035)
1 Child	-0.068 (0.064)	-0.036 (0.050)
2 Children	-0.036 (0.065)	-0.023 (0.051)
3+ Children	0.013 (0.083)	0.025 (0.062)
Child age<4	0.017 (0.059)	-0.021 (0.045)
Tenure	-0.017 (0.008)	-0.012 (0.006)
Full-time	0.086 (0.065)	0.008 (0.057)
Judicial Clerk	-0.041 (0.109)	-0.041 (0.088)
<i><b>Education Controls</b></i>		
Law School GPA	-0.062 (0.042)	-0.043 (0.036)
Law School Ranking	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)
<i><b>Firm Controls</b></i>		
Firm Size	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Solo Practitioner	0.103 (0.292)	0.130 (0.085)
Private Law firm	0.226 (0.0285)	0.183 (0.078)
Federal Government	0.086 (0.373)	0.057 (0.530)
State or Local Government	0.025 (0.387)	0.032 (0.106)
Professional Service Firm	0.041 (0.392)	0.033 (0.470)
Fortune 100 Industry/Service	-0.009 (0.367)	-0.046 (0.327)
<i><b>Areas of Law</b></i>		
Antitrust	-0.143 (0.056)	-0.138 (0.052)
Bankruptcy	0.025 (0.062)	0.022 (0.049)
Civil and commercial litigation	0.017 (0.038)	0.035 (0.030)
Civil rights/liberties	-0.122 (0.069)	-0.126 (0.046)
Commercial law	0.070(0.057)	0.045 (0.046)
Criminal law	-0.005 (0.061)	0.001 (0.043)
Employment law – management	0.064 (0.068)	0.075 (0.054)
Employment law – unions	0.346 (0.174)	0.163 (0.135)
Environmental law	0.077 (0.081)	0.072 (0.071)
Family law	0.056 (0.068)	0.072 (0.048)
General corporate	0.048 (0.054)	0.038 (0.045)
General practice	0.010 (0.069)	0.011 (0.050)
Health law	0.033 (0.087)	0.042 (0.069)
Immigration law	0.148 (0.109)	0.006 (0.065)
Insurance	0.060 (0.061)	0.086 (0.051)
Intellectual Property	0.056 (0.053)	0.010 (0.042)
Municipal law	0.043 (0.108)	0.031 (0.083)

<b>Personal injury - defense</b>	-0.027 (0.059)	-0.053 (0.043)
<b>Personal injury – plaintiffs</b>	-0.062 (0.060)	-0.061 (0.042)
<b>Probate</b>	0.036 (0.062)	-0.025 (0.043)
<b>Public utilities</b>	-0.031 (0.079)	-0.021 (0.071)
<b>Real estate – commercial</b>	0.070 (0.058)	0.035 (0.050)
<b>Real estate – personal</b>	-0.004 (0.070)	0.023 (0.050)
<b>Securities</b>	-0.042 (0.069)	-0.042 (0.058)
<b>Tax</b>	0.061 (0.077)	0.108 (0.068)
<b>Workers compensation</b>	0.064 (0.079)	0.003 (0.059)
<b>Other</b>	0.102 (0.104)	0.119 (0.080)
<b><u>Other Variables</u></b>		0.041 (0.093)
<b>Male mentor</b>	-0.009 (0.048)	
<b>Task (Keep Client Updated)</b>		
<b>Task (Formulate Strategy)</b>		-0.001 (0.047)
<b>Task (Traveling to Court/Clients)</b>		-0.017 (0.044)
<b>Task (Client Meeting)</b>		0.025 (0.069)
		-0.164 (0.204)
<b>Intercept</b>	-0.144 (0.371)	-0.226 (0.105)
<b>Observations</b>	671	977
<b>R-squared</b>	0.0836	0.0677

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p-value> 0.10, \*\* p-value> 0.05, \*\*\* p-value> 0.01